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Preface
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policies of the Commission of the European Communities launches
a number ofstudies in the field of regional policy and regional planning. These studies mainly aim at providing a basis
for policy formulation internally, as well as the preparation of programmes and initiatives and a basis for analysing
the impact ofcurrent or planned activities. The most interesting or innovative of these will now be published in a series
entitled Regional Development Studies. With this series the Directorate-General hopes to stimulate discussion and
action in a wider sphere on the research results received. The publication of the studies is addressed to politicians
and decision-makers at European, regional and local level, as well as to academics and experts in the broad fields
of issues covered.
It is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public debate and promote
a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are considered important for the economic and
social cohesion of the Community and therefore for the future of Europe.
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Commission
but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying out the study.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Executive summary
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to collect information on
the dependence of the NUTS II regions of the Commu¬
nity and their vulnerability to cuts in defence spending.
This process involved the research and analysis of vast
amounts of published as well as unpublished data on
employment in defence. The study's secondary aim was
to use this information in order to provide guidance to
policy-makers.
Overview of defence expenditure
Defence policy and defence spending are facing a period
ofchange and uncertainty. Past trends are unlikely to be
a reliable guide to the future. Political changes in
Eastern and Central Europe and the former USSR, as
well as arms control agreements and voluntary unilate¬
ral defence cuts, are likely to lead to fundamental reap¬
praisals of defence policies and budgets. What is clear,
however, is that the relative importance ofdefence spen¬
ding is declining. Between the early 1970s and the late
1980s (i.e. even before the end of the cold war), defence
expenditure as a share ofGDP in the European Commu¬
nity as a whole declined from 3.7 to about 3.3 % .
Table 1.1.
Defence expenditure as share of EC GDP
(%)
1970-74
3.7
1975-79
3.6
1980-84
3.6
1985-89
3.3
Source: Sipri Yearbook, 1991 (excludes Spain for 1970-74 and 1975-79).
In 1991, current defence expenditure in the EC was ECU
148billionwhichrepresented2.3%ofGDP(and4.7%of
total government expenditure). The following tables
present real expenditure on defence and its annual
change during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Table 1.2. Total defence expenditure of the EC
Constant 1988 prices (billion ECU)
1981
115.9
1982
119.3
1983
121.4
1984
122.9
1985
123.6
1986
124.7
1987
128.7
1988
128.4
1989
128.6
1990
128.8
1991
127.0
Sources: NATO 16 countries and Sipri yearbook, 1991, 1992.
Table 1.3.
1981
1.0
1982
3.0
1983
1.8
Real growth in defence expenditure
1984
1.3
1985
0.6
1986
0.9
1987
3.3
1988
-0.3
1989
0.2
1990
0.1
<%>
1991
-1.5
Sources: Nato 16 countries and Spiri yearbook, 1991.
Real growth in defence spending stagnated in the latter
part of the 1980s and is expected to fall by about 10% by
1995 (compared with 1991) and by 25% or more by the
year 2000.
Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the three
largest defence spenders in the EC. These three respec
tively comprised 25, 24 and 21% of the total EC expen¬
diture on defence in 1990. In terms of expenditure as
a share of GDP, Greece ranks highest (defence expen¬
diture was 5.7% of GDP in 1989), followed by the Uni¬
ted Kingdom (4.2%), France (3.7%) and Portugal
(3.2%). The weighted mean of the EC during that year
was 3.3%.
During the period 1985-89 defence ministries of the EC
spent 49.2% of their defence budgets on manpower,
20.3% on equipment, 4.3% on infrastructure and
26.2% on other operating expenses. In 1989, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal and Belgium spent some 70% or
more of their budget on manpower; the Netherlands
spent 54%, Germany 51% and the United Kingdom
spent the smallest percentage 39% . The three Member
States which spent the largest proportions of their bud¬
get on equipment in 1989 were the United Kingdom
(22%), Greece (22%) and Italy (20%). France is ex¬
cluded from the EC average due to the fact that is does
not break down expenditure in the same way as the
NATO countries. In 1989, France spent 32% of its
defence budget on manpower, 27% on procurement,
26% on maintenance and 15% on research and de¬
velopment.
In addition to defence expenditure reductions within EC
Member States, there have also been reductions in arms
exports. Exports' share of defence production during
the 1980s peaked at 39 % in 1983, but has since declined
to around 5 % in 1987. This has added to the EC defence
industries' problems.
Throughout the EC, the 1990s are likely to be character¬
ized by major changes in:
(i) spending on defence equipment with implications
for the size, structure and location ofdefence indus¬
tries; and
(ii) the size and regional allocation of armed forces.
Some adjustments are predictable. Defence industries
will seek new business, reduce employment, close
plants, and seek mergers. Some firms will leave the
defence business. The ramifications of defence spend¬
ing cuts are likely to be complicated by other develop¬
ments, such as efforts to liberalize defence procurement
in the EC. It is difficult to predict how the armed forces
will respond, particulary in relation to the future
regional distribution ofmilitary bases, but it is clear that
rationalizations are already occurring (especially in
regions hosting large numbers of foreign forces, such as
Germany).
Regional dependence
This study distinguishes between defence industries and
military bases or facilities. Both have some common
features as sources of employment, but some differ¬
ences in terms of local spending power. This study found
that there were 0.68 million people directly employed in
the defence industries in the EC in 1991. This represents
0.55% of the labour force. The aggregate number of
Member States' domestic forces plus conscripts was
found to be 2.2 million (or 1.77% of the labour force).
Apart from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and
Luxembourg, most Member States of the EC have sub¬
stantial conscript forces. When foreign forces, civilians
and dependants as well as local civilians are added to the
domestic forces figure, the total is 2.3 million directly
employed by the military (or 1.87% of the labour force).
When direct employment in defence industries is added
to total military employment, the total is 3 million, or
2.41% of the EC labour force.
For the purpose of this study regional dependence is the
share of the labour force in a particular NUTS Π region
which is directly employed in defence (either defence
industries, the military or a combination of the two) . As
depicted in Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, dependence can be
calculated on a national and EC-wide basis as well. In
order to calculate defence dependence, it was first
necessary to obtain data on industrial defence employ¬
ment and employment on military bases for each NUTS
II region of the Community (however, we have excluded
the easternLóWer of Germany and the overseas depart¬
ments of France). In order to compare the relative de¬
pendence (in employment terms) of the regions, three
rankings were established; one for defence industrial
dependence (A), one for military dependence (B) and
one for total defence-related dependence (C).
Using a threshold of twice the EC average, 19 regions
were assessed to be dependent on industrial defence ac¬
tivity (Table 1.4), and 31 regions were assessed to be de¬
pendent on employment by the military (Table 1.5) . Five
regions were dependent on both (as they appear in both
rankings). When defence industrial employment was
added to military employment and the sum was com-
10
pared to total regional employment, 23 regions were
assessed to be dependent on total defence-related acti¬
vity (Table 1.6), but each of these regions also appeared
on one or the other of the previous two rankings. The
following graphs show which countries are relatively
more dependent on defence activity than others. The
first shows that France has the greatest share of defence
industrial employment relative to its labour force, while
Greece has the greatest share of military employment
(including foreigners) relative to its labour force.
The EC averages, weighted averages of the dependent
regions, and defence employment in dependent regions
are as share of total defence employment (for both
defence industrial and military employment) were cal¬
culated as well (Table 1.7).
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0.0%
Dependent regions
F
UK
EUR 12
I
Β
D
NL
GR
E
DK
Ρ
IRL
L
0.0%
Dependent regions
GR
D
F
EUR 12
UK
Β
NL
E
I
IRL
Ρ
DK
L
Figure 1.1. Defence industrial dependence
1.0 ' 2.0' 3.0% 5.0' 6.0'
Figure 1.2. Military dependence
1.0% 2.0' 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0<
Figure 1.3. Total defence-related dependence
0.0% I.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0%
Sources: EAG and CDE.
12
Table 1.4. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking A: Defence industrial dependence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
UK
UK
D
F
F
UK
I
F
F
F
F
F
I
D
UK
F
F
UK
UK
NUTS Π
(Twice EC average ->)
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine
Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
Limousin
Midi-Pyrénées
-de-France
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Oberbayern
Cornwall, Devon
Basse-Normandie
Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Employment shares
Defence
industries
only
1.10
6.40
2.78
2.74
2.51
2.36
2.35
2.16
2.08
1.98
1.88
1.86
1.76
1.65
1.60
1.55
1.47
1.43
1.26
1.18
Military
only
3.72
0.95
1.14
3.14
3.59
2.56
0.27
2.28
3.80
2.55
1.95
1.62
1.13
8.98
1.78
5.32
1.32
1.02
4.25
7.83
(%)
Total
defence-
related
4.82
7.35
3.89
5.84
6.05
4.89
2.62
4.42
5.83
4.50
3.81
3.46
2.89
10.57
3.36
6.81
2.78
2.44
5.48
8.95
Appearance in
other rankings
Β
31
8
15
(
22
10
C
n
18
16 I
23 ι
19
1
,
|'
6
12
1
20
9
Other regions profiled
23 GR Sterea Ellada
33 E Murcia 0.75 I 3.90 4.64 28
34 Β Hainaut
55 Ρ Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
Note: In addition, regions profiled include the single highest ranking NUTS Π regions in all Member States where dependence exceeds the
EC weighted average. Lisboa has also been included in view of data availability problems.
0.99
0.73
0.44
1.50
0.61
1.21
2.48
1.33
1.65
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Table 1.5. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking Β: Military dependence
1 GR
2 E
3 Ρ
4 GR
5 GR
6 GR
7 GR
8 I
9 D
10 UK
11 UK
12 D
13 D
14 E
15 UK
16 D
17 D
18 F
19 Ρ
20 D
21 UK
22 UK
23 D
24 UK
25 Β
26 UK
27 I
28 E
29 GR
30 F
31 F
42 NL
NUTS Π
(Twice EC average -»
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla*
Açores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Trier
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
North Yorkshire
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Cornwall, Devon
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Corse
Madeira*
Schleswig-Holstein
East Anglia
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Gießen
Lincolnshire
Luxembourg
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire
Valle d'Aosta
Murcia
Ipeiros
Lorraine
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Other region profiled
Utrecht
Employment shares (%)
Defence Military
industries only
only
1.10 3.72
0.00 29.88
| 0.00 22.86
1 0.00 | 11.82
0.00 1 11.27
| 0.00 10.61
i 0.07 | 10.39
I 0.05
1.65
0.07
1.18
0.00
0.08
0.08
0.58
1.55
0.09
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.50
0.18
1.26
0.00
0.00
0.56
10.06
8.98
8.72
7.83
6.25
6.01
5.87
5.63
5.32
5.08
4.80
4.61
4.60
4.54
4.34
4.25
4.10
4.10
4.01
0.36 3.98
0.00 3.95
0.75 3.90
0.03 3.90
0.09 3.85
2.08 3.80
0.36 2.97
Total
defence-
related
4.82
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
10.46
10.11
10.57
8.78
8.95
6.25
6.09
5.95
6.20
6.81
5.17
4.80
4.62
4.60
5.02
4.51
5.48
4.10
4.10
4.55
4.33
3.95
4.64
3.93
3.93
5.83
3.32
Appearance in
other rankings
A
13
19
15
18
33
8
C
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
6
10
9
13
15
17
14
12
21
;
22
20
19
Note: In addition, regions profiled include the single highest ranking NUTS II regions in all Member States where dependence exceeds the EC
weighted average.
Regions not profiled because of low absolute population (islands).
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Table 1.6. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking C: Dependence based on total defence-related employment
1 GR
2 E
3 Ρ
4 GR
5 GR
6 I
7 GR
8 GR
9 UK
10 D
11 UK
12 UK
13 UK
14 E
15 D
16 F
17 D
18 D
19 F
20 UK
21 D
22 D
23 F
NUTS Π
(Twice EC average ->)
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla
Acores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Trier
Cumbria
Cornwall, Devon
North Yorkshire
Madrid
Koblenz
Bretagne
Lüneburg
Bremen
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Schleswig-Holstein
Aquitaine
Employment shares (%)
Defence
industries
only
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.65
0.07
0.05
1.18
0.07
6.40
1.55
0.00
0.58
0.08
2.51
0.08
2.74
2.08
1.26
0.09
0.50
2.36
Military
only
3.72
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
8.98
10.39
10.06
7.83
8.72
0.95
5.32
6.25
5.63
6.01
3.59
5.87
3.14
3.80
4.25
5.08
4.54
2.56
Total
defence-
related
4.82
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
10.57
10.46
10.11
8.95
8.78
7.35
6.81
6.25
6.20
6.09
6.05
5.95
5.84
5.83
5.48
5.17
5.02
4.89
Appearance in
other rankings
A
13
19
1
15
4
3
8
18
5
Β
1
2
3
4
5
8
6
7
10
9
15
11
14
12
13
31
22
16
20
Regions not profiled because of low absolute population (islands).
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Table 1.7. Averages of defence dependence and spatial concentration (%)
Weighted averages
EC average ·
Average of dependent regions
Dependent regions' defence employment as a share of
total EC defence employment
Defence
industries
0.55
1.92
50.47
Military
1.86
5.48
34.59
Total
defence-related
2.41
6.63
28.05
1 Weighted by working population for defence industrial dependence and by working population + military for military and total defence-related
dependence. Sources: EAG and CDE.
Defence industrial employment in dependent regions
represents 50% of defence industrial employment in the
Community while military employment in dependent
regions represents 35% of total military employment in
the Community. These data imply that the defence indus¬
tries are concentrated in fewer regions than the military.
Whithin NUTS Π regions dependent on defence indus¬
tries, there are 55 NUTS ΠΙ regions (out of 103) which
have known concentrations of defence industrial acti¬
vity. These represent 11.6% ofthe population in the EC.
Likewise, there are 115 NUTS ΙΠ regions (out of 149)
with known military concentrations within militarily
dependent NUTS Π regions (home to 10.8% of the EC
population). And there are 94 NUTS III regions (out of
118) which have a concentration of activity in either the
defence industries, the military or both and are also part
of NUTS II regions which have a share of total defence-
related employment exceeding twice the EC average.
This study also attempted to identify areas of defence
concentration outside the dependent regions. The grea¬
test number of NUTS ΠΙ regions with concentrations of
military activity outside the dependent NUTS Π regions
were found to be in Germany (the greatest number in the
NUTS I regions of Bayern, Nordrhein-Westfalen and
Brandenburg). The United Kingdom had the next lar¬
gest number ofNUTS ΓΠ regions with concentrations of
military (in Scotland and Wales) . Italy was found to have
the most additional NUTS HI regions with defence
industrial activity (mostly in Centro and Lombardia).
Belgium's Vlaams Gewest region was found to contain
several NUTS HI regions with defence industrial acti¬
vity. There was no concentration of NUTS ΓΠ regions
with defence activity within a single NUTS Π region
outside the dependent regions (except in the former East
Germany which was not part of the dependence study).
A large proportion of the NUTS ΙΠ regions in which de¬
fence activity is concentrated (within dependent NUTS Π
regions) is not covered by Objective 1, 2 or 5b policy in¬
struments. Approximately 50 % ofthese NUTS ΓΠ regions,
based on each dependency ranking (A, Bor C), are not eli¬
gible for assistance. A smaller proportion of the NUTS
regions are only partially eligible, as depicted in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8. Number of NUTS III regions within dependent NUTS II regions
eligible for Objective 1, 2 or 5b assistance
Objective
1
2
5b
2 and 5b
1, 2 and 5b
Eligibility
Eligible
Totally eligible
Partially eligible
Totally eligible
Partially eligible
Partially eligible
Not eligible
Total
Defence industries
3
2
6
0
15
2
27
55
Military
27
3
8
9
8
1
59
115
Defence industries
or military1
20
4
4
5
12
2
47
94
1 NUTS III regions which are part ofa NUTS Π region with a share oftotal defence-related employment exceeding twice the Community average
and having a concentration of activity in either defence industries or the military or both. Sources: EAG, CDE and DG XVI.
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Vulnerability
In this study, the term vulnerability is used to indicate
whether employment cuts have already been announced
in a particular region, or whether cuts are probable over
the short term. The term highly vulnerable is used to
describe the former situation and vulnerable to describe
the latter. In practical terms it is impossible to forecast
future factory and base closures as announcements of
rationalizations are highly controversial at the regional
level for both the employees or military personnel made
redundant and the local economies (and perhaps neigh¬
bouring economies) in which they are employed. Based
on the definitions just described, however, Table 1.9 in¬
dicates which of the dependent regions of the Commu¬
nity are highly vulnerable or vulnerable to defence cuts
and to which area of defence these descriptions apply
(i.e. defence industries or the military).
Table 1.9. Regions vulnerable to defence cuts
Listed in order of defence industrial dependence, then military dependence
** =
UK
UK
D
F
F
UK
I
F
F
F
D
UK
F
F
UK
UK
GR
D
D
D
E
D
D
D
UK
F
Highly vulnerable (i.e. cuts in employment have been announced).
NUTS Π
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine
Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
üe de France
Oberbayern
Cornwall, Devon
Basse-Normandie
Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Sterea Ellada
Trier
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Schleswig-Holstein
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,
Lorraine
Oxfordshire
* = Vulnerable (
Vulnerability of defence cuts
Defence
industries Military
**
**
**
*
*
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
*
*
*
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
i.e. cuts ir employment are likely).
Appearance in
dependence rankings *
ABC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
23
31
15
22
10
9
12
13
14
16
17
20
26
30
11
18
16
23
19
12
20
9 1
10
15
17
14
21
22
1 These columns indicate where in the dependence rankings each region appears:
Ranking A: Defence industrial dependence,
Ranking B: Military dependence,
Ranking C: Dependence based on total defence-related employment.
Source: CDE survey.
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In the short run, defence firms are likely to adjust to
defence cuts by reducing employment; in the longer run ,
they may close plants or redistribute work between
different locations depending on the relative competi¬
tiveness of those locations. Our industry survey found
that most respondents are trying to avoid plant closures
by seeking new markets although some firms have chos¬
en to specialize in the defence business rather than to
difersify into completely new civil markets. Adjusting
to change takes time; typically an adjustment period of
up to five years is needed.
The survey confirmed that for private firms, the region¬
al implications of defence cuts will be determined by
commercial criteria. For example, plants at sites with
attractive and profitable alternative uses might be closed
and sold to other users (e.g. for housing, office or shop¬
ping developments).
Regarding the closure of military bases, regions in Ger¬
many will clearly be subject to both closures and reduc¬
tions in size. This is particularly true for regions contain¬
ing high proportions of foreign forces, many or most of
which are due to be withdrawn. Withdrawal of foreign
forces will affect both German regions and those regions
into which the forces are deployed or disbanded in their
home countries. In most EC Member States detailed in¬
formation on planned base closure is not available.
However, any information which was available has been
reviewed. Vulnerability does not necessarily mean that a
particular region will face undue hardship. For example,
certain military base closures in densely populated areas
may alleviate land and housing shortages. In addition, the
impact ofcuts themselves will depend upon the structural
characteristics of a region. Certain specialized and iso¬
lated subregions may be more adversely affected by
defence cuts as they may be deprived of the certain
stabilizing influences which come from being part of a
larger integrated economic region.
Regional impact and response
The present study estimated the indirect employment
effect of the direct employment calculated per NUTS II
region. This effect is called the multiplier effect and is
calculated as the ratio of total defence employment in¬
cluding direct and indirect defence employment to
direct defence employment. Existing studies indicate that
regional employment multipliers range from 1.75 to 2.00
for defence industries, and from 1.10 to 1.50 for military
bases. Based on these data, a hypothetical 'worst case'
scenario has been estimated for those regions where cuts
in defence activity have already been announced (i.e. the
highly vulnerable regions). This analysis puts an upper
bound on the negative effects ofdefence expenditure cut¬
backs. In the 'worst case' scenario, Cumbria faces the
possibility of losing 12.8% of its working population as
the result ofcuts in its defence industries. The second and
third most affected regions in terms of defence industrial
cuts are Essex (5.6% of the working population affected)
and Bremen (5.5%). The top three affected by military
cuts are Trier (13.1% of the working population), Hamp¬
shire, Isle of Wight (11.7%) and Koblenz (9.0%). There
is one region which is dependent on both defence indus¬
tries and the military and is highly vulnerable to cuts in
both; cuts in defence could affect 8.8% of the working
population of Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire.
In the very short term the regional impact of defence
cuts is confined to the direct losses in employment and
income; these are then amplified by multiplier effects,
but in the medium term they will tend to be counteracted
by adaptive reactions; and in the long run these adaptive
reactions may themselves be amplified by policy inter¬
vention. It is important to take into consideration the
adaptive capacity of a region in order to conduct a more
thorough analysis of the regional impact ofdefence cuts.
The factors which were used in the present study to as¬
sess regional adaptability include regional economic
structure (i.e. employment in industry as against
agriculture), dependence on older resource-based in¬
dustries, the natural rate of regional population growth,
the change in economic potential resulting from Euro¬
pean integration, unemployment, the percentage of
adolescents in education and training and infrastructure
endowment. All except the last two of these factors were
selected on the basis of a rigorous statistical analysis of
causal factors in regional 'success' between 1977 and
1988. The last two represent additional, potentially rele¬
vant indicators.
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It might seem thatunemployment would be the most ob¬
vious measure ofa regional economy's adaptive capaci¬
ty. The unemployment rate in all the defence dependent
regions combined has declined relative to the EC aver¬
age during the decade of the 1980s.
Table 1.10. Employment trends
Statistic Area 1977-81 1981-85 1988-90
Population (million) EUR 12 316.1 320.0 325.3
Dependent
1 regions
Unemployment (%) EUR 12
Dependent
regions
74.5
5.9
5.6
75.4
9.6
8.8
76.7
9.0
7.7
Source: third and fourth periodic reports and EAG/CDE (figures for
dependent regions are estimates).
However, regional unemployment rates, even averaged
over several years, reflect notjust local conditions but the
national economic climate and they also reflect local
events such as closures or investment, the effectiveness
of local policy, or processes related to patterns of spatial
restructuring (such as decentralization and European in¬
tegration). A measure of adaptive capacity should
reflect, so far as possible given the difficulties involved
in its assessment, the underlying, systematic structural
factors and abstract from aspects which are local in time
or place. Hence the use of measures other than unem¬
ployment alone.
We found significant differences among regions in their
capacity to adapt to defence cuts For example, lagging
rural regions may be less adaptable than prosperous rural
regions, and declining industrial regions and specialized
isolated subregions may be less adaptable than regions
with advanced indigenous industrial activity.
If new or adopted policy instruments are considered ap¬
propriate in the face of defence cuts, such instruments
must be flexible as the actual regions of the Community
which will be most severely affected by pending deci¬
sions are uncertain.
expenditure cuts. These include industrial and technolo¬
gy policies, social policy and training and employment.
The location or relocation of military bases in problem
areas may be an additional option, provided that this is
in line with military objectives and policies. Relocating
military bases from urban to rural areas could impose
more severe problems if the urban areas have high unem¬
ployment and low adaptive capacity and/or if the reloca¬
tion site was contamined from former defence industrial
or military occupants. Decontamination could impose
heavy costs, especially in Member States which have
strict environmental regulations (such as Germany).
Some areas not covered by existing policy instruments
are dependent on defence-related activity. Certain
subregions could face severe economic consequences as
the result of defence employment cuts, and for those
regions with low adaptive capacity the economic and so¬
cial impact of cuts could be very significant. Revisions
to the territorial eligibility for assistance under Objec¬
tives 1, 2or 5b may therefore be preferable to the develop¬
mentofnew policy instruments. The nature ofthe region¬
al policy response will depend on the degree of regional
dependence on defence activity, the vulnerability of the
region to cuts in expenditure and the economic and struc¬
tural characteristics of the region. The drafting and im¬
plementation of national programmes will also have to
take these issues into account.
Issues of conversion
One consequence of reductions in defence expenditure for
both defence industries and the military will be the conver¬
sion of some operations from defence to civilian use.
There has been an ongoing adjustment and conversion
debate characterized by a lack ofdeliberate action at the
national level in each EC Member State. Adjustment
has been left to individual companies to develop their
own corporate strategies. Whils this has led to some
differences in emphasis due to national factors a com¬
plex web of cross-national ownership is emerging.
There are several alternatives to regional policy as¬
sistance in dealing with the negative impact of defence
There is virtually no practical experience of true indus¬
trial conversion in the EC despite the many economic
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and other studies which have been commissioned to
study its potential. Diversification may ultimately be a
better stategy than conversion, initially buying in the
requisite skills and products to complement an existing
defence business. However, such a strategy requires ac¬
cess to capital to facilitate acquisitions and, with falling
defence revenues, such capital itself may be severely
limited.
With regard to the conversion of military bases, the
range ofuses to which sites could be converted include:
(i) agriculture, particularly large sites such as airfields ;
(ii) housing;
(iii) industry and commerce;
(iv) natural, such as parkland, conservation areas;
(v) mixed use, combining two or more of the above.
Examples of all these types of use are have found in the
EC (predominantly in the United Kingdom). Industry
and commercial use provides the greatest long-term
employment, both directly on the site and indirectly in
the local economy. In some cases part of the employ¬
ment is transferred from older industrial or commercial
areas, leading to a smaller net impact. The conversion
of military sites also taking agricultural land for indus¬
trial use, thus indirectly benefiting agricultural produc¬
tion. Most sites returned to agricultural use are incor¬
porated back into existing farms, with little effect on
employment.
Experience of base closures in the United States of
America shows a similar range ofuses, including indus¬
trial parks, airport, prisons, shopping centres, training
and educational facilities, local government offices,
parks and recreational facilities and medical centres.
Naval bases are unlikely to be converted into civilian
dockyards in the face ofovercapacity in shipbuilding, but
are more likely to be used for marina-type development
incorporating leisure facilities and housing, or for indus¬
trial purposes not associated with the dockyard nature of
the site. Military training grounds are the most suitable
facilities for conversion into leisure use or parks, but may
also be used for housing depending on their location.
The choice ofuse depends on both supply and demand.
Issues on the supply side are the location and nature of
the facility. On the demand side, the relative value of the
site and the planning and land-use issues will influence
potential developments. A feature of military conver¬
sion is the long time period which may elapse between
the site being vacated by the military and being deve¬
loped for an alternative use. This reflects the role of de¬
mand in the conversion process. This study suggests
that a policy of retaining land in trust for future use may
be desirable where no immediate urgent need is iden¬
tified.
1.2. Overall study methology
An essential requirement ofthis study has been the com¬
pilation of a constistent, Community-wide data set of
defence-related activity. The measure ofactivity chosen
was employment, with a distinctionbetween defence in¬
dustrial employment and military employment. Data
have therefore been collected in relation to these two
types ofemployment in all NUTS Π regions ofthe Com¬
munity, excluding the eastern Länder of Germany and
the overseas départements of France.
Defence industries
A significant problem in collecting employment data on
defence industries is the lack of current, reliable and
published data on employment in the defence industries
and their locations. There are also various definitions of
defence industries and such variety complicates interna¬
tional cmparisons. Defence industries can be defined as
those industries supplying the armed forces; or those
key national assets required to maintain a defence indus¬
trial base. For the purposes ofthe present study, we have
used a market-based definition suppliers to the armed
forces which concentrates on companies producing
equipment directly associated with military activity.
The aim has been to identify the defence component of
each company's total employment and to restrict the
data to direct (as opposed to direct and indirect) defence
employment.
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Three types of data were collected and analysed:
official data on the regional distribution of defence
expenditure;
Sipri (Stockholm International Peace Research Insti¬
tute) and other data on the regional location ofdefence
companies, compiled on the Centre for Defence
Economics' (CDE) database at York University;
general literature on defence activity, particularly
previous case studies and information on smaller
companies.
The United Kingdom, France and Germany have the lar¬
gest (as well as the greatest number of) defence industries,
followed by Italy. According to Sipri, dependence on mili¬
tary sales defence intensity at the company level is
particularly high in the United Kingdom and France.
Military bases
Military bases differ greatly in size. In addition to mili¬
tary personnel of either national of foreign origin, they
also employ civilians. The local economic impact of a
military base depends on several things:
(i) its absolute and relative size;
(ii) its purchases from the local economy;
(iii) expenditure by military and civilian personnel in
the local economy;
(iv) multiplier effects of local expenditures.
Any reduction in military activity in a locality will have
the immediate effect of reducing those expenditures
identified above.
The social and economic implications of reductions in
military manpower, however, will vary according to the
type ofpersonnel involved. Short-term and conscripted
forces may be more likely to return to their previous
place of residence, so dispersing the unemployment ef¬
fect away from the base at which they were stationed.
Military personnel stationed overseas (particularly the
large numbers ofWestern allied forces in Germany) are
likely to return home if demobilized. This also applies
to civilian personnel (e.g. US support personnel).
Data problems associated with the regional distribution
ofbases are considerable. Base locations as well as the
number of military personnel on each base are consi¬
dered to be sensitive information by most Ministries of
Defence. The methodology employed to overcome
these problems involved the analysis of:
(i) published data (including local data sources such
as telephone directories);
(ii) special studies undertaken by country defence
experts;
(iii) existing studies, particularly on the disposition of
US forces.
The figures estimated for regional employment at bases
rely on a number ofassumptions andjudgments, includ¬
ing estimation of the ratio of foreign forces to civilian
employees, and weightings for the local expenditure
propensities of different types of personnel.
The definitions and assumptions used in the preparation
ofthese data are specified in Chapters 3 and 4. Addition¬
al data at the NUTS ΠΙ level have also been collected,
where possible, in order to identify particular concen¬
trations of defence-related activity. These data include
the eastern Länder of Germany which are themselves
the subject of a separate study sponsored by the Com¬
mission of the European Communities (CEC) and
which are experiencing signficant reductions in mili¬
tary bases.
Regional dependence
Employment is considered a more reliable measure of
defence activity than output because ofthe complexities
of subcontractor relationships in the defence industries
(leading to the possibility of 'double-counting' the out¬
put of subcontractors who supply prime contractors),
and because of the unique nature of military bases. Us¬
ing employment also allows compilation of relatively
consistent data, based on direct employment only.
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The general regional distribution of defence industries
(defined in Chapter 3) and military bases across the
Community was reviewed, prior to detailed analysis of
employment at the NUTS Π level. The next step in the
analysis was to calculate defence-related employment as
a proportion of total regional employment within each
region in order to arrive at a measure of defence de¬
pendence.
Three separate measures ofdependence were made (A,
Β and C) and the NUTS II regions of the Community
were ranked accordingly. These three measures were as
follows:
Ranking A: Defence industrial employment as a propor¬
tion of the regional working population;
Ranking B: Military employment as a proportion of ag¬
gregate regional employment (regional
working population plus military man¬
power);
Ranking C: Total defence-related employment as a
proportion of aggregate regional employ¬
ment (regional working population plus
military manpower).
It should be recognized that consistent data on defence
activity at the NUTS Π level are not generally available.
A large part of the present study has therefore been con¬
cerned with the compilation of such a data set, which
has necessarily involved the use ofcertain assumptions,
and extrapolation of various other data. In particular,
weightings were established for foreign versus domestic
forces and for conscript versus professional forces.
These weightings reflect the lower importance of for¬
eign forces in local economies (because of savings and
the return of salaries to home countries) and the lower
spending power of conscripts (because of lower salary
levels).
A more detailed analysis was then conducted on those
NUTS Π regions which exhibited a dependence on
defence-related activity ofmore than twice the Commu¬
nity average based on either Ranking A or Ranking Β
(all regions exhibiting such a level ofdependence based
on Ranking C also appeared in one or both of Rankings
A and B). With certain additions and exclusions, speci¬
fied in Chapter 5, brief economic profiles were deve¬
loped for each of these regions. These are given in the
Appendix (available from the Commission on request).
Where specific cuts in either industrial employment or
employment at military bases have already been an¬
nounced, these have been identified in Section 5.5 and
the profiles. The general industrial response to expendi¬
ture cuts was assessed via a survey, the findings ofwhich
are given in the Appendix, together with evidence from
previous industrial and base conversion. Evidence of
employment multipliers in defence-related activity has
also been reviewed (in Chapter 6).
The final stage of analysis concentrated on the adaptive
capacity of the profiled regions, whereby an adaptive
'rating' was established for each region. This analysis
involved use ofa regression model, the resulting coeffi¬
cients of which were applied to relevant adaptability
variables, including unemployment, infrastructure en¬
dowment and percentage of adolescents in education
and training. Levels of defence dependence were plotted
against changes in unemployment and against adaptive
capacity. This analysis is included in the Appendix. The
implications of this analysis for regional policy are as¬
sessed in Section 6.3.
Summary
Defence policy and defence spending are facing a period
of change and uncertainty. Between the late 1970s and
late 1980s, defence expenditure as a share ofGDP in the
EC as a whole declined from 3.7 to about 3.3 % . This in¬
dicates that the relative importance ofdefence spending
has been declining. The end of the cold war has ushered
in prospects of greater medium- and long-term cuts.
Real growth in defence spending is expected to fall by
about 10% by 1995 (compared with 1991) and by 25%
or more by the year 2000. This study found that there
were about 0.68 million people directly employed in the
defence industries in 1991 and 2.3 million employed in
the military (including foreigners). Direct employment
in defence represents about 2.41% of the EC
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labour force. Cuts in defence spending will have a major
impact on this employment as well as associated in¬
direct employment.
This study set out to determine the defence dependence
of each NUTS Π region of the Community. Using a
threshold of twice the EC average, 19 regions were as¬
sessed to be dependent on industrial defence activity
and 31 regions were assessed to be dependent on em¬
ployment by the military. When defence industrial em¬
ployment was added to military employment and the
sum was compared to total regional employment, 23
regions were assessed to be dependent on total defence-
related activity, but each of these regions also appeared
on one or the other of the previous two rankings.
This study also found that a large proportion of the
NUTS ΠΙ regions in which defence activity is concen¬
trated (within dependent NUTS Π regions) is not covered
by Objective 1, 2 or 5b policy instruments. Approxi¬
mately 50% of these NUTS ΠΙ regions, based on each
dependency ranking (A, Β or C), are not eligible for as¬
sistance. A smaller proportion of the NUTS ΓΠ regions
is only partially eligible.
Vulnerability, the term used to indicate whether em¬
ployment cuts have already been announced in a partic¬
ular region, or whether cuts are probable over the short
term, was investigated via a survey of defence compa¬
nies. In practical terms it is impossible to forecast future
factory and base closures as announcements of ration¬
alizations are highly controversial at the regional level.
The survey found that most respondents are trying to
avoid plant closures by seeking new markets although
some firms have chosen to specialize in the defence bus¬
iness rather than to diversify into completely new civil
markets. Additionally, the respondents indicated that
most adjustments would take at least five years. The sur¬
vey confirmed that for private firms, the regional impli¬
cations of defence cuts will be determined by commer¬
cial criteria.
Regarding the closure of military bases, regions in the
Community (especially Germany) will be subject to
both closures and reductions in size, particularly for
regions containing high proportions of foreign forces,
many or most ofwhom are due to be withdrawn. Vulner¬
ability does not necessarily mean that a particular
region will face undue hardship as certain military base
closures in densely populated areas may alleviate land
and housing shortages. The impact of cuts themselves
will depend upon the structural characteristics of a
region, with some isolated subregions more adversely
affected by defence cuts than regions which are part of
larger integrated economies.
In assessing the regional impact of and response to
defence cuts is it essential to take into account the adap¬
tive capacity of the regions affected. The factors rele¬
vant to a measurement of adaptive capacity include
regional economic structure, dependence on older
resource-based industries, the natural rate of regional
population growth, changes in economic potential
resulting from European integration and falling trans¬
port costs, unemployment, percentage ofadolescents in
education and training, and infrastructure endowment.
The process whereby indirectjobs and income associat¬
ed with supplier companies are generated or lost are the
result of direct defence employment is known as the
multiplier effect. Multipliers vary between regions as a
result of both region-specific factors and industrial or
base-specific factors. However, a review of recent avail¬
able data indicates multipliers in the range of 1.75 to 2.00
for defence industries and LlOto 1.50 for military bases.
A hypothetical 'worst case' scenario was estimated for
each dependent region classified as highly vulnerable to
defence cuts. This estimated the possible impact of such
cuts on direct and indirect defence employment.
Any policy response to these changes requires flexibili¬
ty on two fronts; area designation (since many depen¬
dent regions and areas of concentrated defence activity
are not currently eligible for aid under structural Funds'
objectives) and policy instruments (since new issues
will be confronted that are peculiar to defence cut¬
backs). Local policy coordination will also be impor¬
tant, given the relative geographical isolation of many
defence establishments.
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The issue of the use ofdefence industries to import new
technology and skills (i.e. technology transfer) has to be
addressed. The policy challenge here is to define the
conditions and rules which would facilitate technology
transfer by other means, and to consider the competitive
implications of such a development.
Finally, the issue of land redevelopment implies the
deployment of specific skills in any new policy initia
tive. Much defence-related activity is land extensive.
It may also involve problems of land contamination
(for example from diesel fuel, toxic chemicals or
minerals, as well as from discarded ammunition or nu¬
clear-related activities). Consideration should be given
to the costs likely to be incurred in decontaminating
vacated sites, and the appropriate funding of such
costs.
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1.3. Rapport de synthèse
Objet
La présente étude a pour but de réunir des informations
sur la dépendance des régions NUTS Π de la Commu¬
nauté à l'égard des activités de défense ainsi que sur leur
vulnérabilité à la réduction des dépenses militaires.
Cette démarche a nécessité la recherche et l'analyse de
grandes quantités de données, publiées ou non, sur
l'emploi dans le secteur de la défense. L'objectif secon¬
daire de l'étude est de dégager de cette information des
éléments d'orientation pour les décideurs.
Examen des dépenses militaires
La politique de défense et les dépenses militaires traver¬
sent une période de changement et d'incertitude. Il est
peu probable que l'examen du passé fournisse des indi¬
cations sûres pour l'avenir. Les changements politiques
intervenus en Europe orientale et centrale ainsi que dans
l'ancienne Union soviétique, de même que les accords
sur le contrôle des armements et les réductions unilaté¬
rales et volontaires des dépenses militaires sont suscep
tibles de déboucher sur de profondes révisions des poli¬
tiques et des budgets militaires. Il est certain, en revan¬
che, que l'importance relative des dépenses militaires
diminue: entre le début des années 70 et la fin des
années 80 (c'ést-à-dire avant même la fin de la guerre
froide), le pourcentage des dépenses militaires par rap¬
port au PNB est passé dans la Communauté européenne
de 3,7 à environ 3,3 % .
Tableau 1.1
Pourcentage des dépenses militaires
par rapport au PNB communautaire
1970-1974
3,7
1975-1979
3,6
1980-1984
3,6
1985-1989
3,3
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1991 (à l'exclusion de l'Espagne pour
1970-1974 et 1975-1979).
En 1991, les dépenses militaires de la Communauté se
sont élevées à 148 milliards d'écus (courants) , soit 2,3 %
du PNB (et 4,7 % du total des dépenses publiques). Les
tableaux qui suivent montrent les dépenses militaires
réelles et leur évolution au cours des années 80 et au
début des années 90.
Tableau 1.2 Total des dépenses militaires de la CEE
en prix constants de 1988
(milliards à 'écus)
1981
115,9
1982
119,3
1983
121,4
1984
122,9
1985
123,6
1986
124,7
1987
128,7
1988
128,4
1989
128,6
1990
128,8
1991
127,0
Sources: OTAN 16 pays et SIPRI Yearbook, 1991, 1992.
Tableau 1.3 Croissance réelle des dépenses militaires
(%>
1981
1,0
1982
3,0
1983
1,8
1984
1,3
1985
0,6
1986
0,9
1987
3,3
1988
-0,3
1989
0,2
1990
0,1
1991
-1,5
Sources: OTAN 16 pays et SIPRI Yearbook, 1991.
La croissance réelle des dépenses militaires a stagné vers
la findes années 80, et on s'attend àunediminutiond'envi¬
ron 10 % d'ici à 1995 (par rapport à 1991) et de 25 % ou
plus d'ici à l'an 2000.
CAllemagne, la France et le Royaume-Uni sont les trois
pays de la Communautéqui consacrent le plus d'efforts au
secteur de la défense, puisqu'en 1990 ils représentaient
respectivement 25, 24 et 21 % des dépenses militaires
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globales de la Communauté européenne. En pourcen¬
tage des dépenses militaires par rapport au PNB, la
Grèce arrive en tête, avec 5,7 % du PNB consacrés à la
défense en 1989, suivie du Royaume-Uni (4,2 %), de la
France (3,7 %) et du Portugal (3,2 % ). La moyenne pon¬
dérée de la Communauté s'élevait, en 1989, à 3,3 %.
Au cours de la période 1985-1989, les ministres de la
Défense de la Communauté ont consacré 49,2 % de leur
budget militaire au personnel, 20,3 % à l'équipement,
4,3 % aux infrastructures et 26,2 % à diverses dépenses
de fonctionnement. En 1989, l'Irlande, le Luxembourg,
le Portugal et la Belgique ont consacré aux dépenses de
personnel 70 % de leur budget, voire davantage, tandis
que les Pays-Bas et l'Allemagne dépensaient respective¬
ment 54 et 51 % et que le Royaume-Uni, avec 39 %, y
consacrait le pourcentage le plus bas. Les trois États
membres qui ont consacré la plus forte proportion de
leur budget à l'équipement en 1989 ont été le Royaume-
Uni (22%), la Grèce (22%) et l'Italie (20%). La
France n'est pas incluse dans la moyenne communau¬
taire parce qu'elle ne ventile pas les dépenses de la
même façon que les pays de l'OTAN: En 1989, la France
a consacré 32 % de son budget militaire au personnel,
27 % aux achats, 26 % à l'entretien et 15 % aux études,
recherches et prototypes.
Parallèlement à la réduction des dépenses militaires
dans les États membres, il y a eu diminution des expor¬
tations d'armes. Au cours des années 80, la part des
exportations dans la production de matériels de défense
a culminé à 39 % en 1983, mais elle est tombée ensuite
à environ 5 % en 1987. Cela n'a fait qu'ajouter aux diffi¬
cultés des industries communautaires de défense.
Pour l'ensemble de la Communauté, les années 90
seront vraisemblablement caractérisées par de profonds
changements relatifs:
a) aux dépenses d'équipement militaire, avec les impli¬
cations que cela comporte en ce qui concerne la
taille, la structure et l'implantation des industries de
défense;
b) à l'importance et à l'affectation régionale des forces
armées.
Certains ajustements sont prévisibles. Les industries de
défense chercheront de nouveaux débouchés, suppri¬
meront des emplois, fermeront des usines et opéreront
des fusions. Certaines firmes abandonneront le secteur
militaire. Les ramifications de la réduction des dépen¬
ses militaires seront vraisemblablement compliquées
par d'autres évolutions, telles que les efforts de libérali¬
sation des achats de matériel de défense dans la Com¬
munauté. Il est difficile de prévoir comment les forces
armées réagiront, notamment en ce qui concerne la
future répartition régionale des bases militaires, mais,
de toute évidence, des rationalisations sont déjà en
cours (spécialement dans des régions qui, comme
l'Allemagne, hébergent des forces étrangères en grand
nombre).
Dépendance régionale
La présente étude opère une distinction entre les indus¬
tries de défense et les bases ou installations militaires.
Elles ont en commun d'être des sources d'emplois, mais
elles diffèrent par leur capacité de dépenser au niveau
local. Il ressort de la présente étude que, en 1991,
0,68 million de personnes étaient directement employées
dans les industries de défense de la Communauté. Cela
représente 0,55 % de la population active. Le total des
forces nationales des États membres, augmenté du nom¬
bre des appelés, a été chiffré à 2,2 millions (soit 1,77 %
de la population active). (A l'exception du Royaume-
Uni, de l'Irlande, du Danemark et du Luxembourg, la
plupart des États membres de la Communauté font subs¬
tantiellement appel au contingent.) Et si l'on ajoute aux
chiffres des forces nationales les forces étrangères, y
compris les civils et charges de famille, de même que
les civils locaux, on obtient un total de 2,3 millions de
personnes directement employées par les militaires
(soit 1,87 % de la population active). Si l'on ajoute à
l'emploi militaire total l'emploi direct dans les indus¬
tries de défense, on obtient un total de 3 millions, soit
2,41 % de la population active de la Communauté.
Aux fins de la présente étude, on entend par «dépen¬
dance» la part de la population active d'une région de
niveau NUTS II qui travaille directement dans les activi¬
tés de défense (qu'il s'agisse des industries de défense,
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des activités militaires ou d'une combinaison des deux).
Comme le montrent les graphiques 1.1, 1.2 et 1.3, la dé¬
pendance peut également se calculer au niveau national
et au niveau de la Communauté. Pour calculer la dépen¬
dance à l'égard de la défense, il fallait d'abord recueillir
des données sur l'emploi dans les industries de défense
et dans les bases militaires pour chaque région NUTS Π
de la Communauté (ont cependant été exclus les Länder
est-allemands ainsi que les départements français
d'outre-mer). Afin de comparer la dépendance relative
(en termes d'emplois) des régions, trois classements ont
été opérés: le premier pour la dépendance à l'égard des
industries de défense (A), le deuxième pour la dépen¬
dance militaire (B) et le troisième pour la dépendance à
l'égard de l'ensemble des activités de défense (C).
En prenant pour seuil le double de la moyenne com¬
munautaire, on a estimé que 19 régions étaient dépen¬
dantes de l'activité industrielle de défense (tableau 1.4)
et que 31 régions étaient dépendantes des emplois
militaires (tableau 1.5). Cinq régions sont doublement
dépendantes (puisqu'elles figurent dans les deux classe
ments). En additionnant les emplois dans les industries
de défense et les emplois militaires et en comparant la
somme obtenue avec les chiffres régionaux de l'emploi,
on obtient 23 régions dépendantes de l'ensemble des ac¬
tivités de défense (tableau 1.6), mais chacune de ces
régions figure également dans l'un des deux classe¬
ments précédents. Les graphiques qui suivent montrent
quels sont les pays relativement plus dépendants des ac¬
tivités de défense que les autres. Le premier montre que
la France a, par rapport à sa population active, le pour¬
centage le plus élevé d'emplois dans les industries de
défense, tandis que lá Grèce a, par rapport à sa popula¬
tion active, le pourcentage le plus élevé d'emplois
militaires (étrangers inclus).
Ont également été calculés les moyennes communau¬
taires, les moyennes pondérées des régions dépen¬
dantes ainsi que le pourcentage des emplois de défense
des régions dépendantes par rapport au total des em¬
plois de défense (emplois industriels et militaires
confondus), us font suite aux graphiques et aux
tableaux ci-après.
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Graphique 1.1. Dépendance à l'égard des industries de défense
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Graphique 1.2. Dépendance militaire
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Graphique 1.3. Dépendance à l'égard de l'ensemble des activités de défense
0.0% 1,0% 2,0% 3,0% 4,0% '5,0% 6,0% 7,0%
Sources: EAG et CDE.
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Tableau 1.4 Régions NUTS II dépendantes
Classement A: dépendance à l'égard des industries de défense
Pourcentage des emplois
1 UK
2 UK
3 D
4 F
5 F
6 UK
7 1 I
8 F
9 F
10 F
11
12
13
F
F
I
14 | D
15 UK
16 F
17 j F
18 UK
19 UK
NUTS Π
(doublement de la moyenne communautaire)
Cumhria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine
1 Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
! Limousin
Midi-Pyrénées
Île-de-France
| Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Oberhayern
Cornwall, Devon
Basse-Normandie
Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Industries
de défense
uniquement
1,10
6,40 ,
2,78
2,74
2,51
2,36 .
2,35
2,16
2,08
1,98
1,88
1,86
1,76
1,65
1,60
1,55
1,47
1,43
1,26
1,18
Militaires
uniquement
3,72
0,95
.1,14
3,14
3,59
2,56
0,27
2,28
3,80
2,55
1,95
1,62
1,13
8,89
1,78
5,32
1,32
1,02
4,25
7,83
Total des
activités
de défense
4,82
7,35
3,89
5,84
6,05
4,89
2,62
4,42
' 5,83
4,50
3,81
3,46
2,89
10,57
3,36
6,81
2,78
2,44
5,48
8,95
Apparition dans
d'autres classements
B C
11
1
31
18
16
23
19
.(
j
8 j 6
15 12
22 20
10 9
Autres régions représentées
23 GR Sterea Ellada
33 E Murcia
34 B Hainaut
55 Ρ Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
0,99
0,75
0,73
0,44
1,50
3,90
0,61
1,21
2,48
4,64
1,33
1,65
28
Les régions représentées incluent, en outre, la région NUTS Π la mieux classée de chaque État membre, dès lors que le degré de dépendance
de cette région dépasse la moyenne communautaire pondérée. Lisbonne a été incluse en raison de l'imprécision des données disponibles.
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Tableau 1.5 Régions NUTS II dépendantes
Classement B: dépendance militaire
Pourcentage des emplois
1 GR
2 E
3 P
4 GR
5 GR
6 GR
7 GR
8 I
9 D
10 UK
11 UK
12 D
13 D
14 E
15 UK
16 D
17 D
18 F
19 Ρ
20 D
21 UK
22 UK
23 D
24 UK
25 Β
26 UK
27 I
28 E
29 GR
30 F
31 F
42 NL
NUTS Π
(doublement de la moyenne communautaire)
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla*
Açores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Trier
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
North Yorkshire
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Cornwall, Devon
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Corse
Madeira*
Schleswig-Holstein
East Anglia
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Gießen
Lincolnshire
Luxembourg
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire
Valle d'Aosta
Murcia
Ipeiros
Lorraine
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Autre région représentée
Utrecht
Industries
de défense
uniquement
1,10
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,07
0,05
1,65
0,07
1,18
0,00
0,08
0,08
0,58
1,55
0,09
0,00
0,02
0,00
0,50
0,18
1,26
0,00
0,00
0,56
0,36
0,00
0,75
0,03
0,09
2,08
0,36
Militaires
uniquement
3,72
29,88
J 22,86
' 11,82
11,27
10,61
10,39
10,06
8,98
8,72
7,83
' 1
6,25
6,01
5,87
5,63
5,32
5,08
4,80
4,61
4,60
4,54
4,34
4,25
4,10
4,10
4,01
3,98
3,95
3,90
3,90
3,85
3,80
2,97
Total des
activités Apparition dans
de défense d'autres classements
4,82 A C
29,88
22,86
11,82
11,27
10,61 j
10,46
10,11
10,57
8,78
8,95
6,25
6,09
5,95
6,20
6,81
5,17
4,80
4,62
4,60
5,02
4,51
5,48
4,10
4,10
4.55
4,33
3,95
4,64
3,93
3,93
5,83
1
1
2
3
4
5
1 7
ί 8
13
.
19
6
10
9
13
15
15
18
17
14
12
21
1
)
22
20 ,
33 1
8 19
3,32
Les régions représentées incluent, en outre, la région NUTS Π la mieux classée de chaque État membre, dès lors que le degré de dépendance
de cette région dépasse la moyenne communautaire pondérée. Lisbonne a été incluse en raison de l'imprécision des données disponibles.
* Régions non représentées, l'importance de la population en valeur absolue étant trop faible (îles).
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Tableau 1 .6 Régions NUTS II dépendantes
Classement C: dépendance fondée sur l'ensemble des emplois de défense
Pourcentage des emplois
Industries Militaires Total des
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
GR
E
P
GR
GR
I
GR
GR
UK
D
UK
UK
UK
E
D
F
D
D
F
UK
D
D
F
NUTS Π
(doublement de la moyenne communautaire)
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla
Açores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Trier
Cumbria
Cornwall, Devon
North Yorkshire
Madrid
Koblenz
Bretagne
Lüneburg
Bremen
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
1 Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Schleswig-Holstein
1 Aquitaine
de défense
uniquement
1,10
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
1,65
0,07
0,05
1,18
0,07
6,40
1,55
0,00
0,58
0,08
J 2,51
0,08
2,74
2,08
1,26
1 0,09
0,50
2,36
uniquement
3,72
29,88
22,86 .
11,82
11,27
10,61
8,98
10,39
10,06
7,83
8,72 .
0,95
5,32
6,25
5,63
6,01
3,59
5,87
3,14
3,80
4,25
5,08
4,54
2,56
activités
de défense
4,82
29,88
22,86
11,82
11,27
10,61
10,57
10,46
10,11
8,95
8,78
7,35
6,81
6,25
6,20
6,09
6,05
5,95
5,84
5,83
5,48 |
5,17 ,
5,02
4,89
Apparition dans
d'autres classements
A
13
19
1
15
4
3
8
18
5
B
1
2
3
4
5
8
6
7
10
9
15
11
14
12
13
31
22
16
20
* Régions non représentées, l'importance de la population en valeur absolue étant trop faible (îles).
Tableau 1.7 Dépendance moyenne à l'égard du secteur de la défense et concentration spatiale
Moyennes pondérées
Moyenne communautaire ( *)
Moyenne des régions dépendantes
Pourcentage des emplois de défense des régions dépendantes
par rapport au total des emplois de défense de la Communauté
Industries
de défense
0,55
1,92
50,47
Bases
militaires
1,86
5,48
34,59
Ensemble des
activités de défense
2,41
6,63
28,05
Sources: EAG et CDE.(!) Pondérée de la population active pour la dépendance à l'égard des industries de défense et de la population active majorée des effectifs militaires
pour la dépendance militaire et pour la dépendance à l'égard de l'ensemble des activités de défense.
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Le nombre des emplois dans les industries de défense
des régions dépendantes représente 50 % du total des
emplois des industries de défense dans la Communauté,
tandis que les emplois militaires dans les régions dépen¬
dantes représentent 35 % du total des emplois militaires
dans la Communauté. C'est dire que les industries de
défense sont concentrées dans un plus petit nombre de
régions que les bases et les installations militaires.
A l'intérieur des régions de niveau NUTS II dépen¬
dantes des industries de défense, on compte 55 régions
de niveau NUTS III (sur 103) qui présentent des concen¬
trations connues d'activité industrielle de défense. Ces
régions représentent 11,6 % de la population de la Com¬
munauté. De même y a-t-il 115 régions NUTS III (sur
149) qui présentent des concentrations militaires con¬
nues dans les régions NUTS II militairement dépen¬
dantes (où vit 10,8 % de la population de la Com¬
munauté). Et on compte 94 régions NUTS III (sur 118)
qui présentent une concentration d'activité soit dans les
industries de défense, soit dans les activités militaires,
soit dans les deux , touten faisantpartiede régions NUTS
Π dont l'ensemble des emplois de défense dépasse en
pourcentage le double de la moyenne communautaire.
La présente étude a également tenté d'identifier les zones
de concentration des activités de défense hors des régions
dépendantes. C'est en Allemagne qu'a été relevé le plus
grand nombre de régions NUTS ΠΙ présentant des con¬
centrations d'activité militaire hors des régions NUTS
II dépendantes (le plus grand nombre ayant été observé
dans les régions NUTS I de Bavière, de Rhénanie-
du-Nord-Westphalie et du Brandebourg) . Le plus grand
nombre de régions NUTS III présentant des concentra¬
tions d'activité militaire a été observé au Royaume-Uni
(en Ecosse et au pays de Galles). L'Italie est le pays où
l'on trouve le plus de régions NUTS ΓΠ supplémentaires
ayant une activité industrielle de défense (surtout dans
le Centre et en Lombardie). En Belgique, la Flandre-
Occidentale contient plusieurs régions NUTS ΠΙ ayant
des activités industrielles de défense. Il n'y a pas une
seule région NUTS II hors des régions dépendantes (à
l'exception de l'Allemagne de l'Est, qui ne faisait pas partie
de l'étude de dépendance) dans laquelle on ait constaté
une concentration de régions NUTS ΠΙ ayant des acti¬
vités de défense.
Une forte proportion des régions NUTS ΠΙ où sont
concentrées des activités de défense (à l'intérieur de
régions NUTS II dépendantes) ne sont pas visées par
les instruments des objectifs nos 1, 2 ou 5 b). Environ
50 % des régions NUTS ΠΙ dépendantes à un titre ou à
un autre (A, B ou C) n'ont accès à aucune aide. Une
proportion relativement faible des régions NUTS ΠΙ
n'y ont que partiellement accès, comme le montre le
tableau 1.8.
Tableau 1.8 Nombre de régions NUTS III, situées dans les régions NUTS II
dépendantes, ayant accès aux aides au titre des objectifs n°s 1, 2 ou 5b)
Objectif n°
1
2
5b
2 et 5b
1, 2 et 5b
Éligibilité
oui
totale
partielle
totale
partielle
partielle
non
Total
Industries de défense
2
6
0
15
2
27
55
Activités militaires
27
3
8
9
8
1
59
115
Industries de défense ou
activités militairesi1)
20
4
4
5
12
2
47
94
Sources: EAG, CDE et DG XVI.
(!) Régions NUTS ψ, faisant partie d'une région NUTS Π, dont l'ensemble des emplois de défense dépasse en pourcentage le double de la moyenne com¬
munautaire et qui présentent une concentration d'activité soit dans les industries de défense, soit dans les activités militaires, soit dans les deux secteurs.
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Vulnérabilité
Dans laprésente étude, le terme de vulnérabilité estutilisé
pour indiquer si des suppressions d'emplois ont d'ores et
déjà été annoncées dans une région donnée ou si elles sont
probables à brève échéance. Le qualificatif très vulnéra¬
ble est utilisé pour désigner le premier cas, le qualificatif
vulnérable s'appliquant au second. Concrètement, il est
impossible deprévoir les futures fermetures d'usines et de
bases militaires, car les annonces de rationalisation sus
citent au niveau régional de vives controverses concer¬
nant aussi bien les salariés ou le personnel militaire licen¬
ciés que lés économies locales (ainsi, peut-être, que les
économies voisines) qui les emploient. Le tableau 1.9
indique néanmoins, sur la base des définitions qui vien¬
nent d'être données, les régions dépendantes qui, dans la
Communauté, sont vulnérables ou très vulnérables à la
réduction des activités de défense ainsi que le secteur des
activités de défense auquel ces qualificatifs s'appliquent
(industries de défense ou activités militaires).
Tableau 1.9 Régions vulnérables à la réduction des activités de défense
énumérées par ordre de dépendance à l'égard des industries de défense d'abord,
de dépendance militaire ensuite
' = très vulnérable (des suppressions d'emplois ont été annoncées) = vulnérable (des suppressions d'emplois sont probables)
Vulnérabilité à la réduction
des activités de défense
NUTS Π
UK
UK
D
F
F
UK
I
F
F
F
D
UK
F
F
UK
UK
GR
D
D
D
E
D
D
D
UK
F
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine \
Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
Ile-de-France
Oberbayern
Cornwall, Devon
J Basse-Normandie
| Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
j Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Sterea Ellada
Trier
ι Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Schleswig-Holstein
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire
Lorraine
Industries
de défense
**
**
**
*
*
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
Activités
militaires
**
*
*
*
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
Source: Enquête CDE.
(!) Ces colonnes indiquent le ou les classements de dépendance où chaque région figure:
classement A: dépendance à l'égard des industries de défense;
classement B: dépendance militaire;
classement C: dépendance fondée sur l'ensemble des emplois de défense.
Présence dans les classements
de dépendance (!)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
23
B
31
15
22
10
9
12
13
14
16
17
20
26
30
C
11
18
16
23-
19
12
20 ij
9 \l
10 '
15
17
14
21
22
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A brève échéance, les entreprises du secteur de la défense
s'adapteront à la réduction des activités de défense en
diminuant leurs effectifs; à plus long terme, elles seront
peut-être amenées à fermer des usines ou à redistribuer
les tâches entre leurs différents lieux d'implantation en
fonction de la compétitivité relative de ces derniers. D
ressort de l'enquête sur les industries de défense, à
laquelle il a été procédé, que la plupart des responsables
interrogés essaient d'éviter les fermetures d'usine en
cherchant de nouveaux marchés, encore que certaines
firmes aient choisi de se spécialiser dans les activités de
défense plutôt que de rechercher une diversification vers
des marchés civils entièrement nouveaux. L'adaptation
au changement demande du temps; on considère ordinai¬
rement que cela peut durer jusqu'à cinq ans.
L'enquête a confirmé que pour les entreprises privées
les implications régionales de la réduction des activités
de défense seront déterminées par des critères commer¬
ciaux. C'est ainsi que des usines situées dans des sites
se prêtant à des usages intéressants et profitables pour¬
raient être fermées et vendues à d'autres opérateurs (par
exemple pour l'aménagement de quartiers d'habita¬
tions, de bureaux ou de commerces).
En ce qui concerne les bases militaires, il est certain
que, dans certaines régions allemandes, on assistera à
la fois à des fermetures et à des réductions d'activité.
C'est vrai en particulier pour les régions hébergeant de
fortes proportions de forces étrangères, dont une partie
importante, sinon la plus grande partie, devra être reti¬
rée. Le retrait des forces étrangères touchera à la fois les
régions allemandes et celles de leurs pays d'origine où
elles seront déployées ou licenciées. Dans la plupart des
États membres de la Communauté, on ne dispose
d'aucune information précise sur les fermetures envisa¬
gées. Toutes les informations disponibles ont néan¬
moins été passées en revue. La vulnérabilité ne signifie
pas nécessairement qu'une région donnée traversera des
difficultés inacceptables. Certaines fermetures de bases
militaires dans des zones à forte densité de population
peuvent, par exemple, atténuer la pénurie de terrains et
de logements. Au demeurant, l'impact des réductions
d'activité proprement dites dépendra des caractéristi¬
ques structurelles de chaque région. Certaines sous-
régions spécialisées et isolées risquent d'être plus dure¬
ment touchées par la réduction des activités de défense
si elles se trouvent ainsi privées des effets stabilisateurs
que procure en toute hypothèse l'appartenance à une
grande région économique intégrée.
Impact régional et réponse
Il s'est agi d'évaluer les effets des emplois directs sur les
emplois indirects, calculés par région NUTS Π. Cet
effet, appelé effet multiplicateur, s'obtient par le calcul
du rapport du total des emplois de défense directs et
indirects aux emplois de défense directs. Les études
existantes indiquent que les multiplicateurs régionaux
de l'emploi s'échelonnent entre 1,75 et 2,00 pour les
industries de défense et entre 1,10 et 1,50 pour les bases
militaires. Sur la base de ces données, les conséquences
d'un scénario pessimiste ont été évaluées pour les
régions où des réductions de l'activité de défense ont
d'ores et déjà été annoncées (régions très vulnérables).
Cette analyse situe la limite supérieure des effets néga¬
tifs de la réduction des dépenses militaires. Dans le scé¬
nario pessimiste, le Cumbria risque, du fait des suppres¬
sions d'emplois dans ses industries de défense, de per¬
dre 12,8 % de sa population active totale ayant un
emploi. Les deuxième et troisième régions les plus tou¬
chées en termes de suppression d'emplois industriels de
défense sont l'Essex (5,6 % de la population active ayant
un emploi) et Brème (5,5 %). Les trois régions les plus
touchées par les suppressions d'emplois militaires sont
la région de Trêves (13,1 % de la population active ayant
un emploi), le Hampshire et l'île de Wight (11,7 %). Π
existe une région qui est dépendante à la fois des indus¬
tries de défense et des activités militaires et qui est très
vulnérable aux réductions d'activité dans les deux sec¬
teurs; la réduction des activités de défense pourrait ainsi
frapper 8,8 % de la population active de l'Avon, du Glou¬
cestershire et du Wiltshire.
A très court terme, l'impact régional de la réduction des
dépenses militaires se limite aux pertes directes
d'emplois et de revenus; ces pertes sont ensuite ampli¬
fiées par des effets multiplicateurs, mais, à moyen
terme, elles tendent à être contrées par des réactions
d'adaptation; et, à long terme, ces réactions d'adaptation
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peuvent elles-mêmes être amplifiées par une interven¬
tion spécifique. Π importe de prendre en considération
la capacité d 'adaptation d'une région si l'on veut appro¬
fondir l'analyse de l'impact régional des réductions de
dépenses militaires. Les facteurs utilisés dans la pré¬
sente étude pour évaluer l'adaptabilité régionale sont: la
structure économique régionale (c'est-à-dire le nombre
des emplois dans l'industrie par rapport à l'agriculture),
la dépendance à l'égard de vieilles industries exploitant
les ressources naturelles, le taux de reproduction de la
population régionale, l'évolution du potentiel économi¬
que résultant de l'intégration européenne, le taux de
chômage, le pourcentage d'adolescents dans les systè¬
mes d'enseignement et de formation ainsi que les dota¬
tions en infrastructures. Tous ces facteurs, à l'exception
des deux derniers, ont été sélectionnés sur la base d'une
analyse statistique rigoureuse des facteurs déterminants
de la «réussite» régionale entre 1977 et 1988. Les deux
derniers facteurs sont des indicateurs supplémentaires
éventuellement pertinents.
On pourrait penser que le chômage constitue la mesure
la plus évidente de la capacité d'adaptation de l'écono¬
mie, d'une région. Le taux de chômage de toutes les
régions dépendantes des activités militaires a diminué
par rapport à la moyenne communautaire au cours des
années 80.
Tableau 1.10 Évolution de l'emploi
Statistique Zone 1977- 1981- 1988-
géographique 1981 1985 1988
Population EUR 12 316,1 320,0 325,3
Régions
dépendantes 74,5 75,4 76,7
Taux de chômage EUR 12 5,9 9,6 9,0
Régions
dépendantes 5,6 8,8 7,7
Sources: Eurostat, troisième et quatrième rapports périodiques et
EAG-CDE (les chiffres concernant les régions dépendantes
sont des estimations).
Mais les taux de chômage régionaux, même en
moyenne pluriannuelle, sont le reflet non seulement de
la situation locale, mais aussi de la situation conjonctu¬
relle au niveau national, de même qu'ils sont la résul¬
tante d'événements locaux: fermetures d'entreprises ou
d'investissements, efficacité de la politique locale, pro¬
cessus lié à des schémas de restructuration spatiale (tels
que la décentralisation et l'intégration européenne) , etc.
La mesure de la capacité d'adaptation devrait autant que
possible, compte tenu des difficultés que comporte son
évaluation, refléter les facteurs structurels systémati¬
ques sous-jacents et faire abstraction d'aspects ponc¬
tuels dans le temps ou dans l'espace. D'où l'utilisation
d'éléments de mesure autres que le seul chômage.
Π a été constaté que la capacité d'adaptation à la réduc¬
tion des dépenses militaires différait de façon significa¬
tive d'une région à l'autre. C'est ainsi que les régions
rurales en retard peuvent être moins adaptables que des
régions rurales prospères et que des régions industriel¬
les en déclin et des sous-régions spécialisées isolées
peuvent être moins adaptables que des régions ayant une
activité industrielle de pointe.
Si des instruments d'intervention nouveaux ou acquis
sont considérés comme appropriés pour faire face à la
diminution des dépenses militaires, il faut que ces ins¬
truments soient souples, car on ignore encore quelles
sont les régions de la Communauté qui seront les plus
durement touchées par les décisions à venir.
L'apport de la politique régionale dans la lutte contre
l'impact négatif de la réduction des dépenses militaires
peut se présenter sous différents aspects: politique indus¬
trielle et technologique, politique sociale, formation et
emploi. L'implantation ou le transfert de bases militaires
dans des zones en difficulté peut constituer une option
supplémentaire, à condition que cela soit conforme aux
objectifs militaires et à la politique de défense. Le trans¬
fert de bases militaires de zones urbaines vers des zones
rurales risque de poser des problèmes si les zones urbai¬
nes ont un taux de chômage élevé et une faible capacité
d'adaptation et/ou si le site abandonné a été contaminé
par les industries de défense ou les forces militaires qui
l'occupaient. Le coût de la decontamination peut être très
élevé, surtout dans les États membres qui (comme l'Alle¬
magne) sont dotés d'une réglementation rigoureuse en
matière d'environnement.
Certaines zones qui ne sont pas visées par les instru¬
ments d'intervention existants sont dépendantes des
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activités de défense. Certaines sous-régions risquent
d'être frappées, de plein fouet par la réduction des
emplois de défense; pour les régions ayant une faible
capacité d'adaptation, l'impact économique et social
des réductions d'activité pourrait être particulièrement
lourd. C'est pourquoi il vaut peut-être mieux réviser
l'admissibilité territoriale au bénéfice des aides accor¬
dées au titre des objectifs nos 1, 2 ou 5 b) plutôt que
d'élaborer de nouveaux instruments. La nature de la
réponse donnée au niveau de la politique régionale
dépendra du degré de dépendance de la région considé¬
rée à l'égard de l'activité de défense, de sa vulnérabilité
à la réduction des dépenses ainsi que de ses caractéristi¬
ques économiques et structurelles. L'élaboration et la
mise en .uvre de programmes nationaux devront égale¬
ment prendre ces éléments en considération.
Problèmes de reconversion
L'une des conséquences de la réduction des dépenses
militaires pour les industries de défense comme pour les
activités militaires sera la reconversion de certaines ins¬
tallations militaires à un usage civil.
Le débat sur l'adaptation et la reconversion se caracté¬
rise dans tous les États membres par l'absence d'action
méthodique au niveau national. En ce qui concerne
l'adaptation, les entreprises ont dû élaborer leurs pro¬
pres stratégies. Si ce processus a entraîné des disparités
dues à des facteurs nationaux, on observe par ailleurs
l'émergence d'un tissu complexe de rapports de pro¬
priété transnationaux.
Il n'y a pratiquement pas d'exemple concret d'une véri¬
table reconversion industrielle dans la Communauté, en
dépit des nombreuses études économiques et autres qui
ont été commandées afin d'en étudier les potentialités.
En définitive, la diversification, qui consiste en l'espèce
à acquérir les compétences et les produits nécessaires
pour compléter une activité de défense existante, consti¬
tue peut-être une stratégie préférable à la reconversion.
Toutefois, une telle stratégie nécessite un accès aux
capitaux pour faciliter les acquisitions; or, la diminu¬
tion des revenus provenant des activités de défense peut
entraîner une raréfaction de ces capitaux.
En ce qui concerne la reconversion des bases militaires,
l'éventail des utilisations auxquelles les sites pourraient
être reconvertis comprend:
l'agriculture, cela valant particulièrement pour les
grandes superficies telles que les aérodromes;
le logement;
l'industrie et le commerce;
la conservation de la nature, notamment les parcs
naturels;
la combinaison de deux ou plusieurs des utilisations
susmentionnées.
Des exemples de ces types d'utilisation ont été observés
dans la Communauté (surtout au Royaume-Uni). C'est
l'utilisation industrielle et commerciale qui fournit le
plus grand nombre d'emplois à long terme, à la fois
directement sur le site et indirectement dans l'économie
locale. Dans certains cas, une partie des emplois sont
transférés d'anciennes zones industrielles ou commercia¬
les, ce qui réduit l'impact net. La reconversion de sites
militaires permet aussi d'éviter l'utilisation de terres agri¬
coles à des fins industrielles, ce qui profite indirectement
à la production agricole. La plupart des sites réaffectés
à un usage agricole sont incorporés dans des exploita¬
tions existantes, ce qui a peu d'effets sur l'emploi.
L'expérience des fermetures de bases militaires aux
États-Unis se caractérise par des utilisations assez simi¬
laires: parcs industriels, aéroports, prisons, centres
commerciaux, établissements d'enseignement et de for¬
mation, bureaux d'administration locale, parcs et instal¬
lations de loisirs ainsi que centres médicaux.
Peu susceptibles d'être reconverties en docks civils en
raison de la surcapacité des chantiers navals, les bases
navales ont plus de chance d'être utilisées pour l'aména¬
gement de ports de plaisance comportant des logements
et des installations de loisirs ou à des fins industrielles
sans rapport avec la nature portuaire des sites. Les ter¬
rains d'entraînement militaire se prêtent parfaitement à
la conversion en parcs ou en zones de loisirs, mais peu¬
vent aussi, selon leur situation, servir à la construction
de logements.
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Le choix de l'affectation dépend à la fois de l'offre et de
la demande. Du côté de l'offre, l'emplacement et la na¬
ture de l'installation sont déterminants. Du côté de la
demande, la valeur relative du site et les possibilités
d'aménagement et d'utilisation de l'espace détermine¬
ront les exploitations potentielles. L'une des caractéris¬
tiques de la reconversion des bases militaires est le délai
très long qui peut s'écouler entre l'évacuation du site par
les militaires et son aménagement pour un autre usage.
Cela reflète bien le rôle de la demande dans le processus
de reconversion. Π ressort de l'étude qu'il peut être sou¬
haitable de conserver des terrains en fiducie lorsqu'au-
cun besoin immédiat n'est perçu.
1.4. Méthodologie générale de l'étude
La présente étude a nécessité la compilation d'un im¬
portant volume de données sur l'activité de défense qui
soient cohérentes à l'échelle de la Communauté. Les
données relatives à l'emploi ont servi d'unité de mesure
de cette activité, une distinction étant opérée entre les
emplois dans les industries de défense et les emplois
militaires. Des données ont donc été recueillies pour ces
deux sortes d'emplois dans toutes les régions de niveau
NUTS Π de la Communauté, à l'exclusion des Länder
est-allemands et des départements français d'outre-mer.
Industries de défense
La collecte de données sur l'emploi dans les industries
de défense est rendue difficile par l'absence de données
courantes, fiables etpubliées sur les emplois dans les in¬
dustries de défense et sur leurs implantations. Π existe
plusieurs définitions des industries de défense, ce qui
complique les comparaisons entre pays. Les industries
de défense sont définies tantôt comme étant celles qui
fournissent les forces armées, tantôt comme étant les ac¬
tifs nationaux essentiels pour maintenir une assise in¬
dustrielle en matière de défense. La définition retenue
aux fins de la présente étude les fournisseurs des
forces armées est une définition rattachée au marché,
qui englobe les entreprises produisant des équipements
directement associés aux activités militaires. Le but
était d'identifier la composante «activité de défense» de
l'effectif total de chaque entreprise et de limiter les don
nées aux emplois de défense directs (par opposition aux
emplois indirects).
Trois types de données ont été recueillies et analysées:
les données officielles sur la répartition régionale
des dépenses militaires;
les données du SIPRI et d'autres données relatives à
l'implantation régionale des entreprises de défense,
recueillies dans la banque de données du Centre for
Defence Economies (CDE) à l'université de York;
la littérature générale sur les activités de défense, en
particulier les études de cas antérieures et les infor¬
mations relatives aux PME.
Le Royaume-Uni, la France et l'Allemagne sont les trois
États membres qui possèdent les industries de défense
les plus fortes (et les plus nombreuses); elles sont
suivies par l'Italie. Selon le SIPRI, la dépendance à
l'égard des ventes militaires intensité de l'activité de
défense au niveau de chaque entreprise est par¬
ticulièrement forte au Royaume-Uni et en France.
Bases militaires
La taille des bases militaires est très inégale. Outre du
personnel militaire national ou étranger, elles emploient
aussi des civils. L'impact économique local d'une base
militaire dépend:
de sa taille absolue et relative,
de ses achats auprès des entreprises locales,
des dépenses des personnels militaire et civil dans le
circuit de l'économie locale,
des effets multiplicateurs des dépenses locales.
Toute diminution de l'activité militaire dans une localité .
aura pour conséquence immédiate une réduction des
dépenses susmentionnées.
Les implications sociales et économiques des compres¬
sions de personnel militaire varient cependant en fonc¬
tion du type de personnel concerné. Les militaires sous
contrat de courte durée et les appelés sont plus que
d'autres susceptibles de retourner à leur précédent lieu
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de résidence, d'où une dispersion de l'effet sur le chô¬
mage loin de la base où ils étaient stationnés.
Le personnel militaire stationné outre-mer (et en parti¬
culier les nombreuses forces alliées occidentales en
Allemagne) regagnera vraisemblablement le pays d'ori¬
gine en cas de démobilisation. Il en va de même pour
le personnel civil (c'est-à-dire le personnel américain de
soutien).
Les problèmes de données liés à la répartition régionale
des bases militaires sont considérables. L'implantation
des bases et les effectifs de chaque base sont considérés
par la plupart des ministères de la Défense comme des
informations sensibles. La méthodologie utilisée pour
surmonter ces difficultés a comporté l'analyse:
de données publiées (y compris de sources locales
telles que les annuaires téléphoniques);
des études spéciales entreprises par des experts du
pays en matière de défense;
des études existantes, notamment sur la disposition
des forces américaines.
Les évaluations relatives au nombre régional d'emplois
dans les bases militaires reposent sur une série d'hypo¬
thèses et d'appréciations, cela valant également pour le
rapport des forces étrangères aux emplois civils ainsi que
pour la pondération de la propension des différents types
de personnel à dépenser au niveau local.
Les définitions et les hypothèses retenues pour l'élabora¬
tion de ces données sont précisées aux chapitres 3 et 4.
Des données supplémentaires au niveau NUTS ΙΠ ont
également été recueillies lorsque c'était possible, afin
d'identifier des concentrations particulières d'activités
de défense. Ces données concernent, notamment, les
Länder est-allemands, qui font l'objet d'une étude sépa¬
rée commanditée par le CEC et connaissent d'importan¬
tes réductions d'activité des bases militaires.
Dépendance régionale
L'emploi est considéré comme une mesure de l'activité
de défense plus fiable que la production en raison de la
complexité des relations de sous-traitance dans les indus
tries de défense (avec le risque de «double comptage» de
la production des sous-traitants approvisionnant les maî¬
tres d'oeuvre) et de la singularité des bases militaires. Le
critère de l'emploi permet également la compilation de
données relativement cohérentes, fondées exclusivement
sur l'emploi direct.
La répartition générale des industries de défense (définie
au chapitre 3) et des bases militaires dans les différentes
régions de la Communauté a été examinée, préalable¬
ment à l'analyse détaillée des données relatives à
l'emploi, au niveau NUTS Π. L'étape suivante de
l'analyse a consisté à calculer pour chaque région le
pourcentage des emplois dans les activités de défense par
rapport à l'emploi total d'une région, de manière à mesu¬
rer la dépendance à l'égard des activités de défense.
Trois mesures distinctes de la dépendance ont été effec¬
tuées (A, B et C), ce qui a abouti à un classement des
régions NUTS Π de la Communauté. Ces trois mesures
étaient les suivantes:
A: pourcentage des emplois dans les industries de dé¬
fense par rapport à la population active d'une région;
B: pourcentage des emplois militaires par rapport à
l'emploi total d'une région (population active et per¬
sonnel militaire);
C: pourcentage de l'ensemble des emplois de défense
par rapport à l'emploi total d'une région (population
active et personnel militaire).
Il faut reconnaître que l'on ne dispose pas de façon géné¬
rale de données cohérentes sur les activités de défense au
niveau NUTS Π. L'étude a donc consisté, pour une bonne
part, à compiler cette série de données, qui a nécessité
le recours à certaines hypothèses ainsi que l'extrapolation
à partir de diverses autres données. En particulier, des
pondérations ont été effectuées pour le rapport des forces
étrangères aux forces nationales et des appelés par rap¬
port aux engagés. Ces pondérations traduisent la moin¬
dre importance des forces étrangères dans les économies
locales (en raison de l'épargne et du rapatriement d'une
partie des traitements) et la faiblesse relative du pouvoir
d'achat des appelés (dont la solde est modique).
Ont ensuite fait l'objet d'une analyse plus détaillée les
régions de niveau NUTS Π qui présentaient une dépen-
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dance à l'égard des activités de défense représentant
plus du double de la moyenne communautaire d'après le
classement A ou le classement B (toutes les régions pré¬
sentant un tel degré de dépendance selon le classement
C figuraient aussi au moins dans l'un des classements
A et B) . Sous réserve de certains compléments et exclu¬
sions précisés au chapitre 5, des profils économiques
sommaires ont été établis pour chacune de ces régions.
Es sont reproduits dans les annexes.
Dans les cas où des suppressions d'emplois spécifiques,
que ce soit dans les industries de défense ou dans les
bases militaires, avaient déjà été annoncées, celles-ci
ont été identifiées au point 5.5 et dans les profils. La
réponse générale de l'industrie à la compression des
dépenses militaires a été évaluée au moyen d'une
enquête dont les conclusions figurent dans les annexes,
conjointement avec les pièces relatives aux opérations
de reconversion antérieures du secteur industriel et des
bases militaires. Les éléments relatifs aux effets multi¬
plicateurs des activités de défense sur l'emploi ont éga¬
lement été examinés (au chapitre 6).
La dernière phase de l'analyse a porté sur la capacité
d'adaptation des régions dont le profil avait été établi, ce
qui a permis la détermination d'un «coefficient» d'adap-
tabilité pour chaque région. Cette analyse a nécessité
l'utilisation d'un modèle de régression, les coefficients
obtenus étant appliqués aux variables d'adaptabilité per¬
tinentes, notamment le taux de chômage, les dotations
en infrastructures et le pourcentage d'adolescents dans
le système d'enseignement et de formation. La courbe
des degrés de dépendance à l'égard des activités de
défense a été établie en fonction de l'évolution du chô¬
mage et de la capacité d'adaptation. Cette analyse figure
en annexe. Les implications de cette analyse pour la
politique régionale sont évaluées au point 6.3.
Résumé
La politique de défense et les dépenses militaires traver¬
sent une période de changement et d'incertitude. Entre
le début des années 70 et la fin des années 80, le pour¬
centage des dépenses de défense par rapport au PNB est
passé dans la Communauté européenne de 3,7 à environ
3,3 % . Cela montre que l'importance des dépenses mili
taires a diminué. La fin de la guerre froide a fait naître
des perspectives de fortes réductions à moyen comme à
long terme. On s'attend à ce que la croissance réelle des
dépenses rnilitaires diminue d'environ 10 % d'ici à 1995
(par rapport à 1991) et de 25 % ou plus d'ici à l'an 2000.
Π ressort de la présente étude que, en 1991, 0,68 million
de personnes étaient directement employées dans les
industries de défense et que 2,3 millions de personnes
étaient employées dans les bases et les installations mili¬
taires (étrangères incluses). L'emploi direct dans les acti¬
vités de défense représente environ 2,41 % de la popula¬
tion active de la Communauté. La réduction des dépen¬
ses militaires aura une forte incidence sur ces emplois de
même que sur les emplois indirects y associés.
L'étude commence par déterminer la dépendance de
chaque région de niveau NUTS Π de la Communauté à
l'égard des activités de défense. En prenant pour seuil
le double de la moyenne communautaire, on a estimé
que 19 régions étaient dépendantes de l'activité indus¬
trielle de défense et que 31 régions étaient dépendantes
des emplois militaires. En additionnant les emplois
dans les industries de défense et les emplois militaires
et en comparant la somme obtenue avec les chiffres
régionaux de l'emploi, on a obtenu 23 régions dépen¬
dantes des activités de défense dans leur ensemble, mais
chacune de ces régions figure également dans l'un des
deux classements précédents.
L'étude a également montré qu'une forte proportion des
régions de niveau NUTS ΠΙ où sont concentrées des
activités de défense (à l'intérieur de régions NUTS Π
dépendantes) n'étaient pas visées par les instruments
des objectifs nos 1, 2 ou 5 b). Environ 50 % des régions
NUTS ΙΠ dépendantes au titre de l'un des classements
(A, B ou C) effectués ne bénéficient d'aucune aide. Une
proportion relativement faible des régions NUTS ΠΙ n'y
ont que partiellemerit accès.
La vulnérabilité, terme utilisé pour indiquer si des sup¬
pressions d'emplois ont déjà été annoncées dans une
région donnée ou si elles sont probables à brève
échéance, a été étudiée à travers une enquête sur les
industries de défense. Concrètement, il est impossible
de prévoir les futures fermetures d'usines et de bases,
car les annonces de rationalisations suscitent au niveau
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régional de vives controverses. Il ressort de l'enquête
que la plupart des responsables interrogés essaient
d'éviter les fermetures d'usines en cherchant de nou¬
veaux marchés, encore que certaines firmes aient choisi
de se spécialiser dans les activités de défense plutôt que
de rechercher une diversification vers des marchés
civils entièrement nouveaux. En outre, les sondés ont
indiqué que l'adaptation durerait généralement au
moins cinq ans. L'enquête a confirmé que, pour les
entreprises privées, les implications régionales de la
réduction des activités de défense seront déterminées
par des critères commerciaux.
En ce qui concerne les bases militaires, dans certaines
régions de la Communauté (surtout en Allemagne), on
assistera à la fois à des fermetures et à des réductions
d'activité. C'est vrai en particulier pour les régions
hébergeant de fortes proportions de forces étrangères,
dont une partie importante, sinon la plus grande partie,
devra être retirée. La vulnérabilité ne signifie pas néces¬
sairement qu'une région donnée traversera des difficul¬
tés inacceptables. Certaines fermetures de bases mili¬
taires dans des zones à forte densité de population peu¬
vent, par exemple, atténuer la pénurie de terrains et de
logements. L'impact des réductions d'activité propre¬
ment dites dépendra des caractéristiques structurelles
de chaque région, certaines sous-régions isolées étant
plus durement touchées par la réduction des activités de
défense que des régions appartenant à des économies
intégrées de plus grande dimension.
L'évaluation de l'impact régional et de la réponse à la
compression des dépenses militaires implique l'examen
de lä capacité d'adaptation des régions concernées. Les
facteurs permettant de mesurer la capacité d'adaptation
sont: la structure économique régionale, la dépendance
à l'égard de vieilles industries exploitant les ressources
naturelles, le taux de reproduction de la population
régionale, l'évolution du potentiel économique résultant
de l'intégration européenne et de la diminution des frais
de transport, le taux de chômage, le pourcentage d'ado¬
lescents dans les systèmes d'enseignement et de forma¬
tion, ainsi que les dotations en infrastructures.
On appelle «effet multiplicateur» le processus de créa¬
tion ou de perte d'emplois indirects ou de revenus de la
sous-traitance qui résulte des emplois directs dans les
activités de défense. Les effets multiplicateurs varient
d'une région à l'autre en raison tant des facteurs spécifi¬
ques de chaque région que des facteurs spécifiques de
l'industrie de défense ou de la base militaire concernée.
L'examen de données disponibles récentes indique tou¬
tefois que les multiplicateurs s'échelonnent entre 1,75 et
2,00 pour les industries de défense et entre 1,10 et 1,50
pour les bases militaires.
Les conséquences d'un scénario pessimiste ont été éva¬
luées pour chacune des régions dépendantes classées
comme très vulnérables aux réductions des activités de
défense. Cela a permis d'évaluer l'impact éventuel de telles
réductions sur les emplois de défense directs et indirects.
Toute réponse politique à ces changements nécessite de
la souplesse sur deux fronts: la désignation de la zone
(étant donné que de nombreuses régions dépendantes et
zones de concentration de l'activité de défense ne sont pas
actuellement admissibles aux aides accordées au titre des
objectifs des fonds structurels) et les instruments d'inter¬
vention (étant donné qu'il s'agit d'affronter des difficultés
nouvelles, propres à la compression des dépenses mili¬
taires) . La coordination de la politique localejouera éga¬
lement un rôle en raison de l'isolement géographique
relatif de nombreux-établissements de défense.
La question de l'utilisation des industries de défense
pour l'importation de technologies et de compétences
nouvelles (transfert de technologies) doit être abordée.
Le défi à relever consiste en l'espèce à définir les condi¬
tions et les règles facilitant le transfert de technologies
par d'autres moyens, ainsi qu'à examiner les implica¬
tions d'une telle évolution au regard de la concurrence.
Enfin, la question du réaménagement du territoire impli¬
que que des compétences spécifiques soient mises en
uvre dans toute initiative nouvelle. Les activités de
défense occupent souvent de grandes superficies. Elles
peuvent aussi être à l'origine d'une contamination des
sols (notamment par le gasoil, par des produitschimiques
ou des minéraux, de même que par des munitions aban¬
données ou des activités en rapport avec l'armement
nucléaire) . Π conviendrait d'examiner le coût probable de
la décontamination des sites évacués et le mode de finan¬
cement approprié de ces coûts.
40

2. Overview of defence
expenditure
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the context in
which recent cuts in defence spending and employment
are taking place. Therefore, this chapter reviews trends
in defence expenditure and military force numbers, the
regional implications of these trends and future defence
expenditure projections.
2.1. Background
Defence policy and defence spending are experiencing
a period of change and uncertainty. Following the
changes in Eastern and Central Europe and the former
USSR, as well as the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1990 CFE Treaty and the more
recent voluntary unilateral defence cuts, the European
members of NATO will be adjusting their defence
budgets. There are real prospects of a disarmament race
as nations and their electorates seek the benefits of the
'peace dividend'.
Although the future is unknown and unknowable, it is
likely to be characterized by continuing cuts in defence
budgets reflecting changes in the size, composition and
traditional roles of the armed forces. The number, size
and distribution of military bases will be subject to
change. Smaller defence budgets will also affect equip¬
ment orders and consequently defence contractors.
Some projects will be cancelled, whilst others will be
delayed and 'stretched out' over a longer period. There
will be fewer new projects and reduced orders will lead
to shorter production runs and reduced requirements for
support and spares. All of these changes will affect vari¬
ous regions of the Community.
This chapter sets the scene by describing the importance
of defence spending in EC Member States. Defence
spending means the purchase of 'inputs', including man¬
power, equipment and infrastructure to provide national
security and protection. Defence ministries and their
armed forces are major buyers of labour. They enter the
labour market to purchase or conscript significant num¬
bers ofmen and some women, particularly in the youn¬
ger age-groups, and the labour they recruit (human cap¬
ital) is of differing skill levels.
The armed forces are also major buyers of equipment,
ranging from simple items, such as food, clothing and
batteries to high technology products such as combat
aircraft and guided weapons. As a single buyer or
monopsonist, a defence ministry's procurement choices
can have a major impact on its national industries. Its
purchasing decisions can determine technological
progress, the size and structure of an industry, entry or
exit, ownership and location. Those decisions also im¬
pact the performance of defence industries (Hartley,
1991; Kirby and Hooper, 1991).
In addition to buying defence equipment, defence
ministries purchase the infrastructure required for their
armed forces. They need a range of defence facilities,
particularly bases and communications systems. The
results are reflected in army garrisons and training
areas, military airfields and naval dockyards, together
with radar and communications sites. These facilities
are required by a nation's armed forces as well as by
NATO forces based overseas (e.g. United Kingdom and
US forces in Germany). The construction, repair, main¬
tenance and modification of these facilities imposes
substantial demands on construction industries.
The various demands of the armed forces are reflected
not only in factor and product markets but also in the
regional location of these markets. A company's
defence activities tend to be nationally rather than trans-
nationally based although there is a developing trend
towards international collaboration on major projects
(e.g. aerospace) . Military bases are distributed in a vari¬
ety of regions throughout Member States but with some
localization. For example, naval ports and dockyards
will be located at strategic points on the coast, whilst
military airfields are likely to be in rural areas.
This study distinguishes between defence industries and
military bases or facilities. Both have some common
characteristics:
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(i) They are sources of employment. Military facili¬
ties employ foreign or domestic service personnel
and civilians whilst defence plants employ local
civilian workers. Either or both might be major
employers in a local economy.
(ii) They are sources of spending power in the local
economy. This creates indirect employment effects
both 'backwards' in the supplier chain and directly
through employees' expenditures.
(iii) They are at risk from cuts in defence spending in
terms of reduced activity or closure. In the case of
defence bases in some EC States, decisions about
closure will be made by overseas governments
(e.g. British, American and former Soviet troop
withdrawals from Germany).
During this period of change, some groups will inevit¬
ably lose from cuts in defence spending. The rest of this
chapter outlines recent trends in defence spending in the
EC Member States as well as numbers of armed forces
and the importance of American forces in Europe.
The overriding purpose of the study has been to collect
data on employment (as well as cuts in employment) in
defence industries and the military for each NUTS Π
region of the Community in order to determine each
region's relative defence dependence and vulnerability
to cuts. Its secondary aim is to provide guidance to po¬
licy-makers in assessing which regions are likely to
suffer most from cuts in defence spending and military
forces. The following outline of trends provides the
necessary background to assist in analysing the poten¬
tial size of the problem facing Member States.
2.2. Trends in expenditure
and manpower
Figure 2.1 shows total military expenditure in the EC (in
billion ecus at constant 1988 prices) for the period
1980-90. The figure indicates that total military expendi¬
ture stagnated after 1987: its rate of increase fell from an
average of 1.51% per annum during the early 1980s to
0.84% per annum during the late 1980s to early 1990s.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the three
biggest military spenders accounting for 74% of the EC
total in 1970 although this share had fallen to 69% by
1990. Italy is the fourth largest military spender account¬
ing for nearly 14% ofthe EC total while Portugal, Ireland
and Luxembourg account for a negligible proportion of
the EC total. Spain has seen the biggest change increas¬
ing its share from 2.5% in 1970 to over 5% by 1990.
Figure 2.2. shows defence expenditure as a proportion of
GDP (i.e. the 'defence burden'). On this basis, Greece,
the United Kingdom and France have borne relatively
high burdens compared to other EC States. Some nations
have experienced reductions in their burdens, namely
Portugal and Germany, whilst others have borne relative¬
ly small burdens (Italy, Spain, Denmark, Ireland and
Luxembourg). The defence burden rose in five countries
during the early 1980s, the largest increases occurring in
the United Kingdom and France. The United Kingdom
figures reflect the Falklands conflict and its commitment
to the NATO 3% target increase in defence spending.
While the United Kingdom and Ireland have all-volun¬
teer forces, other EC States have substantial conscript
forces, so their defence burdens are likely to underesti¬
mate the opportunity costs of defence.
Data on production levels in the defence industry meas¬
ured as a share of GDP for the decade of the 1980s are
depicted in Figure 2.3. The ranking of the top three coun¬
tries based on their defence industrial expenditure match
the rankings based on expenditure as a share of GDP
(Greece, the United Kingdom and France) and all ex¬
perienced reductions in defence expenditure during
1988-90. The next highest ranking country is the Nether¬
lands. Its ranking in this figure contrasts with its ranking
of sixth in defence expenditure as a share of GDP. Portu¬
gal and Belgium are two countries whose defence expen¬
diture relative to GDP during the 1980s placed them
among the top seven countries in the EC; their expendi¬
ture on equipment, however, placed them seventh and
tenth respectively during the same time period. Every
country depicted (except Ireland and Luxembourg as no
data were available for these countries over the specified
time periods) experienced declines in defence industrial
production between 1987-88 and 1989-90.
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Figure 2.1. Total military expenditure of EC Member States
Constant 1988 prices (in billion ECU)
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Sources: NATO 16 nations (various years), World military expenditure, Saadet Deger and Sipri yearbook, 1991
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%Figure 2.2. Defence expenditure as share of GDP
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Figure 2.3. Defence industries1 output as share of GDP
1981-90
GR UK
1981-82
F EC
U 1983-84
NL D
1985-86
Ρ E
1987-88 I
DK Β
1989-90
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Sources: Sipri yearbook, 1991 and Eurostat.
Figure 2.4 shows how the defence budget is distributed
among the major categories of expenditure. Within the
EC, manpower accounts for the largest share of the
budget, followed by other operating expenses and
equipment. In 1989, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal
and Belgium spent some 70% or more of their budget
on manpower; the Netherlands spent 54%, Germany
51 % and the United Kingdom spent the smallest percen¬
tage, 39%. Keeping in mind the impact of equipment
spending on defence industries, the three Member
States which spent the largest proportions in 1989 were
the United Kingdom (22%), Greece (22%) and Italy
(20%). France is excluded from the EC average due to
the fact that it does not break down expenditure in the
same way as the NATO countries. In 1989, France spent
32% of its defence budget on manpower, 27% on
procurement, 26% on maintenance and 15% on
research and development.
The proportion of expenditure on equipment has in¬
creased from 12 (1974-75) to 16 % (1985-89) for EC Mem¬
ber States as a whole. Most countries' equipment spend¬
ing peaked in the mid-1980s. It peaked earliest in Den¬
mark (1980) and latest in Portugal (1989). For Member
States seeking to support and maintain domestic defence
industrial bases, export markets are important. As
depicted in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, the major EC arms ex¬
porters are France, the United Kingdom and Germany,
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followed by Italy, Spain and the Benelux countries.
However, between 1986 and 1990, the major Member
States experienced reductions in their arms exports,
particularly France whose arms exports declined from
some USD 4 billion in 1986 to about USD 1.8 billion in
1990 (at constant 1985 prices: Sipri yearbook, 1991). In¬
creasing excess capacity in European defence industries
in combination with smaller markets available to firms
in the USA and former Warsaw Pact nations will result
in an increasingly competitive environment in the
world's export markets. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show ex
ports' share of defence production and total export ex¬
penditure of the EC during the 1980s. The trends are
somewhat erratic; however over the past few years, the
export market for European defence industrialists has
declined from 20% of their defence production to less
than 10% between 1984 and 1987, or from ECU 10 bil¬
lion in 1984 to ECU 2 billion in 1988 (at constant 1985
prices).
In 1989, military manpower in the 12 EC Member States
was 2.75 million. Between 1975 and 1979, the number of
Figure 2.4. Shares of defence budget
EC average 1985-89
(49.2%) Manpower
(4.3%) Infrastructure
(20.3%) Equipment
(26.2%) Other operating expenses
Note: Calculation excludes France.
Sources: NATO 16 nations (various years), World military expenditure, Saadet Deger, and Sipri yearbook, 1991.
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Figure 2.5.
Exports of EC countries
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European forces fell by 10% ; this is largely attributed to
the two-thirds reduction in the size of Portugal's armed
forces. The number of forces then increased marginally
in the 1980s. France, Italy and Germany presently have
the largest armed forces; Denmark and Luxembourg
have the smallest.
Figure 2.9 shows the numbers of civilian and military
personnel expressed as a proportion of the labour force
for the years 1970 to 1989. Those proportions fell rapidly
during the 1970s and have since fallen at a slower rate.
Greece had the highest proportion of military and
civilian personnel in the labour force 5.8% average
for the period 1985-89, followed by France with 2.9%
and Italy with 2.8%. The countries with the smallest
proportions are Denmark (1.4%), Ireland (1.0%) and
Luxembourg (0.8%). US direct defence expenditure on
goods and services in the EC amounted to ECU 7.82 bil¬
lion in 1987. Germany accounts for 71% ofthis total, the
United Kingdom 12 % and Italy 6 % . Less than 1 % goes
to France. Greece and Italy experienced significant
reductions in US defence expenditure in recent years
whilst Denmark, Spain and Germany experienced
gains.
Figure 2.7. Exports' share of defence production
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Sources: US ACDA, World military expenditure and Sipri yearbook, 1991.
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In 1987, the largest proportion ofUS expenditure (40 %)
was spent on equipment and construction, 30% was
spent on operations and maintenance and the remaining
30% was spenton personnel. Some 95% ofUSexpendi-
ture on bases and facilities is allocated to Germany, the
United Kingdom and Italy. Ireland does not host any US
forces or receive expenditure for bases or facilities. In
1987, Germany accounted for 80% of US forces in Eu¬
rope, the United Kingdom hosted 9%, Italy 5% and
Spain 3 % . The proportions in other EC Member States
are negligible. In Germany, 83 % of US personnel were
in the army while in the United Kingdom 90% were in
the air force. The concentration of US forces in Ger¬
many (and their announced withdrawals) highlights the
vulnerability of West German regions. There are addi¬
tionally substantial numbers of British army and air
force personnel deployed in West Germany. These
forces are to be reduced by half or more, and these
reductions will involve further base closures. Similar
base closures will be experienced in the former East
Germany following the withdrawal of the former War¬
saw Pact forces.
Figure 2.8. Total defence exports of the EC
Constant 1988 prices (in billion ECU)
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Sources: US ACDA, World military expenditure and Sipri yearbook, 1991.
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Figure 2.9. Military as share of labour force
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2.3. Regional implications of trends
Uncertainty about the future defence policies and levels
of defence spending in EC Member States means that
past trends are unlikely to provide reliable insights into
future spending levels. The end of the cold war arms
race might be the start of a disarmament race in which
case major changes are likely to occur during the 1990s
such as the following:
(i) The size and regional allocation ofarmed forces within
and between EC Member States (e.g. the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Germany) . Such changes are likely
to affect the urban-rural balance of economic activity.
Air force bases are usually located in rural areas and
their closure may have serious adverse economic
consequences in areas where there are few alternative
sources of employment for the civilian labour force.
(ii) Equipment spending with implications for the size,
structure, location and product mix ofdefence indus¬
tries in EC States. In the longer term, these changes
are likely to be accentuated by pressures to create an
EC defence policy and a single market for defence
equipment.
The prospects of budget cuts and rising equipment costs
will force nations to reappraise their traditional procure-
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ment policies. It is possible that they will become more
willing to open up their national markets, buy from
abroad and collaborate on major programmes. The
average defenceburden ofEC Member States is current¬
ly 3 % of GDP. The maximum overall impact of a com¬
plete elimination of defence spending would thus be no
more than 3 % ofGDP, and in reality is likely to be under
1%, representing a reduction of up to one-third of
defence spending. However, this rough estimate masks
wide variation among States, both in absolute expendi¬
ture and in the burden it represents.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom have the lar¬
gest absolute defence budgets, together accounting for
some 70% of the EC total. These countries are likely to
see the largest defence cuts. Two of them France and
the United Kingdom also have the highest shares of
GDP devoted to defence, surpassed only by Greece.
However, for most EC States a reduction in defence
spending signals the intensification ofan existing trend,
rather than a change in direction. Assessing trends in in¬
dividual countries is made more difficult by the timing
decisions of the various States. Some countries have
reacted quickly to international changes with announce¬
ments of force reductions and lower military spending.
Germany, for example, is on the verge of scrapping
plans to produce the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA)
and replacing it with cheaper aircraft. The regional im¬
plications of dropping the EFA will be most severe for
Bayern, which employs most of the 10000 defence in¬
dustry jobs involved in the project.1
Others have taken longer to assess the implications, or
have political systems which require more time to reach
consensus on issues which can involve significant costs
as well as benefits (for example, in the accommodation
of forces returning from overseas) . Such delays are par¬
ticularly likely in those countries where the impacts
may fall more heavily on some regions than on others.
Should a disarmament race emerge, the regional impli¬
cations are likely to include an intensification of the ef¬
fects of the current first round of defence cuts. Those
regions which were the recipients of the largest defence
expenditures and were the locations of major defence
activity (military and industrial) will feel the effects
more than those where the defence expenditure has been
smaller. Countries which have not yet planned major
cuts in defence may also decide to disarm, resulting in
further regional defence expenditure reductions.
Reduced defence spending will almost certainly mean
reduced demand for all types of defence equipment,
though there are exceptions. These include new growth
markets resulting from the shift to defensive forces and
equipment and also the substitution of equipment for
manpower. Arms control and contractorization in the
armed forces may also create new markets for defence
industries (e.g. inspection, surveillance and disposal of
equipment). Moreover, for defence industries, the
regional impact ofbudget cuts will depend on how suc¬
cessful defence firms are in obtaining new military and
or civil business. The industry is likely to be character¬
ized by a search for new business, job losses, plant
closures, mergers, international alliances, prime con¬
tractors becoming subcontractors and by exits.
In addition, the continuing integration of Europe into a
single market can be expected to progressively extend
to defence. If a single competitive EC defence market
were created, regions which would benefit in terms of
defence would be those in which the most efficient
defence companies were located. Firms which tradi¬
tionally have operated in protected national markets will
find it difficult to survive in competitive markets. Simi¬
larly, the regional implications ofcreating a centralized
EC procurement agency will depend on the specific
purchasing objectives of such an agency (e.g. whether
it can obtain economies of scale by purchasing stan¬
dardized equipment for all EC States; whether it would
act as a competitive buyer or whether it would allocate
work on the basis of juste retour). Inevitably, though,
the opening-up of EC defence equipment markets will
mean that some industries, firms and regions will be
losers. Such groups and regions will oppose changes
which may make them worse off. They will demand
1 'Miinchen-based Deutsche Aerospace is the main German contrac¬
tor, through its subsidiaries Messerschmit-Bölkow-Blohm and
Motoren- und Turbinen-Union. Deutsche Aerospace said that it
would have to close 14 domestic plants if Germany withdraws from
the project'. Financial Tinjes, 12 June 1992.
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'managed and fair' competition, work-sharing and
other arrangements to protect and compensate them
from any potential adverse effects of change.
With regard to regions, the policy question is whether
to assist or to prevent change. Should regions likely to
lose from defence cuts be offered alternative defence
work, new civil work or should resources, particularly
manpower, be reallocated to other regions? Changing
defence policy will mean changing requirements for
defence facilities. Whilst some bases will be closed,
others may expand to undertake new roles and missions.
There may be substitution effects as a nation's forces
move into 'superior' bases vacated by departing foreign
forces (e.g. US forces closing well-equipped air bases).
Once again, this will affect the urban-rural balance of
economic activity. The need for training areas and the
desire to economize on defence spending by releasing
valuable defence land in urban areas might be favour¬
able for rural areas. For example, the forces could shift
their facilities to rural areas (see Chapter 6).
Whilst current changes might be the start of more fun¬
damental shifts in defence policy and budgets, it is worth
remembering that:
(i) Major changes are likely to be introduced over time
rather than instantly. Member States will differ in
their willingness to cut defence spending and speed
ofadjustment. A country's perception ofadditional
security threats will determine whether it retains
'strong defences', its mix of equipment and man¬
power (among its army, navy and air force), and its
decisions about full-time versus reserve forces.
Contractual commitments to armed forces man¬
power and defence contractors will also affect the
speed of adjustment. In general, adjustment to the
current round of cuts in defence spending might
take up to five years. But the current round of cuts
could well be the start of more substantial future
cuts in defence budgets with major long-term impli¬
cations for service personnel, defence contractors
and the regions in which these are located.
(ii) We have been here before. The European armed
forces and defence industries experienced massive
adjustments following the end of World Wars I and
Π and the Korean War. Nor are such changes unique
to defence. The civil sector is repeatedly adjusting
to change as firms and industries decline, often with
major regional impacts (e.g. the decline of coal,
steel and shipbuilding in the EC).
2.4. Future defence expenditure
The change in international relations, which may be
summarized as the end of the cold war, means that fu¬
ture defence expenditure will not be a simple projection
of past trends. A reduced threat, the opportunity for a
lower state of operational readiness, an evolving NATO
policy, increasing interest in the development ofEC col¬
lective security arrangements and the possibility of a
disarmament race replacing the cold war arms race
mean that the future is dominated by uncertainty. None
the less, some general trends are beginning to emerge.
Defence expenditure in the medium term is expected to
mean lower real spending, leading to a 'peace dividend',
i.e. resources which would have been devoted to defence
would become available for other uses. The general ex¬
pectation is for cuts in defence spending ofup to 10% by
1995 (compared with 1991). Adjustment cannot be made
instantaneously; it takes time and money to adjust to
changed circumstances. This means that over the short
term (to 1993) , cuts are likely to be relatively small, pos¬
sibly of the order of 3 to 4% in real terms. Indeed, in
some nations, defence budgets might increase in the
short term, reflecting transitional or adjustment costs
(e.g. redundancy payments to military and civilian per¬
sonnel, cancellation ofequipment project costs, new ac¬
commodation for forces relocated from foreign bases,
and new equipment for new roles).
Over the medium to long term (1995 to 2000 and be¬
yond), more substantial cuts are likely. Assuming no
new threats emerge, cuts in defence budgets of up to
25 % or more are likely by the year 2000 (compared with
1991 levels). Much will depend on whether the EC
States move towards common security which would
open up opportunities for further savings from the 'cost
of non-Europe.'
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Many countries have not yet finalized their plans for
defence expenditure; announcements of cuts so far may
be only the first round in the transition to new levels of
spending. With the overall expectation of lower expen¬
diture, different countries will follow different adjust¬
ment paths. While some forecast reductions in real ex¬
penditure over the next five years, like Belgium (10 to
20%), the United Kingdom (3 %), and the Netherlands
(6 % ) , in some cases cuts are expected to even exceed in¬
flation, leading to nominal reductions in expenditure (as
is expected in Germany). Countries which expect no
nominal changes, and therefore negative real changes
are Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal.
Changes in international relations have added an extra
dimension of uncertainty to these scenarios. While the
direction ofchange in defence spending is almost certain
to be downward, the extent of that change and the transi¬
tion paths for individual countries remains less clear.
Summary
Compared with growth in the early 1980s, total military
expenditure stagnated after 1987. That growth rate
declined from 1.51% per annum in the early part of the
decade to 0.84 % during the latter part ofthe decade. The
largest spenders on defence in the EC are France, Ger¬
many and the United Kingdom. Greece spends more on
defence relative to GDP than any other Member State,
followed by the United Kingdom and France. All EC
countries (except Ireland and Luxembourg) ex¬
perienced reductions in defence industrial production
during the late 1980s. Manpower accounts for the lar¬
gest share of defence spending in the EC (49.2%), fol¬
lowed by operating expenses (26.2%), equipment
(20.3%) and infrastructure (4.3%). The United King¬
dom, Germany, France and Italy are the biggest
spenders on equipment. The largest exporters are
France, the United Kingdom and Germany. During the
late 1980s, major exporting Member States experienced
reductions in exports, as the export markets of the USA
and the former Warsaw Pact countries contracted and
became more competitive.
Employment in the military (including civilians em¬
ployed in the military) fell rapidly during the 1970s and
has since fallen at a slower rate. Greece had the highest
proportion of military and civilian personnel in the
labour force with a 5.8% average for the period 1985-89,
followed by France with 2.9 % and Italy with 2.8 % . The
USA is an important employer in Germany and the Uni¬
ted Kingdom. Its announced withdrawal highlights the
vulnerability of certain regions in these countries.
The end of the cold war arms race might be the start of
a disarmament race in which case the size and regional
allocation of armed forces within and between EC
Member States will change during the 1990s. Such
changes are likely to affect the urban-rural balance of
economic activity as air force bases are usually located
in rural areas and their closure may have serious adverse
economic consequences in areas where there are few al¬
ternative sources of employment for the civilian labour
force. Also, equipment spending will decline with im¬
plications for the size, structure, location and product
mix of defence industries in EC States. In the longer
term, these changes are likely to be accentuated by pres¬
sures to create an EC defence policy and a single market
for defence equipment.
Defence expenditure in the medium term is expected to
mean lower real spending, leading to a 'peace dividend'.
It is expected that defence spending will decline by 10 %
by 1995 (compared with 1991). Since this adjustment
cannotbe made instantaneously, this means that over the
short term (to 1993), cuts are likely to be relatively
small, possibly of the order of3 to 4% in real terms and
in some nations defence budgets may increase in the
short term, reflecting transitional or adjustment costs.
Over the medium to long term (1995 to 2000 and be¬
yond), more substantial cuts of up to 25% or more are
likely by the year 2000 (compared with 1991 levels).
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3. Defence industries
Purpose
This chapter discusses the methodology used in collect¬
ing employment data in the defence industries and
reviews recent trends in defence industrial employment
in the EC. It includes discussion of the definitional
difficulties inherent in such research and the lack of
comparable published data among Member States.
3.1. Introduction
There is little published up-to-date information on the
EC's defence industries (Creasey and May, 1988; Todd,
1988; Hartley and Hooper, 1990). One exception is the
recent study on West European arms production (An¬
thony et al. , 1990). This provides an analysis of the 100
largest European arms producers. Sipri's World arma¬
ments and disarmament is another important source as
it estimates job losses in the defence industries over the
past few years as well as projections ofjob losses in the
medium term. The major losses are expected to be in
shipyards and producers of land systems, whilst high
technology sectors such as electronics may benefit.
Sipri estimates that during the three years 1987 through
1989, as many as 100000 defence industrial employees
out of about 1.5 million lost their jobs in Western
Europe.2 Assuming that additional arms control and
disarmament treaties are concluded and military spend¬
ing reduced decisively, Western European arms indus¬
try sales (including exports) could fall by 15 to 30 % dur¬
ing the first halfof the 1990s, withjob losses rising even
higher, 425 000 to 560 000 by 1995. 3 Anthony and Wulf
estimate that employment in the arms industry in Euro¬
pean NATO countries will be halved in the period
1985-95 (from 1.5 million in the mid-1980s). Their esti¬
mates are based on the following assumptions:
(a) a second CFE Treaty will require deep cuts in con¬
ventional arms in NATO countries;
(b) reductions in procurement budgets will accelerate
to 5 % annually as a result of the international climate
and successful arms control;
(c) competition in the world arms market will increase
and the European NATO countries trade balance in ma¬
jor conventional arms will shrink by 5% annually; and
(d) annual productivity gains in the arms industry win
amount to 2 %.4
Kirby and Hooper (1991) assess Europe's defence bud¬
gets and choices, its defence industries and procurement
options, and the policy issues associated with economic
adjustment. Elsewhere, current data on EC defence in¬
dustries and their companies are difficult to obtain. The
Sipri yearbook is a useful source of information on
defence policies, budgets, equipment spending, interna¬
tional trade and the major arms producers (Sipri, 1991) .
Similarly, company annual reports provide some in¬
sights into the activities of the major defence contrac¬
tors. Typically, though, these reports do not provide the
detailed information required by this study. Most com¬
panies are diversified groups with a range of military
and civil activities, with little, if any, published infor¬
mation on the skill composition and geographical distri¬
bution oftheir labour forces in their defence businesses.
There is also no generally accepted definition of what
constitute defence industries. Different studies have
adopted those definitions which are thought to be most
appropriate for the particular issues being studied. At¬
tempts to produce a conceptual definition result in con¬
cepts which are difficult if not impossible to apply em¬
pirically. Attempts to define defence industries do so
with reference to both defence companies' customers
and types ofproduct supplied (e.g. Ministry ofDefence
(MoD) and strategic military-specific equipment).
Defence industries can be defined most simply as those
industries which supply the military. This is clearly a
market-basket definition rather than one based on in¬
dustry sectors. As such it raises two initial difficulties.
2 Sipri Yearbook 1991: World annaments and disarmament. Western
Europe includes Norway, but excludes Ireland (not significant),
Sweden or Switzerland.
3 Renner, M. Economic adjustment after the cold war: Strategiesfor
conversion, Unidir, 1992.
4 Anthony, I. and Wulf, H. 'The future ofthe industry: a medium-term
prognosis', in Brzoska, M. and Lock, P. (eds), Restructuring ofarms
production in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, 1992.
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(i) The military buys a vast range of products from
large specialized items such as nuclear submarines
to food, fuel and cutlery. In peacetime, there may
be a temptation to divide items between strategic
and non-strategic (such as the NATO or CoCom
lists); in wartime, fuel is certainly strategic and
food probably so, again leaving uncertain the ques¬
tion of the boundary of the defence industries.
(ii) Some clearly 'defence' goods are produced within
industries that may not in total be defence-based.
For example, a few companies may produce
specialized strategic castings or forgings which
form a small percentage of the output of the indus¬
try ; most members of the industry might not under¬
take defence production. Dual-use goods and tech¬
nologies are a further complication.
This suggests that a definition of defence industries
should include defence intensity: the share of a compa¬
ny's output which is made for defence. In practice there
is a continuum ofdefence intensiveness from industries
such as nuclear submarines with 100% defence use to
non-defence items. Again, the problem arises over the
point on the continuum at which defence-intensiveness
signifies membership of the defence industries.
There is a further difficulty. Companies are assigned to
industry classifications according to their principal
product. Taking the example of nuclear submarines, a
company which specializes in such vessels will list them
as its principal product and hence be assigned to the
nuclear submarine industry, which will be defence in¬
tensive. On the other hand, if nuclear submarines are
made by shipbuilders, defence intensity will depend on
the relative levels of production of military as opposed
to civilian vessels.
The Eurostrategies report on dual-use industries in Eu¬
rope (CEC, 1991) considered 'strategic' defence-related
industries to include all enterprises involved with arma¬
ment production and the production ofdualuse goods and
technologies. Strategic dual-use involves civilian goods
and technologies which may be used for lethal purposes
or to improve overall military capability. As such they
could also be defined as combat-related goods and tech¬
nologies.
Non-strategic defence-related industries are all enter¬
prises supplying the Ministries of Defence with non-ar¬
maments related goods and services. Housing, cloth¬
ing, food and administrative goods and services are not
considered to contribute directly to overall military
capability. These definitions are very broad and the dis¬
tinction between strategic and non-strategic requires an
element of judgment in its application.
Economic theory would suggest one way ofdividing in¬
dustries between strategic and non-strategic by using
the concept of opportunity cost. Those industrial capa¬
bilities considered to be of strategic value are those
which the military are prepared to support by forgoing
other expenditures. In other words, strategic industries
would be those in which the military considers an indus¬
trial capability to be of such importance that they are
prepared to forgo extra equipment, facilities or man¬
power in order to keep that industrial capability in exis¬
tence (Hooper, 1990).
However, unless faced with a loss of suppliers, the mili¬
tary may not consider the value of defence industrial
capability. Whether or not industrial capability is consi¬
dered essential may also depend on the size of the
defence budget. If forces and equipment are already
squeezed by budget constraints then the opportunity
cost of maintaining domestic defence industrial capaci¬
ty will be high. In times of less stringent financial con¬
straints the opportunity cost in terms ofextra equipment
or manpower may be lower.
As well as analysing defence industries, defence
economists also use the associated concept of a defence
industrial base. Hartley (1991) suggests there are at least
three possible definitions of the defence industrial base:
(i) firms receiving Ministry of Defence contracts;
(ii) a minimum core of key national assets;
(iii) a free market view, in which the defence industrial
base is determined by market forces.
The debate about the defence industrial base usually oc¬
curs in the context of government support for industries:
whether some industrial capability which is at risk should
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be supported by the government to maintain a capability
for military purposes. The concept of a defence indus¬
trial base is thus not synonymous with defence indus¬
tries, which are those industrial capabilities which ex¬
ist, rather than those deemed to be essential by some
usually undefined criteria. Hartley's discussion high¬
lights again the combination of customer orientation
(military or non-military) and type ofproduct (strategic
or non-strategic) which feature in many definitions.
An alternative view sees the defence industrial base as
consisting of 'those industrial assets which provide key
elements of military power and national security' (Tay¬
lor and Hayward, 1989, p. 1). In considering these defi¬
nitions, Taylor and Hayward identify three groups of
products: lethal and destructive equipment which is
produced for the military for use in war (or in deterring
war); non-lethal equipment directly associated with
military activity; and goods produced for the civil mar¬
ket and also used by the military. Most analysis of
defence industries focuses on the first two of these
product groups, trade in which is subject to strict con¬
trol by most governments. Taylor and Hayward also
raise the issue of whether all firms currently supplying
the MoD should be included, and whether some non-
suppliers are really part of the defence industrial base.
For the present study, no distinction has been made be¬
tween 'strategic' and 'non-strategic' defence industries,
since cuts in defence expenditure probably affect both.
However, in order to make data collection practicable,
the present study has concentrated primarily on the first
two product groups defined by Taylor and Hayward,
namely lethal equipment and non-lethal equipment
directly associated with military activity such as trans¬
port and communications equipment. Non-equipment
items such as food, fuel and clothing are excluded
although they are part of total defence procurement.
This working definition of defence industries also re¬
lates to the objective of the study to assess the region¬
al implications of reductions in defence spending. For
reductions to be significant for an individual region,
that region must be dependent on military activity. The
defence industry is thus defined by reference to the
defence equipment component of each company's total
employment and the aggregation ofthose components in
any one region.
Most national statistics are based on contracts issued by
MoD procurement agencies based upon the value oftheir
contracts with defence companies. Where government
sources are unavailable, data have been collected from
company information on direct employment, or by es¬
timating output and converting this to employment. Esti¬
mates such as these include employment in all defence-
related activity such as subcontract work, rather thanjust
the MoD's direct orders. Nevertheless, as the sample of
companies used in such analyses is typically limited to
major defence companies, the extent of indirect employ¬
ment included in such estimates is limited.
Although it is fer from comprehensive, official informa¬
tion on military purchases by region gives some indica¬
tion of those regions (as opposed to companies) which
have significant defence industry employment. Some
data on the larger defence companies, which account for
a large share of defence output and employment, are
known. The regions in which their plants are located can
be identified. Areas where other smaller companies are
important can be deduced by comparing the location of
major company activity with the regional data on mili¬
tary purchases. Microeconomic analysis has then been
undertaken to determine the defence components ofcom¬
pany employment.
Defence industries definition
1. Market-based defmitions are more relevant than
those based on industrial sectors; i.e. those in¬
dustries that supply the military are in the
defence market.
2. No distinction has been made between 'strategic'
and 'non-strategic' defence industries since cuts
m defence expenditure would affect both; How¬
ever, the study concentrates on equipment
directly associated with military activity,
3. The aim has been tö identify the defence equip¬
ment component of each company's total em¬
ployment.
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3.2. Methodology and data for
industry review
The methodology used to compile a data set on the
regional distribution ofdefence industries' employment
involved an iterative approach. Firstly, existing data
from national governments and other published sources
showing the regional distribution of defence expendi¬
ture were assembled. The data are based on national
regional classifications so the government departments
concerned were approached to see if such data could be
prepared at NUTS II level . These data are usually based
on contract payments by these government departments
and as such relate to prime contractors and direct suppli¬
ers only.
Secondly, data were collected on the regional location
of the top 100 defence companies in Europe as identified
by Sipri (Anthony et al., 1991), supplemented by data
which were available on other companies. The accumu¬
lation of these data represents one source of the precise
locations of defence activity within the broad regions
identified in the national payment data. Defence com¬
pany data, however, are not directly comparable with
the payments data which formed the primary source of
regional analysis. Many defence companies do not pub¬
lish information on the location of their military ac¬
tivity. Companies and individual plants also often un¬
dertake both military and civil activities. Indeed diver¬
sification has been a deliberate strategy for many com¬
panies. Data which are available, for example from
company reports and accounts, often refer to the total
activity of a company, division or site (location), rather
than the output which is related to military use.
Many companies are both direct suppliers to the mili¬
tary and act as suppliers and subcontractors to prime
contractors. Data on the output of military-related
products and activity by such companies would thus
comprise an element which is included in the purchase-
based data obtained from government sources, and a
subcontracted element which is not directly included.
Such indirect defence output would eventually appear as
a purchase from a prime contractor or a direct supplier
who might be in a different region. Here again, the im
plication is that data obtained from company reports and
accounts cannot simply be aggregated to provide an al¬
ternative to government data.
The Centre for Defence Economics (CDE) database in¬
cludes information for major EC defence companies
which overcomes some of the deficiencies of the pub¬
lished reports and accounts. It includes information on
approximately 3 000 companies. This information has
been built from published sources and discussions with
defence companies over a number of years and has been
supplemented for this study by extensive analysis by a
team of defence country experts.
Thirdly, the literature on defence activity, particularly
case studies of industries or regions was also used to
identify the location of defence production. This litera¬
ture is not comprehensive for all regions of the EC, and
in some instances is not based on statistical analysis. It
does, however, provide valuable additional and reliable
information which identifies locations which are depen¬
dent on defence industries. The most commonly used
definition of defence employment is 'direct' employ¬
ment and, for the sake of consistency, we have used this
definition wherever possible in preparing the data set
for the analysis of regional dependence. Evidence from
previous studies of the multiplier effect of indirect em¬
ployment (which is not included in the data set or analy¬
sis of dependent regions) is reviewed in Section 6.2.
Other literature examined, particularly in relation to
smaller companies, is included in Section 7.1.
Major defence contractors
There have been a number of estimates of defence-
related employment amongst the major contractors in
the EC. The regional analysis for this study confirms a
grouping of Member States in terms of direct em¬
ployment:
Group I is composed of the United Kingdom, Germany
and France which have the largest defence industries.
Group Π consists of Italy.
Group III is composed of Belgium, Spain, the Nether¬
lands and Greece.
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Group IV is composed of the remaining countries with
little, if any, defence industrial employment (Denmark,
Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal).
According to Sipri, in 1989 35 of the 100 largest defence
companies were in EC Member States compared with 37
in 1988. Sweden (four companies) and Switzerland (three
companies) were the only European non-EC States with
companies in the top 100 in 1989. Six out of the 14 coun¬
tries represented in the list were EC members, with the
United Kingdom, France and Germany taking second,
third and fourth place respectively after the USA.
In terms of industrial sectors, Sipri found that electronics
companies continued to receive a growing share ofdefence
procurement in 1989, at the expense ofaircraft producers
and the traditional land and sea system prime contractors
(e.g. tanks and ships). This trend is likely to continue.
The analysis also highlights the increasing internation¬
alization ofdefence companies through acquisitions and
collaborative agreements. In Europe certain sectors are
increasingly becoming dominated by individual compa¬
nies or collaborative groups, notably in aerospace,
helicopters, engines, missiles and electronics. The trend
is towards a smaller number of large defence contractors
in the EC, with a range ofdefence and civil activities, act¬
ing as prime contractors and systems integrators, sup¬
ported by a network of subcontractors and suppliers.
A list ofthe top 100 arms producing companies in Europe
in 1988 (Anthony et al., 1990), rather than in the world,
shows that 86 of the 100 are in EC Member States.
Table 3.1.
Ranking of top 100 European arms
producing companies
Companies in top 100
Number Rank
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Companies
Number
28
25
17
6
4
4
in top 100
Rank
1
2
3
4
5 =
5 =
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Portugal
2
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Anthony et al., 1990
Any such ranking of European defence companies will
be affected by changes in the structure of industries,
such as the takeover in 1989 of MBB by Daimler Benz
in Germany and the merger ofAeritalia with Selenia to
form Alenia in Italy. Such restructuring on both a na¬
tional and international basis is an important and con¬
tinuing feature of the European defence industries. In
some instances, such as the MBB-Daimler Benz mer¬
ger, the number of companies included for a particular
country will obviously be reduced. Other mergers may
bring new groups into the list, perhaps displacing exist¬
ing members.
The dependence of defence contractors on military
sales (defence intensity) is, on average, particularly
high for the major defence companies in the United
Kingdom and France (40% or more), and low for Ger¬
many (under 10%). Sipri suggests that 12 of the major
European defence companies rely on the defence mar¬
ket for over 70% of their sales, and six of these rely on
that market for 90% of their sales.
The size of the major European defence companies and
their rankings among the world producers, together
with the trend towards internationalization, suggest
that the major companies will survive the expected
reduction in equipment requirements. However, while
the major companies may survive, many of their exist¬
ing production facilities may not. Also, their survival
may come at the expense of smaller defence contractors
which are more likely to leave the defence sector
through conversion, merger or closure. An assessment
of industrial vulnerability to lower defence spending
must therefore take into account smaller defence com-
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panies and the individual production plants of larger
companies. This smaller scope of defence activity has
been taken into account in the present study through use
of the CDE database and available relevant literature.
Summary
There is no generally accepted definition ofwhat consti¬
tute defence industries. However, in order to make data
collection practicable, the present study has concentrat¬
ed primarily on lethal and non-lethal equipmentdirectly
associated with military activity. This working defini¬
tion ofdefence industries also relates to the objective of
the study to assess the regional implications ofreduc¬
tions in defence spending. For reductions to be signifi¬
cant for an individual region, that region mustbe depen¬
dent on military activity. The defence industry is thus
defined by reference to the defence equipment compo¬
nent ofeach company's total employment and the aggre¬
gation of those components in any one region.
The methodology used to compile a data set on the
regional distribution of defence industrial employment
involved an iterative approach. Firstly, existing data from
national governments and other published sources show¬
ing the regional distribution ofdefence expenditure were
assembled. Secondly, data were collected on the regional
location of the top 100 defence companies in Europe as
identified by Sipri, supplemented by data which were
available on other companies. The accumulation of these
data represents one source of the precise locations of
defence activity within the broad regions identified in the
national payment data. Thirdly, the literature on defence
activity, particularly case studies of industries or regions,
was also used to identify the location of defence produc¬
tion. The literature provided valuable additional and
reliable information which identified locations which are
dependent on defence industries. The most commonly
used definition of defence employment is 'direct' em¬
ployment and, for the sake of consistency, we have used
this definition wherever possible in preparing the data set
for the analysis of regional dependence.
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4. Military bases
Purpose
This chapter presents the methodology used in gather¬
ing data on regional military employment in the Com¬
munity. In addition, available data on planned force
numbers are given, together with the categories of mili¬
tary employment included in the data-gathering
process. Issues relating to the economic impact ofmili¬
tary bases on their local economies are also discussed.
4.1. Introduction
The data-collection process yielded an aggregate num¬
ber of Member States' domestic forces plus conscripts
of2.2 million (or 1.77 % ofthe labour force) . Apart from
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Luxem¬
bourg, most Member States of the EC have substantial
conscript forces. When foreign forces, civilians and de¬
pendants as well as local civilians are added to the
domestic forces figure, the total is 2.3 million directly
employed by the military (or 1.87 % ofthe labour force).
Germany currently has the greatest number ofdomestic
military personnel in Europe with approximately
500 000 in theBundeswehr. In addition, there are nearly
400000 Western allied military personnel in Germany
occupying over 400 bases. France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Spain all have over 300000 domestic
military personnel.
The next group of countries, comprising Greece, Bel¬
gium, the Netherlands and Portugal each have over
100000. Finally, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg
have much smaller numbers of military personnel.
Greece has by far the largest level of military personnel
in relation to its population (200000 or about 2%) fol¬
lowed by Belgium, France and Portugal, which have
around 1% each. With the exception of Greece, Ireland
and Luxembourg all EC force levels are expected to be
reduced significantly over the next five years. These
redundancies can be summarized briefly as follows:
Belgium
Overall manpower reduction of 19.7% (12.9% for
professional forces) during 1990-95. Source: Plan Char-
ler-bis. The government has recently announced the es¬
tablishment ofa purely professional army by 1994 and has
placed a ceiling (below the current level of BFR 99 bil¬
lion) for at least five years. Source: Ministry of Defence
Denmark
Reductions in conscript levels, including activity reduc¬
tions in Jutland and Greater Copenhagen. Source:
Defence Agreement, effective as of 1.1.1993.
Germany
Bundeswehr manpower in West Germany to be reduced
from 500000 to 310000, or 38% (and from 103 000 to
60000 in the East) by 1994. Source: FBIS-WEU, May
1991. Former East German navy personnel will be
reduced from 8700 to approximately 2000.
Greece
No significant reductions are expected.
Spain
Reductions in length of service for conscripts and
reserves, although population growth limits manpower
reductions in the short term. Source: Military Service
Reform Law, 1991.
France
Overall reductions expected, including major withdraw¬
als from Germany and 20 to 24 % reduction in army man¬
power 1991-97. Official Programme Law detailing these
reductions has been delayed in publication.
Ireland
No significant reductions are expected.
Italy
Army and MoD manpower to be reduced by 20 to 30%
within next five years; air force and navy manpower to
be reduced by 10 to 20 % . Conscription to be reduced by
47%. Source: Italian Ministry of Defence military at¬
taché.
Luxembourg
No significant reductions are expected in NATO staff
(approximately 100).
61
Netherlands
Overall manpower reduction ofapproximately 15% (all
services) 1991-95. Source: Defence White Paper, 1991.
Portugal
No overall manpower reduction likely, although expen¬
diture on manpower likely to be reduced as costs for
reserves (one-third of military manpower is in this
category) shift from the defence budget to the social
security budget. Source: Ministry of Defence.
United Kingdom
Service personnel and MoD civilian manpower reduc¬
tions of 25 % (including major withdrawals from Ger¬
many) 1991-95. Source: Options for change, 1990.
The popular concept of a military base is the permanent
home from which forces undertake their various duties
and activities. This is reflected in the dictionary definition
ofa base used for military purposes: 'a place from which
an operation or activity is directed' (Oxford, 1990).
For this study the term military base is used to indicate
this broad concept. A base may, however, be anything
from a small spares or maintenance depot to the largest
army, navy or air force communities. Using this broad
definition there are several thousand military bases
across the European Community. Some may encom¬
pass a number of separate facilities in a base 'complex.'
To analyse the economic and social impact of every fa¬
cility would thus clearly present an impossible task, and
one which is outside the scope of the present study.
The extent of the task can be limited by referring back
to the objective of the study, namely assessment of the
impact of military bases (and reductions in such) on
regional economies. To have a significant impact, bases
must be large relative to other economic activity.
The regional economic impact will depend on the ex¬
penditure associated with these bases. Most data which
are available, however, relate to military employment
rather than expenditure. Employment has been used as
the primary indicator of military base size. Where pre¬
cise numbers are not available, the size of a base or facil
ity can be estimated by the number and type ofunits locat¬
ed there e.g. a regiment or battalion at an army base.
Three categories of military employment can be distin¬
guished:
(i) members of the armed services;
(ii) civilian employees of the armed services;
(iii) other military-related personnel
Members of the armed services are characteristically
divided between the three services: army, navy, and air
force. Other classifications, however, have been adopted
where appropriate for this study; for example, profes¬
sional forces versus conscripts and domestic versus for¬
eign forces. In many countries there are paramilitary
forces in addition to the armed services, which may be in¬
cluded under some definitions of military manpower.
Civilian employees of the armed services are employees
who work for the military at military facilities but are
not members of the armed services and are not subject
to military orders to the same extent as members of the
armed services. They thus have no obligation to be post¬
ed to other facilities, transfer to other jobs or take part
in conflicts. Civilian employees are usually recruited
from the local population near a military facility. Unlike
members of the armed services, civilian employees are
part of the local labour market and may move into and
out of military employment more easily, although in
regions that are heavily dependent on military bases, al¬
ternative employment may not be abundant.
Other military-related personnel include those em¬
ployees working for and paid by the military who do not
enter into the two previous categories. They include
paramilitary forces not considered as part of military
manpower, government employees of the Ministry of
Defence, retired military personnel, and reservists.
Local economic impact
The impact of a military base on a local economy will
depend on a number of factors, which can be categor¬
ized as follows:
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(i) the absolute and relative size of the base;
(ii) the purchases by the base from the local economy ;
(iii) the expenditure by the military employees in the lo¬
cal economy;
(iv) the payments to civilian employees;
(v) the local multiplier effects resulting from each type
of initial expenditure.
Specific local economic impacts depend on the size of
the initial expenditure and how much base-generated
spending remains within the locality, rather than leak¬
ing to other regions or overseas. Any reduction in mili¬
tary activity in a locality will have an immediate effect
by reducing the types of expenditure identified above.
The implications of manpower reductions will vary ac¬
cording to the type of personnel involved. Military per¬
sonnel stationed in their home countries will typically
be released from service at the camp at which they are
last serving. When released they may stay in that local¬
ity, return to the place where they lived before entering
the service, or move elsewhere. There is little published
information on the experience ofresettlement, but anec¬
dotal evidence from the United Kingdom suggests cer¬
tain characteristic responses. Short-term and conscript¬
ed military personnel are perhaps more likely to return
to their previous place of residence; those at or near
retirement are likely to stay in the area of their last post¬
ing; and those with younger families may move to the
area from which one of the parents originated, often the
home of the wife. Other factors taken into account are
levels ofexisting unemployment in the area ofdemobili¬
zation and in the area oforigin. Tracing the regional im¬
pact of reductions in military manpower is therefore an
extremely complex task which would necessitate exten¬
sive research into relocation intentions (which is beyond
the scope of the present study).
Military personnel stationed in other European coun¬
tries often return to their home countries prior to being
released from service. Certain locations with appropri¬
ate camps and other facilities may see even more serv¬
icemen entering their local civilian community and
labour force than were previously stationed there.
When civilian employees are released from their jobs,
it is generally the case that those who were recruited
from the local labour market will remain in the area and
re-enter the local labour market. Those near retirement
age and some married women leave employment if jobs
are scarce.
Where civilian employees are part of the families of
overseas servicemen, or in cases where overseas forces
recruit civilian employees from their home countries,
these civilians are generally expected to return to their
(new) family's country of origin, with a few exceptions
who choose and are able to settle in the country in which
they served.
Reducing the size of the armed forces may also have
localized consequences for areas which traditionally
provided recruits for the armed forces and where a sig¬
nificant proportion of the potential labour force joined
the services instead of entering the civilian labour mar¬
ket. The impact of this aspect of military employment
is not thought to be a significant element in regional ac¬
tivity when compared with the effect of base closures,
and has thus not been pursued in this study.
4.2. Methodology and data
for bases review
The methodology for the review ofbases adopts a simi¬
lar approach to that for the review of defence industries
in that it relies on official data, published studies and
original data collection.
It is necessary to stress that data problems are consider¬
able. The locations ofbases and the numbers ofmilitary
personnel at each site are sensitive issues and are consi¬
dered to be confidential by many governments. Some
details are available for US forces in Europe. For other
forces the best data indicate the number in a region,
without identifying the locations ( NUTS Π regions)
within that region. Some countries do not make a list of
their military facilities publicly available, although
most if not all can be readily identified through sources
which are public, such as the telephone directories.
Where the location ofbases can be identified, there are
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often no published data on the number of service and
civilian personnel employed at each.
The scope of published data on regional military em¬
ployment varies among Member States, but no country
publishes detailed data by NUTS II regions. In some in¬
stances, however, data exist from which an analysis at
NUTS II level can be derived. This is true for Ministries
of Defence data in Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland
and the United Kingdom.
Published data on civilian employees is extremely
sparse, although two typical ratios have been established.
These ratios are as follows:
Ratio of foreign forces to foreign
civilians and dependants
Ratio for foreign forces to locally
recruited civilians
1:1
4.15 : 1
Source: Greenwood, D. The economics of US bases andfacilities in
Western Europe, Table 5.3, p. 85.
In addition it has been important to weight both foreign
forces and conscripts against domestic professional
forces to reflect the fact that they spend less than domes¬
tic professional forces in the local economies in which
they are based. Members of foreign forces, especially
US forces in Germany, either save a large proportion of
their salary, send it home or spend it in local US supply
stores rather than spend it in the host region in which
they are based. Conscripts inevitably have lower spend¬
ing power than their professional counterparts because
of their lower salary levels.
From previous studies, the ratios associated with local
purchasing activity are as follows:
US forces in Germany versus domestic
professional forces
US forces elsewhere and other foreign
forces versus domestic professional
forces
0.25 : 1
0.45 : 1
Domestic conscript versus domestic
professional forces 0.40:1
Source: Bebermeyer, H . and Thimann C. The economic impact ofthe
stationing of USforces in the Republic of Germany, p. 102-103.
Source: Kerstens, K. and Meyermans, E. 'The draft versus an all-
volunteer force; Issues of efficiency and equity in the Belgian draft',
unpublished paper, October 1991.
In other words, foreign forces and conscripts have been
downweighted and the numbers used for analysis
reduced according to the above ratios. These ratios have
been applied to the data on regional employment used
to assess dependence on defence-related activity at the
NUTS Π level.
The scope for special studies to be undertaken for this
project was limited by the time-scale of the project. In
Germany and Spain, country defence experts conducted
studies of local authority data. In Portugal, the Ministry
of Defence produced some data for the study, but what
they were able to accomplish was limited by the time
available. In Italy, work has been carried out in order to
update the only available published data which relate to
1981, and in Greece, the country defence expert con¬
ducted a study ofexisting Ministry ofDefence and other
data.
The contribution ofexisting studies has also been limit¬
ed at the NUTS Π level. However, the studies which do
exist are important in providing input into efforts to pre¬
pare NUTS Π data from national classifications, and in
checking the analysis of regional dependence.
Nevertheless, the statistical ranking ofNUTS Π regions
by military employment relies heavily on estimated data
incorporating a number of assumptions and judgments.
Wherever possible, these assumptions have been based
on the qualitative findings of interviews with ministry
officials, military attachés and NATO personnel.
Some countries have progressed further than others in
their consideration ofdefence policy under the changed
international situation following the end ofthe cold war.
In some countries, planning has progressed as far as
force structure, size and location. In others, more basic
issues have yet to be resolved. Additionally, policies
which have been formulated may not have been made
public. The immediate effects of the new policies may
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run counter to the longer-term implications; for exam¬
ple, when the size of national bases increases to accom¬
modate forces returning from overseas in the short term
prior to longer-term reductions in force sizes and even¬
tual base closures.
For all of these reasons, information on the vulner¬
ability of military facilities must be considered tenta¬
tive. The regions which can be most reliably identified
as vulnerable to short-term reductions are mostly in
Germany and the United Kingdom. In both countries
reductions have been announced and involve both
domestic and overseas, particularly US, forces.
The impact of reductions in force levels may not all oc¬
cur in the region where forces are located. The with¬
drawal of forces takes income from the local economy
in the form of lost work for local companies following
base closures, loss ofjobs for locally employed civilians
and reduced spending in local shops. However, unlike
a factory closure, closing a military base may not result
in a large number ofservicemen seeking employment in
the area of the base closure. Many servicemen may
transfer to another base or return to their home country
before being released from service. Others may decide
to leave the area to return to their family home or to
move to an area with better employment prospects, bet¬
ter schooling or other attractive characteristics, rather
than stay where they have been serving.
In Germany, the withdrawal ofUS and other allied forces
will have a significant impact on local economies.
However the relationship between the scale ofthis impact
and the size of the base which is reducing its activity or
closing is not a straightforward one. Larger bases tend to
be more self-sufficient and hence contribute proportion¬
ately less to a local economy than smaller bases. Since
there have been announced closures in every dependent
German NUTS Π region, all of them may be considered
highly vulnerable to reductions in military activity. .
Summary
The data collection process yielded an aggregate num¬
ber ofdomestic forces plus conscripts of2.2 million (or
1.77% of the labour force) in the EC. When foreign
forces, civilians and dependants as well as local
civilians are added to the domestic forces figure, the to¬
tal is 2.3 million directly employed by the military (or
1.87% of the labour force). Germany currently has the
greatest number of domestic military personnel in Eu¬
rope as well as 400 000 Western allied military person¬
nel occupying over 400 bases. France, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Spain all have over 300000 domestic
military personnel. With the exception of Greece and
Luxembourg, all EC force levels are expected to be
reduced significantly over the next five years.
This study estimates the number offerees, civilians and
dependants stationed at military bases. The term mili¬
tary base is used to indicate anything from a small spares
or maintenance depot to the largest army, navy or air
force communities. There are several thousand military
bases across the EC. The regional economic impact of
a particular base (and its closure) will depend upon its
associated expenditure in the local economy.
Three categories ofmilitary employment have been dis¬
tinguished in the study, including members ofthe armed
services, civilian employees of the armed services and
other military-related personnel (such as MoD em¬
ployees). There are considerable problems associated
with the collection ofmilitary employment data includ¬
ing confidentiality and lackofsufficient regional break¬
down. In order to estimate civilians employed by the
foreign military two ratios were established: one esti¬
mates the number of foreign civilians and dependants
relative to foreign forces, and the other estimates the
number of locally recruited civilians relative to foreign
forces (the ratios are 1:1 and 4.15:1 respectively). For¬
eign forces and conscripts have been downweighted in
the calculation ofdefence dependence in order to reflect
their lower local purchasing activity.
Information on the vulnerability of military facilities
must be considered tentative. The regions which can be
most reliably identified as vulnerable to short-term
reductions are mostly in Germany and the United King¬
dom. In both countries reductions have been announced
and involve both domestic and overseas, particularly
US, forces. The impact ofreductions in force levels may
not all occur in the region where forces are located as
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the withdrawal of forces takes income from the local
economy and the impact of manpower reductions will
vary according to the type ofpersonnel involved. When
released from service, troops may remain in the locality
in which they are based, return to the place where they
lived before entering the service, or move elsewhere.
In Germany, the withdrawal of US and other allied
forces will have a significant impact on local econo
mies. However the relationship between the scale of this
impact and the size of the base which is reducing its ac¬
tivity or closing is not a straightforward one. Larger
bases tend to be more self-sufficient and hence contrib¬
ute proportionately less to a local economy than smaller
bases. Since there have been announced closures in ev¬
ery dependent German NUTS Π region, all of them may
be considered highly vulnerable to reductions in mili¬
tary activity.
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5. Regional dependence
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to present the metho¬
dology used to determine defence employment per
region of the Community and to calculate regional
defence dependence. All regions of the Community
were ranked by three measurements, namely defence in¬
dustrial dependence, military dependence and total
defence-related dependence. A cut off of twice the EC
average was used to establish three short-lists of depen¬
dent regions. The maps in Section 5.2 indicate not only
which NUTS Π regions of the Community are dependent
on defence, but by which measure they are dependent
(defence industrial, military or both) as well as areas of
defence activity at the NUTS ΓΠ level. Section 5.3
presents dependence by Member State and by objective
region (Objectives 1, 2, 5b and all objectives). This sec¬
tion concludes with a comparison of the aggregate em¬
ployment data on defence industries and the military cal¬
culated from the data-gathering exercise of the present
study versus published national employment data.
Section 5.4 identifies five general types of dependent
region and gives examples of where they are
predominantly located. Section 5.5 discusses the con¬
cept of vulnerability, and identifies in which dependent
regions defence cuts have already been announced, and
in which regions further cuts are probable.
5.1. Analytical approach
Defence dependence is a term used to indicate that share
of a region's employment, expenditure or output that is
directly related to defence. In considering all three vari¬
ables as a measure of regional defence dependence, we
found that of these three, available published employ¬
ment data were most consistent. Employment data also
avoid potential 'double counting' of prime and subcon¬
tractors' output.
In some instances, data on defence industries were
provided by Ministries of Defence or other published
sources at the NUTS Π level. Greece and Italy were
countries which had regional defence industrial data
available. In other cases, the most recent national data
on direct employment were gathered from country ex¬
perts (who often obtained these data from Ministries of
Defence). The data were then allocated to NUTS Π
regions based upon employment data per company from
the Centre for Defence Economics' database. This data
collection process was used for Germany and the United
Kingdom. Regional defence industrial employment for
France were available as regional shares of industrial
employment; therefore calculation of defence employ¬
ment per region applied these shares to regional indus¬
trial employment.
In the case of the Netherlands, national defence indus¬
trial data were broken down by defence expenditure. In
only one instance, Belgium, was it necessary to break
down national data into NUTS Π data due to the lack of
regional breakdown or company data. National data
were not available for Portugal or Spain; therefore their
defence industrial employment data were estimated
from company data in the CDE database (and regional
authorities in the case of Spain). A complete list of
sources for defence industrial employment as well as
military employment is provided in Section 7.2.
Military employment is composed of several types
which are important to distinguish for expenditure rea¬
sons (professionals earn more than conscripts and thus
spend more in their regional economies). The
categories of military include the following:
Domestic bases
Domestic forces
Conscripts
Local civilians
Foreign bases
Foreign forces
Foreign conscripts
Foreign dependants
Local civilians
We have also included employees of the Ministries of
Defence in each of the Member States where data were
available. All foreigners included in the calculations of
defence dependence are appropriately weighted to
reflect a reduced propensity to consume in their regions
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relative to domestic forces (as they are likely to save a
significant amount of their income in their home coun¬
tries). Likewise, conscripts are appropriately weighted.
These weightings are given in Chapter 4.
A region's defence activity may be vulnerable to cuts in
expenditure (the likelihood of closures or reductions in
activity may be quite high), while the region itself may
not be dependent on such activity. The implications of
this are that such a region's vulnerability may be of less
concern than that of a region which has a higher propor¬
tion of its total employment associated with defence ac¬
tivity and is hence assessed as being more defence de¬
pendent.
The reverse is of course also true. A region may be
defence dependent while not being vulnerable to cuts in
expenditure. The next section of this chapter deals with
defence dependence, not vulnerability. Those regions
which are at this stage considered to be vulnerable to
defence cuts are given in Section 5.5.
Methodology
The basic steps followed to arrive at a regional assess¬
ment of defence dependence were:
(i) Calculation of working population per NUTS II
region
The total working population provided by Eurostat
(called 'Total economically active population') was exa¬
mined but it was found that there was considerable incon¬
sistency in reporting years. (For example, the most recent
available data for Greece are for 1983 but for the United
Kingdom 1988.) An alternative calculation oftotal work¬
ing population was therefore developed as follows:
Total working population =
Total population χ Labour participation rate
the unemployed
The source used for total population is Eurostat, where
the most recent data are for 1988. These data are har¬
monized across all Member States of the Community.
The labour participation rate was obtained from Eu-
rostat's regional profiles, also for 1988, which indicate
that share of the population which is economically ac¬
tive, or with wage-earning capability. The unemploy¬
ment rates are from Eurostat 1988.
(ii) Calculation of defence industrial employment per
NUTS II region
The regional breakdown of defence industrial employ¬
ment data was obtained by the means described above.
(Hi) Calculation of military manpower per NUTS II
region
The military manpower data described above have been
obtained from Ministries of Defence or EC Member
States, combined with estimates of regional break¬
downs from the country experts. Military manpower
has then been added to the total working population
figures to arrive at an aggregate employment figure for
each region.
(iv) Defence share of total employment
The data for defence industrial employment and mili¬
tary manpower have been combined to give a figure for
total defence-related employment. This has then been
divided into the aggregate employment for each region
to arrive at the defence share. Calculations were also
made of the employment share of defence industries
alone and the military alone (see Figure 5.1).
(v) Rankings of defence dependence
Based on the calculations described above, three separate
rankings were established for all NUTS Π regions in the
Community. These are described in the box below:
Bankings of defence dependence
A: Defence industrial employment as a proportion
of the regional working population.
B: Mmtaiyinanpowerasaproportionofaggregate
: -employment (regional working population plus
military manpower).
C: Total defence-related employment as a propor¬
tion of aggregate employment (regional work¬
ing population plus military manpower).
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Figure 5.1. Measures of defence dependence: Three rankings
Total working
population + Military
Aggregate
employment
Defence
industrial
employment
Military
employment Total
defence-related
employment
5.2. Dependency rankings by NUTS II
Criteria for selection of dependent
NUTS II regions
After ranking all regions of the Community by the three
methods, the three distributions were examined to see
if there were any 'natural' breaks. Since the distribu¬
tions are smooth, it was decided that defence dependent
regions would include those which had employment
shares in defence which were twice the EC average in
any of the three categories defence industrial, mili¬
tary or both. The cut off points for the three measures
of dependence were therefore the following:
1.10% for defence industries;
3.72% for the military;
4.82% for total defence-related employment.
With the exception of four regions which fell into the
military Ranking B, we have examined the economic
trends of each of the other regions, made an attempt to
determine the vulnerability of each and assessed the
economic adaptability or ability to change in the face
ofshocks ofeach. The four regions excluded from ex¬
amination were two regions in Greece (Voreio Aigaio,
Notio Aigaio), one in Spain (Ceuta y Melilla) and one
in Portugal (Madeira). Each of these is an island region
with low aggregate population and apparently few or no
foreign forces (whose departure could have a detrimen¬
tal impact on an island region such as the Açores).
Four additional regions were added to Ranking A for
coverage reasons. It was our intention to include the top
ranking region in every Member State in either defence
industries or the military if their rankings were above
the EC average (but below twice the average). The four
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regions are Sterea Ellada, Murcia and Hainaut in Rank¬
ing A and Utrecht in Ranking B. Since there is signifi¬
cant defence activity in Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (relative
to the rest of Portugal), but the extent of its dependence
is not known, we have included a profile of this region
in Ranking A as well.
When these additional regions are taken into account,
we have 49 defence dependent regions (see Tables 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3): Ranking A includes 23 regions, Ranking
Β has 32 and Ranking C has 23. Every region in Ranking
C appears in one or the other (or both) of Rankings A
and B. There are six regions which appear in both Rank¬
ings A and B. Of the 49 dependent regions, 44 are pro¬
filed in the Appendix.
There are instances where a region appears on more
than one ranking. For obvious reasons, a high ranking
region based on either the military or defence industries
will also appear on the total defence-related employ¬
ment ranking. Five regions appear on all three rankings,
indicating that they have defence industrial employment
and military employment shares which are over twice
the EC average. These regions are:
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire (UK)
Cornwall, Devon (UK)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (I)
Hampshire, Isle of Wight (UK)
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (F)
The last two columns in each ranking indicate not only
that a region may appear in another ranking but where
in that ranking the region lies (Cumbria ranks first in
Ranking A (defence industrial dependence) and 11th in
Ranking C (total defence-related dependence).
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Table 5.1. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking A: Defence industrial dependence
Employment shares (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
23
33
34
55
UK
UK
D
F
F
UK
I
F
F
F
F
F
I
D
UK
F
F
UK
UK
GR
E
B
P
(Twice EC average ->)
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine
Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
Limousin
Midi-Pyrénées
He de France
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Oberbayern
Cornwall, Devon
Basse-Normandie
Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Other regions profiled
Sterea Ellada
Murcia
Hainaut
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
Defence
industries
only
1.10
6.40
2.78
2.74
2.51
2.36
2.35
2.16
2.08
1.98
1.88
1.86
1.76
1.65
1.60
1.55
1.47
1.43
1.26
1.18
Military
only
3.72
0.95
1.14
3.14
3.59
2.56
0.27
2.28
3.80
2.55
1.95
1.62
1.13
8.98
1.78
5.32
1.32
1.02
4.25
7.83
Total
defence
related
4.82
7.35
3.89
5.84
6.05
4.89
2.62
4.42
5.83
4.50
3.81
3.46
2.89
10.57
3.36
6.81
2.78
2.44
5.48
8.95
0.99
0.75
0.73
0.44
1.50
3.90
0.61
1.21
2.48
4.64
1.33
1.65
Appearance in
other rankings
Β
31
8
15
22
10
C
11
18
16
23
19
6
12
20
9
28
Note: In addition, regions profiled include the single highest ranking NUTS Π regions in all Member States where dependence exceeds the
EC weighted average. Lisboa has also been included in view of data availability problems.
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Table 5.2. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking Β: Military dependence
1 GR
2 E
3 Ρ
4 GR
5 GR
6 GR
7 GR
8 I
9 D
10 UK
11 UK
12 D
13 D
14 E
15 UK
16 D
17 D
18 F
19 Ρ
20 D
21 UK
22 UK
23 D
24 UK
25 Β
26 UK
27 I
28 E
29 GR
30 F
31 F
42 NL
NUTS Π
(Twice EC average -»
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla*
Acores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Trier
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
North Yorkshire
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Cornwall, Devon
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Corse
Madeira*
Schleswig-Holstein
East Anglia 1
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Giessen
Lincolnshire
Luxembourg
Berkshire, Buckinghanshire, Oxfordshire
Valle d'Aosta
Murcia
Ipeiros
Lorraine
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Other regions profiled
Utrecht
Employment shares (%)
Defence
industries
only
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.05
1.65
0.07
1.18
0.00
0.08
0.08
0.58
1.55
0.09
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.50
0.18
1.26
0.00
0.00
0.56
0.36
0.00
0.75
0.03
0.09
2.08
0.36
Military
only
3.72
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
10.39
10.06
8.98
8.72
7.83
6.25
6.01
5.87
5.63
5.32
5.08
4.80
4.61
4.60
4.54
4.34
4.25
4.10
4.10
4.01
3.98
3.95
3.90
3.90
3.85
3.80
2.97
Total
defence- Appearance in
related outer rankings
4.82 A C
29.88 | 1
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
10.46
2
10.11
10.57
8.78
8.95
6.25
3
4
5
7
8
13 J 6
10
19 9
13
6.09 j 15
5.95
6.20
6.81
5.17
4.80
4.62
4.60
5.02
15
17
14
12
21
22
4.51 !
5.48 18 20
4.10
4.10
4.55
4.33
3.95
4.64 33
3.93
3.93 1
5.83 8 19
3.32
Regions not profiled because of low absolute population (islands).
Note: In addition, regions profiled include the single highest ranking NUTS Π regions in all Member States where dependence exceeds the EC
weighted average.
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Table 5.3. Dependent NUTS II regions
Ranking C: Dependence based on total defence-related employment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
GR
E
Ρ
GR
GR
I
GR
GR
UK
D
UK
UK
UK
E
D
F
D
D
F
UK
D
D
F
NUTS Π
(Twice EC average ->)
Voreio Aigaio*
Ceuta y Melilla
Açores
Notio Aigaio*
Kriti
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Trier
Cumbria
Cornwall, Devon
North Yorkshire
Madrid
Koblenz
Bretagne
Lüneburg
Bremen
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Schleswig-Holstein
Aquitaine
Employment shares (%)
Defence Military
industries only
only
1.10 3.72
0,00
0.00
0.00
0.00
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
0.00 10.61
1.65 8.98
1
0.07
0.05
1.18
0.07
6.40
1.55
0.00
0.58
0.08
2.51
0.08
2.74
2.08
1.26
0.09
10.39
10.06
7.83
8.72
0.95
5.32
6.25
5.63
6.01
3.59
5.87
3.14
3.80
4.25
5.08
0.50 j 4.54
2.36 2.56
Total
defence-
related
4.82
29.88
22.86
11.82
11.27
10.61
10.57
10.46
10.11
8.95
8.78
7.35
6.81
6.25
6.20
6.09
6.05
5.95
5.84
5.83
5.48
5.17
5.02
4.89
Appearance in
other rankings
A
13
19
1
15
4
3
8
18
5
Β
1
2
3
4
5
8
6
7
10
9
15
11
14
12
13
31
22
16
20
Regions not profiled because of low absolute population (islands).
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Mapping of dependent regions
Cartographic representations of profiled dependent
regions are presented in the following nine maps. They
show which NUTS Π regions are dependent, the criteri¬
on upon which that dependence is based and some indi¬
cation of where the different types of defence activity
are concentrated at the NUTS HI level. Each profiled
dependent NUTS Π region in each Member State is out¬
lined in one of three colours:
(i) Green represents defence industrial dependence
(i.e. NUTS Π appears in Ranking A);
(ii) Yellow represents military dependence (i.e.
NUTS Π appears in Ranking B);
(iii) Pink represents dependence upon both defence
industries and the military (i.e. NUTS Π appears
in both Rankings A and B).
Within each dependent NUTS Π, certain NUTS HI re¬
gions are coloured as well. NUTS HI regions coloured
green have a concentration of defence industrial activi¬
ty; those coloured yellow have a concentration of mili¬
tary activity; and those coloured pink have concentra
tions of both defence industrial and military activity.
However, NUTS HI colouring does not necessarily
represent dependence at the NUTS HI level; unlike the
NUTS Π colouring, that for NUTS HI regions reflects
absolute rather than relative measures of activity.
For example, a NUTS Π region may be dependent on the
military only but have concentrations of defence indus¬
trial activity in some NUTS HI regions and concentra¬
tions of both defence industrial and military activity in
other NUTS HI regions. A hypothetical example of such
a NUTS Π region is given below. The lack of colour in
a NUTS HI region indicates that no significant concen¬
tration ofdefence activity is believed to be located in that
region.
[NUTS Π dependent on
NUTS Π with defence
industrial concentration
the military]
NUTS m with military
concentration
NUTS HI with no
known defence concen¬
tration
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Map 5.1. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands NUTS III level
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Map 5.2. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
France NUTS III level
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Map 5.3. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Denmark and West Germany NUTS III level
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Map 5.4. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Greece NUTS III level
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Map 5.5. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Italy NUTS III level
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MaP 5.6. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands NUTS III level
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Map 5.7. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Spain and Portugal NUTS III level
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Map 5.8. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Spain and Portugal NUTS III level
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Map 5.9. Defence activity in dependent NUTS II regions
Ireland and the United Kingdom NUTS III level
Islonds /^V* fø
Y
^ f
* -o
Northern Ireland
*»
West
Mid West
'
South Weet ^
Kartographie:
Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landes¬
kunde und Raumordnung, Bonn 2
North East
Uidlonds
South Eost
Oyfed
, 100
Ciwyd Cheshire
Powys
Hereford &
Worcester
Gwent
Somerset
Dorset
km ,
Ntfth Ya***«
Humtut-
West sid--
Yorkshire
Surrey
Sultofc
Kent
NUTS III
	 NUTS II
COUNTRY
83
	
5.3. Dependence by Member State and
objective region
In addition to examining defence dependence at the
NUTS II level, calculations were made of dependence
at the national level based on the NUTS II data. In these
calculations, dependence is weighted by either working
population or else aggregate employment (depending
on the measure of defence dependence). The results are
displayed in Table 5.5. They show that Greece ranks
highest in total defence-related dependence (3.79%),
followed by France (3.15%), Germany (2.84%) and the
United Kingdom (2.31%). The weighted average per¬
centage of people employed in defence-related activity
for the EC as a whole lies between Germany and the
United Kingdom at 2.41%.
When defence industrial dependence is examined, the
ranking of Member States changes; France is first with
1.21% of the working population in defence industries,
followed by the United Kingdom (0.65%) and Italy
(0.52%). Then come Belgium and Germany.
Looking at military dependence, again the rankings
change with Greece taking the number one spot (3.51 %) ,
followed by Germany (2.51%), France (1.95%) the EC
weighted average (1.87%), Belgium (1.72%) and the
United Kingdom (1.68%). 5
To get an idea of the degree of spatial concentration of
defence employment, the following ratios were calcu¬
lated: defence industrial employment in defence depen¬
dent regions as a share of total Community defence in¬
dustrial employment and military employment in
defence dependent regions as a share of total Com¬
munity military employment.
Table 5.4. Percentage of Community defence
employment within dependent regions
A. Employment in EC
B. Employment in
dependent regions
C. B. -A
Source: EAG and CDE.
Defence
industries
683100
344800
50%
Military
2349100
821500
35%
NUTS II regions dependent on defence industries are
home to half the Community's defence industry em¬
ployment, while those NUTS II regions dependent on
the military are home to 35 % of the Community's mili¬
tary employment. These data imply that the defence in¬
dustries are concentrated in fewer regions than the mili¬
tary.
In addition, the proportion of defence dependent
regions that are covered by Objective 1, 2 or 5b policy
instruments was calculated by identifying which NUTS
III regions in dependent NUTS Π regions contained
defence activity (carried out by EAG/CDE) and com¬
paring this list to NUTS ΠΙ regions eligible for as¬
sistance under the objectives (carried out by DG XVI).
The results show that among the 55 NUTS ΠΙ regions
with defence industrial activity located in NUTS Π
regions dependent on defence industries, 9 % are totally
eligible to one or more of the objectives, 42% are par¬
tially eligible and 49 % are not eligible for any objective.
The proportions of the EC population which these three
categories involve are 1.1, 4.7 and 5.9% respectively
(1989 population statistics).
With regard to the 115 NUTS HI regions with concentra¬
tions ofmilitary activity located in NUTS Π regions de¬
pendent on the military, 34% are totally eligible for as¬
sistance, 15% are partially eligible and 51% are not
eligible for any objective assistance. The first of these
categories covers 1.5 % of the EC population, the se¬
cond 4.1% and the third 5.2%.
And lastly, of the 94 NUTS ΙΠ regions which have con¬
centrations of either defence industrial employment or
military employment or both and which are located in
NUTS II regions whose share of total defence-related
activity exceeds twice the Community average, 31% are
totally eligible for assistance under at least one objec¬
tive, 19% which are partially eligible and 50% which
are not eligible. These categories involve 0.9% of the
EC population, 4.6 and 3.6% respectively.
5 Calculation of military dependence include weighted conscripts
and foreign forces, civilians and dependants.
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Table 5.5. Share of employment in defence
for EUR 12, Member States and objective regions
Share of employment (%)
EUR 12
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom
Objective 1
Objective 2
Objective 5b
All objectives
Source: EAG Regional Defence Employment Matrix.
Defence
industries only
0.55
0.36
0.15 '
0.33
0.28
0.22 ·
1.21
0.00
0.52
0.00
0.30
0.15
0.65
0.29
0.59
0.55
0.49
Military
only
1.86
1.59
1.06
2.51
3.51
1.50
1.95
1.36
1.50
1.05
1.59
1.12
1.68
1.75
1.67
2.21
1.88
Total
defence-related
2.41
1.95
1.21
2.84
3.79
1.72
3.15
1.36
2.01
1.05
1.88
1.26
2.31
2.04
2.27
2.75
2.37
Figure 5.2. Total defence-related share of employment
Greece
France
Germany
Objective 5b
EUR 12
All objectives
United Kingdom
Objective 2
Objective 1
Italy
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Ireland
Portugal
Denmark
Luxembourg
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Table 5.6.
Total
Proportion of defence-dependent regions that are covered by
Objective 1, 2 or 5b policy instruments
Totally eligible
Partly eligible
Not eligible
Defence
NUTS III
5
23
27
industries
%
9.1
41.8
49.1
Military
NUTS III
39
17
1 59
%
33.9
14.8
51.3
Total defence-related
NUTS III %
29 30.9
18 19.1
47 1 50.0
55
Source: EAG, CDE and DG XVI.
100.0 115 100.0 94 100.0
Figure 5.3. Proportion of NUTS III regions with defence activity
in dependent NUTS II regions
Eligible under Objectives 1 , 2 or 5b
Totally eligible
Partly eligible
Not eligible
50% 60%
In defence industrial dependent NUTS II regions. | | In military dependent NUTS II regions.
In NUTS II regions with total defence-related dependence > twice EC average.
Comparison of regional aggregates
to national defence employment data
The table below provides a comparison between ag¬
gregated NUTS II data gathered and analysed by the
Centre for Defence Economics and EAG versus nation¬
al totals appearing in the Sipri Yearbook (the sources of
which are publications, conferences, papers and Minis¬
tries of Defence).
The reason that aggregate defence industrial figures for
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United King
dom are less than their Sipri counterparts is that the
Sipri national totals include both direct and indirect
defence employment, whereas the regional aggregates
take only direct employment into account.
Sipri's estimate of defence industrial employment for
Greece does not include the private sector, hence it is
less than the regional aggregate figure.
The aggregate defence industrial figure for Italy is a
combination of employment in both private defence
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companies and State-owned companies. The Sipri
source does not indicate its definition of defence indus¬
trial employment in Italy.
The reason the aggregate figures for defence industrial
employment in Spain differ from Sipri is mainly due to
the tact that there are no official data available. The
Spanish Sipri data are from a 1988 Spanish publication
referring to previous years and are consequently some
what out of date.
Most of the regional aggregate figures for the military
are less than the Sipri figures. This is probably due to
the fact that the Sipri figures are for 1988 and the
CDE/EAG data are as current as possible (in many
cases they are 1991 estimates). Since 1988, military
manpower has been felling in most countries.
Table 5.7. Comparison of regional aggregates to
national defence employment data
Β
DK
D
GR
E
FR
IRL
I
L
NL
PT
UK
Total
Regional
aggregates
12 500
4 000
86 470
10 407
25 774
263 031
0
109 783
0
17 500
6 500
147 174
683 139
Defence industries
National
totals
33 000
na
191 000
9 000
66 000
400 000
na
Ί 103 000
na
¡ 33 000
na
620 000
1455000
Difference
20 500
104 530
(1 407)
40 226
136 969
(6 783)
15 500
472 826
782361
Military (including conscripts)
Regional
aggregates
61 191
28 800
396 108
210 000
281 585
439 002
13 107
409 600
1331
85 821
61 623
215 620 '
National
totals
110 000
31000
495 000
199 000
304 000
550 000
13 000
390 000
1000
107 000
104 000
342 000
Difference
48 809
2 200
98 892
(11 000)
22 415
110 998
(107)
(19 600)
(331)
21 179
42 377
126 380
2203788 2646000 442212
Note: na = not available.
Sources: Regional aggregates: EAG/CDE Defence Employment Matrix. National totals: Sipri Yearbook 1991.
5.4. Categories of dependent regions
Characterizing and categorizing defence dependent
NUTS II regions in general terms at the NUTS II level
is complicated by the geographic and economic diver¬
sity within many of these regions. The analysis is easier
for certain smaller areas within those NUTS II regions
or dependent NUTS Π regions which are geographical¬
ly small. In general, subregions or smaller NUTS Π
regions may be identified as belonging to one or more
of the following categories:
Categories of defence-dependent regions
1. Lagging rural
2. Prosperous rural
3. Declining urban industrial
4. Specialised isolated sub-region
5. Advanced indigenous industrial
Each of these categories will be described more fully,
with examples drawn from the profiled defence depen¬
dent regions (contained in the Appendix).
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Rural areas are often a small part of a NUTS II region,
and frequently agriculture employs the smallest propor¬
tion of the workforce in NUTS II regions (relative to
manufacturing industry or services). Lagging rural
subregions are often identified by their coverage by EC
Objective 1 or 5b aid and are predominantly located in
the dependent NUTS II regions of France, Greece,
Spain and Germany. The subregions in France include
central and southern Bretagne, southern Centre,
western, central and southern Aquitaine, all of Limou¬
sin, southern Midi-Pyrénées, and northern Provence.
Murcia, in Spain, belongs to this group also.
The rural subregions of dependent German NUTS II
regions generally have a smaller proportion of their
workforce in agriculture and higher per capita incomes
in comparison to France; however Trier is predominant¬
ly an Objective 5b region. Smaller subregions of
western Lüneberg, northern Unterfranken and Schles¬
wig-Holstein have lagging rural areas despite low un¬
employment, high GDP per capita and high adaptive ca¬
pacity. The only dependent British NUTS III region
which fits into this category well is Cornwall.
Only in the Greek mainland regions (Dytiki Makedo
nia, Anatoliki Makedonia, Sterea Ellada and Ipeiros),
Corse and Greek islands does agriculture play a major
role in terms of employment in a region's economic
structure. These small regions of very high defence de¬
pendence are without exception lagging regions with
low adaptive capacity.
Prosperous rural regions are located primarily in the
United Kingdom and Germany. Though much of the
physical landscapeofthese NUTS Π regions may be rural ,
their economies rarely depend significantly on agricul¬
ture for employment. In the United Kingdom, no region
had more than 5.2% of its workforce in agriculture in
1987. With the exception of the German regions men¬
tioned above, the other dependent German regions have a
greater proportion oftheir workforces in agriculture than
the United Kingdom, but still no more than about 5.2% .
Declining industrial regions are not uncommon
amongst the regions identified as dependent on defence
industries. Such regions or subregions typically contain
concentrations of heavy engineering and manufacturing.
But they also contain urban centres often with well-
equipped and functioning infrastructures. Education and
training are readily available so that if redundancies do
occur in a sector, alternatives are available (although they
may not lead to immediate alternative employment).
Declining industrial regions are often covered by EC Ob¬
jective 2 aid. French and British regions dominate this
category, including the following industrial centres:
Genova in Liguria and Tarbes in Midi-Pyrénées, Bre¬
men, Le Havre in Haute Normandie, Plymouth in Corn¬
wall/ Devon and Manchester in Lancashire.
Certain subregions of the Community are both isolated
and specialized in particular industries often in 'me¬
tal-bashing' activities. Typical ofthese subregions is the
presence ofnaval ports and shipbuilding which are often
isolated from other major conurbations. Isolated indus¬
trial subregions generally have weaker infrastructures
than larger prosperous industrial areas; and conse¬
quently have higher unemployment and lower adaptive
capacity. A prime example of such a subregion is Bar¬
row-in-Furness in Cumbria which is also the
predominant area of defence activity in this NUTS Π
(and III) region. Another example might be St Brieuc in
Bretagne. Even Kiel might be classified into this group.
There are many dependent NUTS II regions which con¬
tain areas of advanced indigenous industrial activity.
British, German and French dependent regions
dominate this category. Madrid might also be included.
The industrial cities of advanced industrial regions
generally have a well developed infrastructure and rela¬
tively high GDP per capita. Education and training are
also readily available leading these regions to possess
relatively high adaptive capacity. Examples ofadvanced
industrial subregions in the United Kingdom are Bristol
and Gloucester in Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire;
Oxford and Reading in Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,
Oxfordshire; Norwich, Ipswich and Cambridge in East
Anglia; and Southampton in Hampshire, Isle ofWight.
An obvious example in France is Paris and the Île-
de-France region. Toulouse and much of the surround-
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ing NUTS ΠΙ, Haute-Garonne region is another exam¬
ple. It is probably most appropriate to include Bordeaux
and much of the surrounding NUTS IE, Gironde, in this
type of region. After all not only is there a significant ad¬
vanced electronics and aerospace sector in Bordeaux, but
it is the leading region in one increasingly technological
industry in which France has a world lead, oenology.
Munich in Oberbayern, Germany and Utrecht in the
Netherlands are further examples of regions of this type.
5.5. Regional vulnerability to cuts
When defence companies close plants or lay off wor¬
kers, this can have a significant impact on regional econ¬
omies. The present study includes an interview survey
of defence firms which provided information regarding
their likely responses to cuts in defence spending. The
sample comprised firms with 57 plants in dependent
NUTS Π regions which varied in size and specializa¬
tion. Some firms provided detailed but confidential in¬
formation on their future plans for plant closures.
The survey found that most respondents are trying to
avoid complete closures by searching for new markets.
Other firms have chosen to specialize in the defence
business rather than diversify into completely new civil
markets. There is no clear regional or sectoral pattern
to this distinction or to theplanned reductions in activity
that were disclosed during the interviews. Rather, the
survey confirmed that for private firms, the regional im¬
plications of defence cuts will be determined by com¬
mercial criteria. Plants at sites with attractive and
profitable alternative uses, for example, may be closed
and sold for other uses (e.g. for housing, office or shop¬
ping developments). Land prices and the availability of
regional aid also influence such decisions.
The survey findings have been analysed to establish
some broad indication of where plant closures (and
therefore redundancies) are already known to be
planned. The regions in which such plants are currently
located have been classified as 'highly vulnerable'.
Those regions in which plant closures are likely (but not
certain) have been classified as 'vulnerable'. It should be
stressed that these findings are not definitive and are in
tended only as a broad indication of regional industrial
vulnerability. The picture will also change over time.
Survey data are included in the Appendix.
With regard to the closure of military bases, it is clear
that regions in Germany will be subject to both closures
and reductions in size. This is particularly true for
regions containing high proportions of foreign forces,
many of whom are due to be withdrawn. Withdrawal of
foreign forces will affect both German regions and the
regions into which the forces are deployed or disbanded
in their home countries.
Somedetails ofbase closures in Germany, affectingboth
domestic and allied forces stationed there, have been an¬
nounced. In other countries, however, many decisions
regarding the future distribution ofbases have not been
made. In some cases manpower reductions will take the
form of reductions in activity at a number of locations,
ratherthantheclosureofasinglebase. Inother cases, ac¬
tivity may be transferred from one base to another, with
a net reduction in employment but a gain for the base
receiving the transfer. We have not evaluated this effect.
Information on likely US base closures in Europe have
been collected from the Pentagon and other published
sources. However, again not all these closures will neces¬
sarily have a negative impact on their local economies.
Some vacated American bases will be occupied by
domestic forces transferred from other less well
equipped bases.
Analysis of available data has enabled a preliminary
identification of those dependent regions that are cer¬
tain to experience base closures ('highly vulnerable')
and those that are likely to experience such closures
('vulnerable').
As with the defence industry analysis, this is not a
definitive assessment of regional vulnerability. It does,
however, provide a broad indication ofwhere, on the ba¬
sis of current information, cuts are most likely to occur
within dependent NUTS Π regions. Where possible,
specific details ofindustrial and base locations are given
in the regional profiles contained in the Appendix.
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The following Table 5.8 indicates whether a region is
'highly vulnerable' or 'vulnerable' (or neither) to cuts
in defence activity. As reference the last three columns
of the table list where in the defence dependence rank¬
ings (A, Β and C) each region appears.
Table 5.8. Regions vulnerable to defence cuts
(Listed in order of defence industrial dependence, then military dependence)
' = Highly vulnerable (i.e. cuts in employment have been announced). = Vulnerable (i.e. cuts in employment are likely).
NUTS Π
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
UK
UK
D
F
F
UK
I
F
F
F
F
F
I
D
UK
F
F
UK
UK
GR
E
P
GR
E
P
GR
GR
GR
GR
D
UK
D
D
E
D
D
F
P
D
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Bretagne
Aquitaine
Lancashire
Liguria
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur
Centre
Limousin
Midi-Pyrénées
De de France
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Oberbayern
Cornwall, Devon
Basse-Normandie
Haute-Normandie
Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Sterea Ellada
Murcia
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
Voreio Aigaio
Ceuta y Melilla
Açores
Notio Aigaio
Kriti
Dytiki Makedonia
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki
Trier
North Yorkshire
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Corse
Madeira
Schleswig-Holstein
Vulnerability of defence cuts
Defence Military
industries
**
**
** ! **
* | *
* *
**
**
** I *
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
Appearance m
dependence rankings1
A
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
23
33
55
Β
31
8
15
22
10
28
1
2
3
C
11
18
16
23
19
6
12
20
9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
4
5
7
8
10
13
15
17
14
21
22
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Table 5.8. Regions vulnerable to defence cuts
(Listed in order of defence industrial dependence, then military dependence)
' = Highly vulnerable (i.e. cuts in employment have been announced). * = Vulnerable (i.e. cuts in employment are likely).
Vulnerability of defence cuts
Military
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
UK
D
UK
Β
UK
I
GR
F
NL
NUTS Π
East Anglia
Giessen
Lincolnshire
Luxembourg
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire
Valle d'Aosta ι
Ipeiros
Lorraine
Utrecht
Defence
industries
Appearance in
dependence rankings1
ABC
21
23
24
25
26
27
29
30
42
1 These columns indicate where in the dependence rankings each region appears:
Ranking A: defence industrial dependence,
Ranking B: military dependence,
Ranking C: dependence based on total defence related employment.
Source: CDE Survey.
Summary
Defence dependence is a term used to indicate that share
of a region's employment, expenditure or output that is
directly related to defence. In considering all three vari¬
ables as a measure of regional defence dependence, em¬
ployment data were found to be most consistent among
available published data.
After collecting defence employment data and weight¬
ing certain categories of employment based on their
relative propensities to spend in their local economies,
defence dependence was calculated for each NUTS Π
region and all regions ranked based on three measures:
defence industrial dependence, military dependence
and total defence-related dependence. Regions which
exhibited a level ofdependence which was twice the EC
average (or greater) were short-listed and classified as
the most dependent regions of the Community.
For coverage purposes, the top ranking dependent
region in every Member State in either defence indus¬
tries or the military was included if their rankings were
above the EC average (but below twice the EC average)
and there was no other higher ranking region in that
country in either defence industries or the military; 49
regions were therefore included as defence dependent:
23 for their defence industrial employment, 32 for mili¬
tary employment and 23 for total defence-related em¬
ployment. Every region in the third ranking appears in
one or the other of the previous two (five appear in all
three rankings).
In addition to examining defence dependence at the
NUTS Π level, calculations were made of dependence
at the national level based on the NUTS Π data. Greece
ranks highest in total defence-related dependence
(3.79%), followed by France (3.15%), Germany
(2.84%) and the United Kingdom (2.31%). The weight¬
ed average percentage of people employed in defence-
related activity for the Community as a whole lies be¬
tween Germany and the United Kingdom at 2.41%.
When defence industrial dependence is examined.alone,
the ranking of Member States changes; France is first
with 1.21% ofthe working population in defence indus¬
tries, followedby the United Kingdom (0.65 %) and Italy
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(0.52%). With regard to military dependence, Greece is
most dependent (3.51%), followed by Germany
(2.51%), France (1.95%), the EC weighted average
(1.87%), and the United Kingdom (1.68%).
In addition, the proportion of defence-dependent
regions that are covered by Objective 1, 2 or 5b policy
instruments was calculated by identifying which NUTS
III regions in dependent NUTS Π regions contained
defence activity. This list was then compared with the
NUTS ΠΙ regions eligible for assistance under the Ob¬
jectives. The results show that among the 55 NUTS ΙΠ
regions with defence industrial activity located in a
NUTS II region dependent on defence industries, 9%
are totally eligible for one or more of the Objectives,
42% are partially eligible and 49% are not eligible for
any Objective. The proportions of the EC population
which these three categories involve are 1 . 1 % , 4 .7 % and
5.9%, respectively (1989 population statistics).
One hundred and fifteen NUTS ΠΙ regions have concen¬
trations of military activity located in NUTS II regions
dependent on the military; 34% are totally eligible for
assistance, 15 % are partly eligible and 51 % are not eligi¬
ble for any Objective assistance. The first of these
categories covers 1.5% of the EC population, the se¬
cond 4.1% and the third 5.2%.
Of the 94 NUTS ΠΙ regions which have concentrations
ofeither defence industrial employment or military em¬
ployment or both, and which are located in NUTS Π
regions whose share oftotal defence-related activity ex¬
ceeds twice the Community average, 31% are totally
eligible for assistance under at least one objective, 19%
are partly eligible and 50% are not eligible. These
categories involve 0.9 % ofthe EC population , 4 .6 % and
3.6%, respectively.
In comparing published national defence employment
data to the national estimates of EAG/CDE (calculated
by aggregating the NUTS Π data), there is a large gap
between the two in terms ofdefence industries (ofabout
780000). This is due to problems of definition (pub¬
lished national totals for Belgium, France, the Nether¬
lands and the United Kingdom include indirect as well
as direct employment). Most of the regional aggregate
figures for the military (the EAG/CDE data) are less
than the published national figures due to the fact that
EAG/CDE are three years more recent than the pub¬
lished figures (since 1988, military manpower has been
falling in most countries).
Practically all the defence-dependent regions fall into
one or more of the following categories; lagging rural,
prosperous rural, declining urban industrial, special¬
ized isolated subregion and advanced indigenous indus¬
trial.
A survey was conducted covering firms with 57
defence plants in dependent NUTS Π regions of the
Community to determine which had already or were
likely to lay off workers. The regions in which such
plants are already due to close have been classified as
'highly vulnerable'. Those regions in which plant
closures are probable or likely (but not certain) have
been classified as 'vulnerable'. It should be stressed
that these findings are not definitive and are intended
only as a broad indication of regional industrial vul¬
nerability. The picture will also change over time. The
results indicate that of the 49 dependent regions, 12
are highly vulnerable to cuts in defence industries, 16 in
the military and five to both. Four regions are vulner¬
able to cuts in defence industries and four to cuts in the
military.
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6. Regional impact and
response
Purpose
This chapter discusses the impact that defence expendi¬
ture reductions may have on dependent regions (taking
into account their economic characteristics and whether
they are dependent ondefence industries, the military or
both) and a range of possible responses to those cuts.
The concept of adaptive capacity is defined and the
methodology used for its measurement discussed.
Section 6.2 reviews the multiplier effect which includes
additional indirect employment resulting from direct
defence employment. One range ofmultipliers is estab¬
lished for defence industrial employment and one for
the military. In order to establish an upper bound to the
impact of defence cuts on regional employment a 'worst
case' scenario is calculated taking into account the mul¬
tiplier effects.
Section 6.3 suggests some study implications for
regional policy including the following topics: recom¬
mendation of flexibility in area designation, policy in¬
struments and policy coordination, technology transfer
and land redevelopment.
6.1. Overview of methodology
The impact ofany global cuts in defence expenditure on
regional and subregional economies is the product of
many factors. First we need to know the dependence of
the regional economy on defence-related employment
and the vulnerability of particular types of defence-
related employment to cuts. Measures of the first of
these variables are presented in Chapter 5. The problem
of reliably and systematically identifying the present
and future vulnerability of different sectors and facili¬
ties to actual cuts has already been identified.
Together, however, the dependence of a regional econ¬
omy on defence employment and the incidence of the
cuts which actually take place will determine the direct
change in regional defence-related employment. How
this initial change in employment translates into a
change in incomes, however, will be moderated by the
regional structure of defence employment; is it closure
ofa large conscript-dependent base at one extreme or of
a high value-added research facility at the other?
Initial direct changes in regional employment and in¬
comes will have local multiplier effects as local services
and industries, subcontractors and, ultimately, activi¬
ties dependent on the indirect employment, contract.
The local or regional multiplier is a familiar concept
and many studies have attempted to quantify these ef¬
fects, both in general, and in the context of particular
events. Some ofthese studies are reviewed in Section 6.2
where plausible upper bounds of regional dependency,
including multiplier effects, are discussed.
This, however, is not the end ofthe story. Local, like na¬
tional economies, have self-correcting feedback
mechanisms giving them a natural resilience. Localized
events such as job losses (or job creation) trigger off
changes in behaviour. Workers seek work outside the
area affected; new businesses are set up; existing busi¬
nesses for which labour supply was previously a con¬
straintmay expand; the cost ofpremises falls and labour
is more available, encouraging an inflow of new em¬
ployers; unemployed workers may migrate or take early
retirement, disappearing entirely from the local work¬
force and unemployment; policy may intervene directly
to encourage new employment.
The range of adaptive reactions is considerable and
varied, but their net impact appears to be relatively sys¬
tematic. Thus, in the very short term the regional impact
is confined to the direct losses of employment and in¬
come; these are then amplified by multiplier effects ; but
then in the medium term they will tend to be counteract¬
ed by adaptive reactions; and in the long run these adap¬
tive reactions may themselves be amplified by policy in¬
tervention. Thus in the long run a full analysis of the
regional impact ofdefence cuts should, in principle, in¬
clude an analysis of the likely policy response and the
local efficiency ofpolicy administration the ability of
local, national and supranational agencies to convert
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policy expenditures into effective action to achieve po¬
licy goals. This, however, is beyond the scope of the
present study.
While local multiplier analysis is familiar, the concept
of 'adaptive capacity' (Cheshire and Hay, 1989;
Cheshire, 1990) is less so despite the fact that regional
policy has increasingly focused on improving the supply
side response of local economies; in other words, on im¬
proving their adaptive capacity.
A quite simple example demonstrates the importance of
taking into account local adaptive capacity, as well as es¬
timating the size of initial economic shocks, if an ac¬
curate idea ofthe importance ofa closure to a local econ¬
omy is to be gained. In 1980 two large steel plants were
closed in England. Both were in small free-standing
towns heavily dependent on steel making. The plants
were of comparable importance to their local econo¬
mies. Both closures triggered off very similar policy
responses. One town, Corby, in the East Midlands, was,
however, in a relatively prosperous region with a gener¬
ally more skilled labour force, newer industrial struc¬
ture, lower unemployment and close to advanced
metropolitan regions, and less remote from the central
regions of Europe. The other closure was in Consett in
the North a region of long-term decline and heavy in¬
dustry. Although the North is not at the polar extreme
to the East Midlands on the spectrum of European
regions, it certainly has less favourable economic
characteristics leading to lower adaptive capacity.
Figure 6.1 shows the adjustment path ofunemployment
through time in the local labour markets (travel to work
areas) relative first to the surrounding Level 3 region
(the county) and secondly to the surrounding Level 1
region. It will be seen that while in Corby unemploy¬
ment in the local area, relative to the surrounding Level
3, had returned to its pre-closure level within 18 months,
in Consett it still had not done so after four years. The
adaptive capacity ofregions is important in determining
the medium-term impact of local economic distur¬
bances, and thus the need for a policy response.
It may be noted, however, that in the present instance a
case can be made for not concentrating policy assistance
too exclusively on regions of low adaptive capacity. A
distinction can be made between long-term strategic
regional policy, the aim of which is to improve lagging
areas with low adaptive capacity and shorter term policy
reacting to specific regional problems or shocks (such
as shipbuilding or coal areas). For programmes
designed as a response to particular events such as
defence cuts more may be achieved with fewer
resources if policy assists areas ofhigh adaptive capaci¬
ty rather than solely targeting low adaptive capacity
areas which may be more effectively served by general
strategic regional policy. It may be that improving
regional adaptive capacity is appropriate as a long-term
strategic goal of regional policy; in so far as this is ac¬
cepted, then for long-term strategic purposes resources
designed to improve regional adaptive capacity should
be focused on regions where that is lowest.
The concept of adaptive capacity, how it may be best
measured, and its application to the issue of the ap¬
propriate regional policy response to defence cuts is
considered in more detail in the Appendix. The factors
which were used to assess regional adaptability include
regional economic structure (industry versus agricul¬
ture), dependence on older resource-based industries,
the natural rate of regional population growth, change
in economic potential resulting from European integra¬
tion and falling transport costs, unemployment, percen¬
tage of adolescents in education and training and infras¬
tructure endowment. All except the last two of these fac¬
tors were selected on the basis of a rigorous statistical
analysis of causal factors in regional 'success' between
1977 and 1988 (Cheshire, 1990). The last two represent
additional, potentially relevant indicators. All measures
used harmonized data.
In Section 6.3 some general conclusions are drawn
about the types of regional economies dependent on
defence; the types of defence expenditures that are in¬
volved, and the policy implications of defence cuts.
Apart from the question of adaptive capacity, the inci¬
dence of problems will also reflect the type of defence
dependence and the spatial structure of the regions that
are affected . Are regions dependent on military bases or
on industry? Is that industry new high technology in-
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Figure 6.1 . Ratio of total unemployment to that of surrounding areas
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Table 6.1. Hypothetical impact on employment of defence cuts in
highly vulnerable regions
Dependent and
highly vulnerable
NUTS Π regions
Working
population
(1)
Working ftip. +
domestic
forces
+ weighted
foreigners
(2)
Multipliers
Industries: 2.00
Military: 1.50
Defence industries
Regional Number
defence affected
employed Multiplier = 2.0
(3) (4)
(3) x (2.0)
Highly vulnerable to cuts in defence industries
Military
Total
military
employed
(5)
Cumbria
Essex
Bremen
Lancashire
Liguria
Centre
Oberbayern
204 100
515 300
288 480
519 700
617 451
856 372
1 772 553
204 309
519 669
293 360
520 647
623 911
869 496
1 791 285
13 071
14 307
7 912
12 235
13 332
16 943
28 203
26 142
28 614
15 824
24 470
26 664
33 886
36 606
1949
5 925
9 215
1417
14 254
22 168
31936
Number
affected
Multiplier = 1.5
(6)
(5)x(1.5)
Both
industry &
military
affected
(7)
(4) + (6)
The 'worst
case'
scneario
%of
working
population
affected
(8)
(4 or 6 or 7)/
(1 or 2)
12.81
5.55
5.49
4.71
4.32
3.96
3.19
Highly vulnerable to cuts in the military
Trier
Hampshire I. of. W.
Koblenz
Lüneburg
Madrid
Rheinhessen-Pfalz
Unterfranken
Schleswig-Holstein
Berks. Bucks., Ox.
Lorraine
184 248
664 100
589 167
648 700
1 486 903
816 342
568 969
1 123 221
855 600
863 563
195 391
698 354
611576
673 251
1 517 825
845 677
587 121
1 157 147
878 275
881 858
128
7 831
494
500
8 634
755
0
5 590
3 062
741
17 034
54 674
36 741
39 537
85 453
42 952
28 186
52 546
34 932
33 937
25 551
82 011
55 112
59 306
128 180
64 428
42 279
78 819
52 398
50 906
13.08
11.7
9.01
8.81
8.44
7.62
7.20
6.81
5.97
5.77
Highly vulnerable to cuts in defence industries and military
Avon, Glous., Wilts 860 100 878 324 10 797 21 594 37 293 55 940 77 534 8.83
Sources: Col. (1): calculation based upon Eurostat data (see Section 5.1).
Col. (2), (3)&(5): EAG/CDE defence employment matrix.
Note: Shading indicates that a region is not highly vulnerable to cuts in a particular area (defence industries or military).
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dustry or older, more traditional industry? Is the
defence activity concentrated in isolated, and perhaps
remote, subregions or are regions that are defence-de¬
pendent typically metropolitan regions with stronger
interdependent local labour markets where the effects of
defence cuts will quickly be diffused? These are the key
questions relating to the regional impact ofand response
to defence cuts.
6.2. Review of regional multipliers
The income and employment effects ofdefence industri¬
al activity as well as military bases are, in fact, greater
than their direct employment figures suggest. The com¬
panies which supply both are often highly (and some¬
times totally) dependent upon either defence companies
or military installations. The process whereby indirect
jobs and income associated with supplier companies are
generated or lost as the result of direct defence employ¬
ment is known as the multiplier effect.
Multipliers may vary among regions for two reasons.
The first is region-specific; ifit is highly integrated into
the economies of neighbouring regions, the multiplier
may be smaller, as certain economic activity 'leaks' into
neighbouring areas and reduces the full impact ofeither
increases or decreases in economic activity. The second
reason is industrial or base-specific. The more self-
sufficient a defence company (i.e. certain industries
tend to build entire systems and some tend to have many
subcontractors), the lower the multiplier. Likewise, the
less a military base relies upon a local economy for pro¬
visions, the smaller the impact ofcuts on the local econ¬
omy. (These factors have not been taken into account in
the hypothetical cases presented below.) Multiplier ef¬
fects can be calculated by one of two ways: examining
the additional income generated as the result of direct
employment in defence or by examining the additional
employment generated. Much of the existing empirical
work on multipliers in general tends to focus on income
multipliers, but there have been many recent estimates
made regarding the employment multiplier. Some of
these estimates relate to defence industries and some to
the military, as the multipliers often differ between the
two categories. We have found that, in general, defence
industrial employment multipliers are greater than mili¬
tary base employment multipliers - and may range any
where from 25% to 90% greater. From a review ofrecent
available data on defence multipliers, the following range
of multipliers were calculated for the two categories:
[Defence employment multiplier«]
Range
Defence industries 1.75-2.00
Military- 1.1Ò-L50
Where the multipler =
(Δ = changein)
ADirect + Δ Indirect
Δ Direct employment
The reasons why the two categories ofdefence employ¬
ment differ in terms oftheir multipliers are first, that lo¬
cal service employment partly depends on the incomes
generated in defence (i.e. demand push effects) and se¬
cond, that defence industries often have multiple suppli¬
ers located near them, who often depend heavily on a
single or a few defence company customers (i.e. a sup¬
ply generated effect). The multiplier (which combines
both effects) will be large when one large defence com¬
pany is the major employer in a region, such as BAe in
Kingston, United Kingdom where a multiplier of 1.5
was calculated from the data presented. 6 As a result of
a closure in this area, a recent study estimated that 10 %
of manufacturing employment would be lost between
1991 and 1997. An IFO study on the impact ofdirect em¬
ployment in western Germany revealed that for every
direct job in defence industries there were 1.1 indirect
jobs created (multiplier = 2.1). 7
In the City ofWirral, England (County ofMerseyside),
shipbuilding and related companies account for 12% of
manufacturing employment in the region. An almost
equal number of individuals are employed in supplier
companies which are directly dependent on the ship¬
yards, yielding a multiplier of 1.96. 8 Somewhat smaller
6 'Changing the Future', Aztec Training and Enterprise Council,
January 1992.
7 'Conversion in the FRG', IFO, February 1992.
8 The impact of reduced military spending on local economic activi¬
ty, Association of District Councils and Association of Metropoli¬
tan Authorities.
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multipliers have been calculated as well; for example
Eurometal NV of the Netherlands is responsible for
0.33 indirect jobs for every direct job in the area (mul¬
tiplier = 1.33). And in Medway, Kent, GEC Avionics
generates 0.27 indirect jobs for every direct job (mul¬
tiplier = 1.27). 9
The impact ofa military base in a small rural communi¬
ty can be significant as well, but in general, the data in¬
dicate that the number of indirect jobs generated from
bases is not as large as the number created by defence
companies. For example, many American bases located
in remote rural areas of western Germany are practical¬
ly self-sufficient. Besides the local civilians directly
employed on those bases, there may be little additional
impact. Conversely, on other bases where entire towns
are dependent on a single base for employment both
direct and indirect the multiplier effect may be as high
as 2. 10 More often the multiplier is somewhat smaller
than that; for example, in East Anglia, the multiplier as¬
sociated with the US Airforce Base there is 1.15. » In
the Netherlands, multipliers for different types ofestab¬
lishments were estimated, ranging from 1.1 to 2.1. In
general, naval bases were at the higher end of the range
and rural army and airforce bases were at the lower end.
The average for all bases in the Netherlands was 1.4. Ώ-
Hypothetical impact of defence cuts on
direct and indirect employment
The present study has measured defence dependence of
NUTS II regions by direct employment only; it has not
taken indirect employment into account. In the event of
defence cutbacks, however, indirect employment would
be affected as well as direct. In order to get a rough idea
of the size of such impacts on employment in defence-
dependent and highly vulnerable regions, we calculated
what total (direct and indirect) employment would be
per region. In doing so, we applied the higher end of
each of the multiplier ranges (2 for defence industries
and 1.5 for military) to the relevant category ofemploy¬
ment in the highly vulnerable regions (i.e. in Table 6.1,
multiplying Column (3) by 2 and/or Column (5) by 1.5).
It should be stressed that these are 'worst case' esti¬
mates, providing an estimate of the upper limits of the
regional impact of defence cuts since implicitly all
defence activity is assured to be cut.
The resulting number ofdirect and indirect defence em¬
ployees appears in Column (4) or (6) or (7), depending
upon whether a region is dependent on defence indus¬
tries, the military or both. The total number of defence
employees affected is then divided by either the working
population (for defence industrial dependence) or ag¬
gregate employment (working population plus the mili¬
tary for military dependence or dependence on both in¬
dustry and the military). Column (8) gives the resulting
percentage of a region's working population which
could be affected by defence cuts. This hypothetical
analysis is more complicated than Column (9) suggests,
as, especially in the case ofthe military, job losses in one
region may not appear in that region at all. Troops may
move back to their home countries or towns or unem¬
ployed defence industrial workers may migrate to differ¬
ent areas. No matter where they move to, the figures in
Column (9) suggest that for the most highly dependent
regions in each category 12.8% of the working popula¬
tion in Cumbria could lose their jobs in the near future;
Trier could lose 13.1% and Avon, Gloucestershire, Wilt¬
shire could lose 8.8%.
6.3 Study implications
for regional policy
Flexibility in area designation
To a significant extent regions where defence industries
are concentrated and which are therefore potentially
vulnerable to the economic effects of reduced defence
expenditures are not presently eligible for aid. The rea¬
sons for this are not hard to understand. Important ele¬
ments of defence industries are new industries which
have experienced substantial growth during the cold war
9 The impact ofreduced military spending on local economic activi¬
ty, op cit.
I" Greenwood, The economics of US bases andfacilities in Europe,
p. 89.
1' The impact ofreduced military spending on local economic activi¬
ty, op. cit.
12 Paul Rusmann, Dutch defense economist.
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era and brought prosperity to their regions. Typically
regions in which such activities were concentrated were
not those associated with industrial decline. Some
defence sectors such as naval shipbuilding, small arms
or armoured vehicles used traditional skills and are
concentrated in older 'metal-bashing' or engineering
areas, but even within these regions, the defence indus¬
tries were not always in the 'traditional', or less successful
parts.
The 'new' industries associated with defence elec¬
tronics or the aerospace industries, for example have
been concentrated in new and successful regions or
subregions; mainly in what might be called advanced
metropolitan regions. There are many regions or
subregions which are geared to specialized defence sec¬
tors and which are dependent and now appear highly
vulnerable. It is even possible that some entire 'new' in¬
dustrial sectors, such as microchip manufacture, might
be vulnerable. New defence industries are often concen¬
trated in regions not usually considered to be
problematic and are therefore not covered by Objec¬
tive 2. Even where defence industries are heavily
represented in declining industrial regions designated
for aid under Objective 2, frequently the concentration
is in subregions not designated.
The following table demonstrates thateven though some
NUTS ΠΙ regions which contain defence activity
(defence industrial or military) are totally covered by
policy instruments, there is a high percentage with no
coverage whatsoever. Of NUTS ΠΙ regions with con¬
centrations of defence industrial activity (in dependent
NUTS Π regions), only 15 % are either totally or partly
covered by Objective 2 instruments; 27% of these
NUTS ΠΙ regions are actually partly covered by Objec¬
tive 5b instruments, while 49% are not covered by any
objective instruments.
Table 6.2. Number of NUTS III regions within dependent
NUTS II regions eligible for Objective 1, 2 or 5b assistance
Objective
1
2
5b
2 and 5b
1, 2 and 5b
Eligibility
Eligible
Totally eligible
Partially eligible
Totally eligible
Partially eligible
Partially eligible
Not eligible
Total
Defence
industries
3 (or 5%)
2 (or 4%)
6 (or 11%)
0
15 (or 27%)
2 (or 4%)
27 (or 49%)
55
Military
27 (or 23%)
3 (or 3%)
8 (or 7%)
9 (or 8%)
8 (or 7%)
l(orl%)
59 (òr 51%)
115
Source: EAG, CDE and DG XVI.
There is greater coverage on the military side as 23 % of
NUTS ΙΠ regions with military concentrations (within
dependent NUTS Π regions) are eligible for Objective 1,
11% are totally or partially eligible for Objective 2 and
15% are either totally or partially eligible for Objective
5b. However, this still leaves 59% of NUTS UJ regions
in this category with no objective coverage at all.
In terms ofareas ofeligibility, then, the impact ofdefence
cuts has radical implications. A substantial proportion of
the most dependent areas are outside existing designated
areas. Effective reaction by the Community where it
is necessary must therefore be flexible. Just as Rechar
designated rural mining areas so, should any Community
initiativebe deemed necessary in the face ofdefence cuts,
new areas may have to be designated. Such areas may
typically be current areas of 'new' but defence-dependent
industry or non-problem rural areas with economies
heavily dependent on military personnel. In addition,
new subregions might need to be designated. The need
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for flexibility in area designation is reinforced by the
difficulty ofpredicting the size and incidence ofdefence
cuts. If one programme were cut perhaps, for exam¬
ple, the European Fighter programme the regional
implications would be very different from cuts in
another large programme; helicopters or radar, for
example.
Regional policy instruments are one means of assisting
regions adversely affected by defence cuts. There may
be other instruments in addition to or other than region¬
al policy to assist affected regions, but the size of the
problem will depend to a significant degree on the size
ofregional employment cuts in defence. This will deter¬
mine if the size of the problem is sufficiently large to
merit regional policy or other support (like industrial
policy or technology policy) or whether a solution could
be found within the military domain.
Policy instruments and policy
coordination
Not only is there a need to be flexible in regional desig¬
nation for aid in the face ofdefence cuts but the implica¬
tions are that there should be flexibility ofpolicy instru¬
ments and also policy coordination. Existing frame¬
works within, for example, Community initiatives
and existing instruments are extensive. Current
structural Funds regulations already permit the applica¬
tion of a broad range of policy instruments under the
various objectives (including 5b). Flexibility will be re¬
quired both at the Community level, i.e. items of ter¬
ritorial eligibility for and availability of the Funds'
resources, and at the national level, i.e. in the drafting
and implementation of programmes including actions
that sometimes may lie outside the precincts of national
regional policy.
The new industrial areas may pose a problem ofeligibil¬
ity, but generally the labour force involved tends to have
marketable skills and is located in more buoyant and
adaptable local economies. The situation needs to be
carefully monitored but the most serious problems of
adjustment are likely to occur where defence industry
cutbacks are in presently prosperous pockets of older
declining industrial areas and affect 'metal bashing' or
traditional skills. This will be especially true where the
labour force affected is older. Much of the industrial in¬
frastructure associated with such industrial complexes
is likely to be highly specialized and may pose serious
problems of site decontamination. Much of the labour
force involved is not likely to be readily re-employed
without substantial retraining. There will be a need for
a wide range of policy measures directed to environ¬
mental improvement, site decontamination and clear¬
ance and reskilling as well, perhaps, as assisted mo¬
bility.
Reductions in military personnel, on the fece of it,
might seem likely to pose less intractable problems.
There may be exceptional sites which pose serious
problems but much decontamination that could be
potentially present will be dealt withby military person¬
nel. Bases generally have quite low densities ofdevelop¬
ment and can be converted to industrial uses or to hous¬
ing or even recreational uses quite readily. In many of
the areas concerned, land for development is already at
a premium and the closure ofmilitary bases may be per¬
ceived as an opportunity even a commercial oppor¬
tunity rather than a problem. It may be desirable in
such cases for regional policy to favour maintaining
military bases in rural areas and to encourage the scal-
ing-down or even the closure of military facilities in ur¬
ban or other more congested areas. The extent of the op¬
portunity will depend, in part, on the buoyancy of the
local economy, the level of cuts in local defence indus¬
tries, and whether the loss of income and employment
from the base closure is substantial in relation to current
levels. Any of these circumstances may make conver¬
sion more difficult to secure. It may be necessary to
balance certain economy-seeking intentions of the mili¬
tary (e.g. the military may wish to close certain smaller
rural bases and consolidate closer to a major urban
centre) with regional economic and social objectives.
The novelty in policy terms of reductions in mili¬
tary personnel is likely to be the extent and comparative
isolation ofthe sites involved, the character of the labour
force involved (predominantly young, less educated but
disciplined and male) and the character of the local
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economies concerned. These economies are often much
more rural and more isolated than is the case with major
industrial job losses, and beyond the sphere of influence
of major conurbations where training facilities are con¬
centrated and wherejob opportunities are most diverse.
Although nearly all conscripts and most regular person¬
nel are likely to disperse if bases close, the civilian em¬
ployees are likely to remain, as will those in the locality
who are indirectly dependent on the base for their liveli¬
hood. Thus, successful conversion will frequently de¬
pend on in situ delivery of training and redevelopment
of the sites involved. This may require instruments and
skills which are not presently a common feature of
regional policy. It will also require a level of resourcing
and a range of policy instruments not envisaged for
regional assistance under Objective 5b.
As well as flexibility in regional designation, therefore,
there is a need to be flexible with policy instruments.
The range of relevant policy instruments and agencies
is likely to be considerable. The policy instruments list¬
edbelow can all be used within the framework ofcurrent
EC regional policy; they only need to be included in the
regional development plans and programmes proposed
by the Community Member States.
Regional policy instruments,
sectors and agencies
(i) Traditional regional policy instruments/agencies;
(ii) Training and employment;
(iii) Social policy;
(iv) Technology policy;
(v) Industrial policy;
(vi) Environmental policy;
(vii) Land redevelopment.
Inreality, landredevelopmentor recycling policy canonly
be implemented when a particular site is in the public do¬
main (under a public agency). This could pose problems
especially in urban areas where much contamination has
occurred as the result of defence establishments.
This, in turn, implies a need for local coordination,
given the relative isolation of many defence establish
ments. Some ofthe types ofpolicy identified above will
be more generally relevant than others. For example,
environmental policy may be relevant where large tracts
ofland are released or in some industrial closures where
there are serious pollution and waste disposal problems,
but environmental policy is likely to have less in general
to contribute than regional, social, industrial or tech¬
nology policy.
The particular contribution ofdifferent policy areas will
depend crucially on which facilities are in fact closed.
In the case of a whole high technology sector which
could be vulnerable technology policy would be central.
It would also be important in many other areas of the
'new' defence industries which mightbe vulnerable. Ef¬
fective response to base closures, especially in more
isolated contexts where there was significant direct and
indirect civilian employment, would depend more on
training, social and regional policies with land
redevelopment skills also being important. There is thus
a need both for flexibility in the application of policy
sectors and instruments and a need for (local) coordi¬
nation of those policies.
New policy challenges:
technology transfer and industrial
conversion
In some parts of the Community the development of
defence industries has been partly motivated by a desire
to achieve technology transfer and economic develop¬
ment. At the risk of oversimplification, the view has
been taken that given national and European defence
spending there were benefits to regional and national
economies of developing a high technology defence
capability. This most commonly took the form ofa tech¬
nology transplant a local facility of an international,
high technology defence firm or subcontracting. It
has been suggested, for example, that a significant part
ofthe electronics industry in Spain was originally devel¬
oped on the back of defence industries. In Portugal it is
suggested subcontracting in the aerospace industry is
seen as potentially playing a similar role; i.e. giving ac¬
cess to new imported technologies and skills which have
spin-off benefits to civilian industry.
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In as far as this form oftechnology transfer has been im¬
portant in the economic development of once lagging
regional or national economies two questions arise. The
first is, what will be the reaction ofgovernments in these
countries to an increasingly tight defence market? The
second is, if defence spending ceases to play this role of
technology transfer^ownand^shouldirbeTeplaced?
The first of these questions is relevant since it could in¬
fluence the extent to which any defence cuts create more
serious and deep-rooted problems in the advanced in¬
dustrial regions. If the reaction of governments in the
less developed countries of the Community is to rein¬
force the position of their high technology defence in¬
dustries, this would make the overall defence market
even more competitive and make the problems ofthe ad¬
vanced industrial regions more intractable.
The second question potentrally poses an even greater
challenge to Community and national (regional) de¬
velopment policies. Are there other ways, even more ef¬
fective ways, of achieving technology transfer? In prin¬
ciple one might expect an indirect route such as the
use of defence spending to be less effective than a
direct one such as the establishment of new industries,
transplants, etc. The problem is that defence spending,
at least until the full implementation of the Single Euro¬
pean Act, has been an 'acceptable' method of achieving
technology transfer. It has been acceptable both in terms
of international norms ofbehaviour, in terms of interna¬
tional trade agreements and within the framework of
Community rules. It may be for these reasons rather
than because it is intrinsically efficient as an instrument
of technology transfer that it has been adopted. The
challenge for Community policy is to define conditions
and rules which would facilitate technology transfer by
other means. Again many different policy areas might
need to be involved. Apart from those already identified
there might be implications for the rules governing com¬
petition.
There are virtually no examples in the Community of
true industrial conversion from defence to civil applica¬
tions, although many companies are pursuing strategies
of diversification. Issues of conversion are discussed
more fully in the Appendix but may pose as additional
policy challenges in the future. The interaction ofpolicy
initiatives with corporate strategies will be key to this.
Land redevelopment
Tvfuchtlefence-related activityisland extensive, The ex-
treme case is exercise areas (which have often become,
because of their protection from the environmental
ravages of intensive farming, important wildlife
habitats) but bases are also generally land extensive.
Even defence-related industry tends to be more land in¬
tensive than civilian equivalents because of the degree
of shelter that has been enjoyed from market pressures
and rising land prices.
As was noted above, in many regions this may be as
much ofan opportunity as a problem but an opportunity
which it will only be possible to exploit if the necessary
skills are applied and policy is adapted to take account
of the particular problems involved. These problems in¬
clude some traditional concerns ofregional policy, such
as infrastructure provision and access to capital (the EIB
could have a significant role) but they also include other
skills not so familiar to Community policy. At the local
level there is increasing familiarity with land redevelop¬
ment skills in the policy-making community. Urban
policy and local economic development initiatives have
increasingly emphasized public-private partnership ap¬
proaches. But quite specific skills are needed. In ad¬
dition, again as noted above, in redeveloping defence
land, there are likely to be widespread problems of con¬
tamination.
Land contamination is a more serious problem than is
commonly realized. For example, the costs of clearing
the mineral oil residue from the soil of a longstanding
vehicle depot might be so high as to entirely eliminate
development profit. Defence industries have frequently
occupied the same site for extended periods and used
toxic chemicals or minerals. The costs of making such
sites safe for redevelopment may be high. This is to say
nothing of the extreme cases of establishments where
there might be changes from ammunition or nuclear
contamination. In these situations, the industrial con-
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cern which originally caused the pollution might be
responsible for its removal, but the precise responsibili¬
ty will rest with whomever the parties to a sale of indus¬
trial sites decide will bear that responsibility (this may
be complicated if the party responsible is either
bankrupt or long gone from the site). For military sites
the application of the widely accepted 'polluter pays'
principle would suggest that the costs of closure should
include the costs ofdecontamination. A policy principle
that might be invoked is that national defence budgets
should bear such costs. It is not easy to see how such a
policy could be applied to industrial sites, however, so
there could be a case for any Community initiative to in¬
clude a budget line for site decontamination.
Summary
In assessing the regional impact of and response to
defence cuts it is essential to take into account the adap¬
tive capacity of the regions affected. The factors rele¬
vant to a measurement of adaptive capacity include
regional economic structure, dependence on older
resource-based industries, the natural rate of regional
population growth, changes in economic potential
resulting from European integration and falling trans¬
port costs, unemployment, percentage ofadolescents in
education and training, and infrastructure endowment.
The process whereby indirectjobs and income associat¬
ed with supplier companies are generated or lost as the
result of direct defence employment is known as the
multiplier effect. Multipliers vary between regions as a
result of both region-specific factors and industrial or
base-specific factors. However, a review of recent avail
able data indicates multipliers in the range of 1 .75 to 2.00
for defence industries and l.lOto 1.50 for military bases.
A hypothetical 'worst case' scenario was estimated for
each dependent region classified as highly vulnerable to
defence cuts. This estimated the possible impact ofsuch
cuts on direct and indirect defence employment.
Any policy response to these changes requires flexibili¬
ty on two fronts; area designation (since many depen¬
dent regions and areas of concentrated defence activity
are not currently eligible for aid under structural Funds
objectives) and policy instruments (since new issues
will be confronted that are peculiar to defence cut¬
backs). Local policy coordination will also be impor¬
tant, given the relative geographical isolation of many
defence establishments.
The issue ofthe use ofdefence industries to import new
technology and skills (i.e. technology transfer) has to be
addressed. The policy challenge here is to define the
conditions and rules which would facilitate technology
transfer by other means, and to consider the competitive
implications of such a development.
Finally, the issue of land redevelopment implies the
deployment of specific skills in any new policy initia¬
tive. Much defence-related activity is land extensive. It
may also involve problems of land contamination (for
example from diesel fuel, toxic chemicals or minerals,
as well as from discarded ammunition or nuclear-relat¬
ed activities). Consideration should be given to the
costs likely to be incurred in decontaminating vacated
sites, and the appropriate funding of such costs.
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The following table lists the primary sources for direct
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in the military. Where it was necessary to break nation¬
al or NUTS I data down to the NUTS Π level, the ba¬
sis upon which a breakdown was made is described as
well.
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